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Preface
Over the last decades, developed economies have been undergoing a structural transformation 
towards knowledge economies. Trends include:
•	 A	growing	and	now	dominant	share	of	the	economy	represented	by	"services",
•	 Extended	 and	 sustained	 growth	 of	 knowledge	 assets	 with	 supporting	 changes	 in	 R&D	 activities,	
education, lifelong learning, etc,
•	 A	shift	in	the	economic	activity	of	developed	economies	to	concentrate	on	the	higher	levels	of	the	
value chain. Manufacturing diminishes as a percentage of total output, often moving rapidly to lower-
cost locations (mainly Asia).
Throughout the brief 50 year history of the semiconductor industry, its innovation and growth have 
been fuelled by rapid technical evolution. This has led to changes in the structure of the industry that have 
many similarities with those in the wider economy. In particular, the ownership and trading of intellectual 
property and the respective innovative business models have not only been hot topics of discussion at 
conferences and workshops but have also led to the creation of new industry segments. Over the past two 
decades,	structural	changes	in	the	semiconductor	"value	chain"	have	led	to	the	emergence	of	businesses	
dedicated to the development of computing cores which have rapidly proliferated into a very diverse 
range of consumer products.
Indeed, I was employed as a designer in the IC industry 30 years ago and was responsible for 
the development of one of the first commercially available CMOS cell libraries. Although this was a 
rudimentary predecessor of the IP cores and function blocks available today, many of the technical and 
commercial questions remain, albeit with many magnitude changes in complexity. Trade-offs between 
development time and costs, and between custom-dedicated and programmable must be weighed up. 
Factors such as optimisation of chip size, yield, cost, maximizing function, minimizing power consumption 
vs. redundancy, flexibility and programmability must also be carefully considered at the conception of a 
new product design and debates are even more complex and intense today than they were one or two 
decades ago.
IP-centric, fab-less companies are essential actors in the value chain. Hardware commoditisation has 
converted architectural IP and software into the main differentiation factors, and IP-centred companies 
into essential actors in the semiconductor industry value chain. The progressive relocation (to Asia) of the 
foundry companies, and consequently that of IP-centred activities close to their test sites (“the fab is the 
lab”) and also close to their markets (corporate manufacturing sector users: automotive, telco equipment, 
etc.), questions the very viability of European IP-centred companies and, in more general terms, the move 
to the higher levels of the value chain. The projected end of semiconductor scaling is posing additional 
vital challenges to the whole sector.
This	report	reflects	the	findings	of	the	study,	carried	out	by	JRC-IPTS	at	the	request	of	DG	Information	
Society and Media, on the IP-centred industry. The report offers insights into the intellectual property 
business, and discusses the changing role of “drivers”, including the emergence of Asian actors and the 
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potential impact that may result as we approach limits in terms of technology scaling. It concludes by 
discussing the competitiveness of the European IP-centred industry and the policy-related issues that 
may impact future competence development, access to design tools, relevance of roadmap activities, 
intellectual property legislation, and emerging innovation models.
David	Broster
Head of the Information Society Unit
JRC IPTS
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e1. Executive Summary
During	 2008	 and	 2009,	 the	 Information	
Society Unit of the Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies1 ran a research project 
on semiconductor intellectual property (IP) 
blocks, also known as IP cores. This project was 
launched	at	the	request	of	the	Directorate	General	
Information Society and Media of the European 
Commission, and the research was conducted by 
Oy Meaning Processing Ltd. The study collects 
and analyses data on IP blocks, with a special 
focus on the future competitiveness of the related 
European industry.
Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) 
blocks, also known as IP cores, are reusable 
design components that are used to build 
advanced integrated circuits (ICs). It is typically 
impossible to create new IC designs without 
pre-designed IP blocks as a starting point. These 
design components are called “intellectual 
property” blocks because they are traded as rights 
to use and copy the design. Firms that focus on 
this business model are often called “chipless” 
semiconductor firms.
IP cores are perhaps the most knowledge-
intensive link in the information economy value 
chain. They define the capabilities of billions of 
electronic devices produced every year. As all 
products are becoming increasingly intelligent 
and embedded with information processing and 
communication capabilities, future developments 
in semiconductor IP will have a profound impact 
on the future developments in the overall 
knowledge economy and society.
1 The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies is 
one of the seven research Institutes of the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre.
At present, the IC industry is approaching 
the most fundamental technological disruption 
in its history. The rapid incremental innovation 
that has led to exponential growth in the 
number of transistors on a chip and expanded 
the applications of ICT to all areas of human life 
is about to end. This discontinuity –the end of 
semiconductor scaling– opens up new business 
opportunities and shifts the focus of ICT research 
to new areas.
The main objective of this study is to describe 
the current state and potential future developments 
in semiconductor IP, and to relate the outcomes 
of the study to policy-related discussions relevant 
to the EU and its Member States.
Key results of the study include the 
following:
There are over 150 European firms that license 
semiconductor IP. Globally, among the top 20 
independent IP vendors, nine have headquarters 
in the EU or have substantial development 
activities in European countries. At present, many 
IP vendors have difficulties with profitability and 
growth. The approaching technology disruption 
will, however, create new business models and 
potentially lead to rapid expansion of innovative 
activities in semiconductor-based industries.
Asian countries are implementing 
focused policies that aim to create and support 
semiconductor ecosystems that span from design 
to final system production. China –the largest 
semiconductor consumer worldwide– is still 
catching up technology leaders both in design and 
chip fabrication. The slowing down of advances 
in IC fabrication technology will, however, make 
this lag increasingly unimportant. There are now 
about 500 semiconductor design enterprises 
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in China, although only a handful are actively 
marketing their IP outside China. China may be 
relatively well positioned for the new business 
logic and IP architectures that emerge at the end 
of semiconductor scaling in the next years.
Product reconfigurability is also becoming 
increasingly important in semiconductor 
hardware. Reconfigurability means that processing 
architecture can be changed according to the 
needs of the computational problem at hand. 
This will change the traditional division of labour 
between software and hardware, and make high-
performance computation possible with relatively 
low-performance processing technologies.
When reconfigurable application-specific 
hardware architectures are combined with low 
cost implementation technologies, radically new 
domains of innovation become possible in the ICT 
industry. New downstream innovation models will 
become important. The realisation of emerging 
opportunities will, however, critically depend on 
wide access to design tools and competences. To 
a significant extent, the future of semiconductor 
IP depends on competence development that 
occurs in open innovation ecosystems and 
outside formal educational settings.
Several entry barriers limit growth in this 
area. Research policies that encourage the 
development of open design ecosystems, low-
cost design-to-implementation paths, new 
forms of competence development, and new 
computational models could have high impact 
on the future of IP architectures in Europe. As 
the IP industry and its knowledge processes are 
based on global networks, regional policies have 
to be formulated in a global context, for example, 
as policies that facilitate the formation of strategic 
ecosystem hot-spots. In Chapter 9, the report 
suggests several concrete initiatives that could 
support policymaking and accelerate growth in 
this domain.
11
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e2. Introduction
2.1. Study Theme and Motivation
This study describes the current state and 
future development scenarios for pre-designed 
semiconductor intellectual property cores (IP 
cores). IP cores, also known as IP blocks and 
“virtual components,” are designs that can be 
used to build integrated semiconductor devices 
and “systems-on-chip.” They are widely marketed 
by European, American and Asian firms, and 
they are critically important building blocks in 
current and future digital products. Firms can 
re-use internally developed IP cores in their 
own products or they can gain revenues through 
licensing, royalties, and customisation of these 
pre-designed components. There are over 150 
European firms that sell licences to their IP cores. 
At present, the globally leading vendor is the ARM 
Holdings plc, based in the UK, whose IP cores 
were used in about every fourth programmable 
electronic device manufactured in 2007.
As technology allows now billions of 
transistors on one semiconductor die, it is 
impossible to build new chips from scratch. 
Instead, designers start with large libraries of 
semiconductor IP and construct new chips by 
combining, modifying, and complementing 
earlier designs. Often dozens or more IP blocks 
are combined in one chip to create Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), Application 
Specific Standard Products (ASSPs), and complete 
Systems-on-Chip (SoCs). These, in turn, provide 
the foundation for products such as mobile 
phones, television desktop boxes, digital cameras, 
MP3 players, automobile engine and industrial 
process controllers, toys, smart cards, hearing 
aids, heart monitors, and basically everything that 
uses or processes information and data.
As the design of IP cores often requires 
expertise both in microelectronics design and 
demanding application domains, specialised 
firms that develop IP cores represent a highly 
knowledge-intensive segment of the ICT industry. 
IP cores are used in almost all new semiconductor 
chip designs, and they are critically important for 
the successful introduction of new electronics 
products. The future of this industry segment is 
therefore of major importance to the European 
information economy.
In the history of the semiconductor industry, 
manufacturing, assembly and testing activities 
have relatively rapidly moved to countries 
with low manufacturing costs. Today, with the 
exception of Intel, IBM, Samsung and few other 
Integrated	 Device	 Manufacturers	 (IDMs),	 the	
actual manufacture of semiconductor chips is 
dominated by firms located in Taiwan, China, and 
Singapore.2 Also Intel and IBM are increasingly 
producing leading-edge semiconductors in 
Asia. Intel started the construction of its first 
semiconductor manufacturing plant in China 
at the end of 2007, investing $2.5 billion in the 
project.	In	December	2007,	IBM,	in	turn,	licensed	
its advanced 45 nanometre technology to SMIC, 
now globally the third-largest independent 
semiconductor manufacturer, based in China. 
The present study, therefore, also discusses the 
current and potential geographic relocation of 
design activities of semiconductor IP cores, and 
its possible policy implications.
The semiconductor industry is today in 
a historically unique situation. For almost 
five decades the industry has been driven by 
2 In 2007, the Taiwanese TSMC and UMC, the Chinese 
SMIC, and the Singaporean Chartered Semiconductor 
were the leading independent semiconductor foundries, 
with a market share of 71 per cent.
12
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continuous miniaturisation. The size of transistors 
on semiconductor die is now measured in 
nanometres. The smallest features on leading-
edge chips are now down to three atomic layers. 
As the cost of manufacturing has remained 
almost constant per square millimetre, transistors 
are now tens of millions times less expensive than 
they were just three decades ago.
This improvement is a key factor in the 
emergence of the information economy and 
knowledge society. The predictability and 
constancy of improvements in the semiconductor 
industry has defined business logic in the industry 
and also widely beyond it. Many industries 
now explicitly or implicitly rely on continuous 
technical progress in the semiconductor 
industry. In the near future, this fundamental 
driving force will evaporate. Miniaturisation is 
becoming increasingly expensive, its technical 
and economic benefits are declining, and new 
alternative sources of value are emerging in the 
knowledge economy.
This technical discontinuity will have huge 
implications. It will show up in macroeconomic 
indicators of productivity and growth, and it will 
make us ask why, exactly, smaller transistors were 
considered to be better. At the same time, new 
business models will emerge, and new sources 
of value will be defined and appropriated. 
Value added in design is becoming increasingly 
important as incremental technical improvement 
slows down. The present study claims that to 
understand the emerging opportunities, we 
need to understand the “chipless” model, which 
focuses on creating re-usable intellectual property 
blocks and processing architectures.
Semiconductor IP represents a very 
knowledge-intensive part of the ICT industry, 
and one of its highest value-adding activities. 
Basically, it packages and resells pure knowledge. 
Changes in the semiconductor IP sector, therefore, 
are	potentially	important	for	the	USD	1.5	trillion	
electronics industry, as well as for the rest of the 
knowledge economy.
2.1.1. European Intellectual Property 
Architectures in the Global Context
Europe is today a relatively strong player in 
the semiconductor IP field. Although European 
and global semiconductor firms now manufacture 
many of their products in Asia, Europe has several 
leading IP firms and over 150 small IP vendor 
firms. The semiconductor wafer manufacture is 
now dominated by dedicated Taiwanese, Chinese 
and	 Singaporean	 firms,	 and	 also	 large	 IDMs	
now increasingly outsource wafer production 
to Asia. The leading edge general-purpose 
microprocessor production, in turn, is led by 
traditional integrated device manufacturers such 
as	Intel,	AMD,	and	IBM.	Although	semiconductor	
design is increasingly done in countries such 
as India, Europe still has strong capabilities in 
IP creation, and good possibilities to stay at the 
leading-edge in the semiconductor IP industry. 
European researchers have also developed new 
innovative processing architectures, and several 
semiconductor IP start-ups have been launched 
in the EU as a result of university research.
In geographical terms, the UK is the 
leading EU country in semiconductor IP, though 
successful IP firms exist in most EU countries. 
We describe the European IP vendors in more 
detail in subsequent chapters of this report. We 
also highlight some of the factors that have led 
to geographic concentration of semiconductor 
design activities on the global and European 
levels.
Although this study estimates that the revenues 
generated by the chipless semiconductor firms are 
less than one percent of the total semiconductor 
industry, it is important to understand the reality 
behind the numbers.
First, the semiconductor IP industry creates 
inputs for the semiconductor industry. It is 
13
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therefore not possible to estimate the economic 
impact of semiconductor IP simply by comparing 
these two industries using their revenues. In fact, 
the size of the IP market should be compared 
with the semiconductor design services market. 
The semiconductor IP industry is essentially 
about semiconductor designs that are sold as pre-
packaged products. Often the package comes with 
consulting and customisation. At one extreme, 
the design work is done to the specifications of a 
customer. In that case, market analysts categorize 
the activity as design service. When the design 
is sold as a licence to use and copy a design 
component, the activity is categorised as IP.
Gartner Inc. estimates that the global 
semiconductor design services revenue in 2008 
was	about	USD	1.7	billion.	This	is	almost	exactly	
the size of the chipless semiconductor market. 
In other words, about half of the semiconductor 
design market consists of design services and 
about half pre-designed IP blocks. As IC design 
houses also extensively reuse their internally 
developed IP blocks, the exact proportions of 
revenues are, however, quite impossible to 
estimate accurately.
Second, the majority of commercially used 
semiconductor IP is not visible. For example, 
Semico estimates that about four or five times 
more reusable IP blocks are developed internally 
than are sold on the market. The volume of 
reusable IP design activities, therefore, may well 
be five times bigger than market studies estimate. 
As the processes for managing and packaging IP 
blocks mature inside semiconductor firms and 
as it becomes increasingly necessary to create 
reusable IP as the complexity of designs increase, 
this internally developed IP can relatively easily 
be used to create additional revenues. Potentially, 
the visible IP market could rapidly increase as 
such internal IP would enter the market.
In general, IP creation is among the highest 
value adding activities in the ICT production, 
and its economic impact is often grossly 
underestimated. The semiconductor IP segment, 
therefore, represents interesting policy and 
business opportunities, as the ICT industry enters 
a period of technical disruption in the next years.
2.2. Scope of the Study
In the present study we define intellectual 
property cores as pre-designed components that 
can be combined with other design elements to 
form a functional system. Traditionally, IP cores 
have been implemented on semiconductor 
die, either in Application Specific Integrated 
Circuits (ASICs), or on Field-Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGAs).3 Emerging technologies, such 
as printed organic electronics, however, can 
potentially also be used to implement IP cores in 
the future. Although the focus of the study is on 
semiconductor IP cores, it also takes into account 
developments occurring beyond the present 
semiconductor industry.
New technologies, including carbon 
nanotubes, graphene transistors, self-organising 
molecular devices, and quantum computing 
can potentially bypass the physical limits of 
known semiconductor technologies. Eventually, 
such radical new technologies could substitute 
current technologies and enable progress in 
ICTs. The present study does not discuss these 
future technologies in any detail, for a very 
simple but important reason: it starts from the 
observation that even if radical new technologies 
were available today in industrial volumes, 
their deployment would require knowledge, 
manufacturing technologies, and design methods 
and tools that are radically different from those 
currently used in the semiconductor industry. 
The underlying claim is a rather strong one. Even 
if, for example, new carbon-based transistors 
and full-scale manufacturing methods for them 
existed today, the industry would still face a 
3 The appendix describes ASIC and FPGA design 
processes in more detail.
14
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major technical disruption that would rewrite 
the rules under which it has operated for the 
last several decades. This disruption will occur 
irrespective of whether the new technologies 
are there today, or in thirty years time. Although 
the full story is obviously more complicated, the 
present study empirically focuses on the current 
industrial reality and simultaneously argues that 
the continuous progress that characterised the 
development of ICTs is about to end. The analysis 
of future developments in the semiconductor IP 
industry is therefore based on charting the current 
business landscape and generic patterns of 
technology development, instead of focusing on 
possible scientific breakthroughs and innovative 
new technologies. A further justification for this 
approach is that there are no known alternatives 
for the currently used technologies that could 
be manufactured in industrial volumes in the 
foreseeable future.
The specific empirical focus of the present 
study is on IP cores that can be programmed and 
combined into larger processing architectures. 
The study defines such IP cores as IP computing 
cores. These are, typically, programmable 
microprocessors, micro-controllers, digital 
signal processors, analog-digital mixed-signal 
processing blocks, and configurable computing 
architectures. As computing cores typically 
require additional IP components to create a 
fully functional chip or a system-on-chip, these 
complementary components are also taken into 
account when relevant.
For the purposes of the present study, it is 
not necessary to categorise different types of 
semiconductor IP in any great systematical detail, 
although it is useful to understand that different 
economic constraints and innovation dynamics 
underlie different IP product segments. In 
practice, market analysts often distinguish many 
different types of IP to segment the market and to 
cluster vendors. Such segmentation is not trivial, 
and methodological differences sometimes lead 
to widely varying estimates of IP markets. In 
practice, IP is packaged in many ways, vendors 
continuously develop their business models, and 
entries, exits and mergers change the business 
landscape so fast that data is barely comparable 
across the years.
Market studies sometimes differentiate 
between two types of semiconductor intellectual 
property: design IP and technology licensing. 
Technology licensing is used to transfer rights 
to	 use	 patented	 inventions.	 Design	 IP,	 in	 turn,	
consists of documented designs that the licensor 
can use as components in the licensor’s own 
designs. According to preliminary data from 
Gartner Inc., the global semiconductor design IP 
market	was	USD	1.486	billion	in	2008,	whereas	
semiconductor IP technology licensing was worth 
USD	586	million.4 The various semiconductor IP 
categories used by Gartner are shown in Table 1.
In the present study, we use a wide variety of 
market studies, industry reports, business news, 
and primary data collected on IP firms and their 
activities. We have also conducted several case 
studies that focused on the histories and growth 
patterns of selected IP firms. Going beyond a 
simple description of the current state of the IP 
segment, we also interpret the current situation 
and future developments in the broader contexts 
of globalisation and technology and innovation 
studies.
In the next chapter, we discuss major socio-
economic trends, as economies, products, and 
organisations enter the new knowledge-based 
era. We focus on the challenges of traditional 
intellectual property, new innovation models, 
and policy. Semiconductor “intellectual property” 
is often a misleading term, as it tends to put the 
semiconductor design segment into a context 
4 The data is a preliminary estimate for 2008. One should 
also note that the numbers do not add up. The total 
volume	of	 the	various	 IP	segments	 in	 the	 table	 is	USD	
1,540 million. Assuming that technology licensing 
is counted as a separate IP category, the total market 
would be 2,127 million.
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where the concept of intellectual property and 
intellectual property rights would be central. This 
is rarely the case in practice, as can be seen during 
the following chapters. Yet, the semiconductor 
IP segment is characterised by the fact that it 
trades intangible assets, and the structures of 
intellectual rights regimes are important for 
its future. We highlight some key issues, and 
provide some references for further discussions. 
Similarly, we briefly revisit some key themes of 
recent innovation research, as they inform and 
underlie various sections of the report, including 
its policy proposals. The chapter also discusses the 
possibility that the wide use of ICTs has actually 
changed the fundamental conditions for making 
policy. We frame this discussion in the context of 
long waves of economic growth and the impact of 
key technologies, showing how developments in 
the semiconductor technology potentially destroy 
the historical patterns of growth and crisis, also 
known as the Kondratieff waves. The aim of the 
chapter is to give some perspective to the rest of the 
study and to help the reader think about changes 
that occur outside the semiconductor industry that 
could shape its future in important ways.
Chapter 4 switches from this conceptual 
discussion to a more data-oriented approach. It 
describes the current reality of the semiconductor 
industry, describing its business models and 
value creation activities both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms. We then focus on the 
semiconductor IP industry itself, providing 
data on the IP market and supply, including 
geographic patterns of production. To get a better 
understanding of what typical IP firms actually 
do, we provide a detailed description of Swedish 
IP firms and a brief outline of the historical 
development of the largest IP vendor, ARM Ltd.
Chapter 5 describes in details the IP market, 
its suppliers and consumers. It gives comparative 
data for different geographical regions and offers a 
more in-depth view of the Swedish IP vendors as 
well as of ARM Holdings, the worldwide leading 
company whose headquarters are based in UK.
Chapter	6	moves	to	the	main	historical	drivers	
in the semiconductor industry, first focusing on 
the continuous miniaturisation and its impacts, 
and then discussing economic trends and 
patterns of internationalisation. In discussing the 
historical development of internationalisation, we 
highlight the factors that underlie the prominence 
of Silicon Valley and East Asia as global hubs in 
semiconductor production.
Table 1: Semiconductor IP in 2008, as categorised by Gartner Inc.Table 1: Semiconductor IP in 2008, as categorised by Gartner Inc.  
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Based on innovation and technology 
studies, we then try in the following Chapter 7 
to uncover major drivers that could shape the 
future of semiconductor IP and information 
processing architectures. The chapter is obviously 
speculative in nature, as we talk about generic 
trends that cannot be verified at this point in time. 
Specifically, we discuss the future of Makimoto 
Waves that have been claimed to drive the 
industry through cycles of standardisation and 
customisation. We also propose a new model 
that links reconfigurable IP architectures to user-
centric innovation models.
One question of intrinsic interest to 
regional policymakers is the potential of China 
as a semiconductor IP creator. In the history of 
semiconductors, production tasks and segments 
of value chains have rapidly moved to East Asia 
and, more recently, to China. We describe in 
Chapter 8 the status of the IC design segment in 
China, highlight some recent policy issues, and 
evaluate five possible trajectories that could make 
China a prominent IP actor.
Finally, in its last chapter, the report suggests 
several policy implications. We present a generic 
model of entry and exit in the IP segment, and use 
it to highlight key areas where policy could make 
a difference. These include new approaches for 
competence development, expanded access to 
design tools in open development ecosystems, 
and new low-cost realisation paths for designs 
and experimentation. We further highlight the 
need for new computational models, including 
reconfigurable hardware processing architectures, 
and suggest that latent opportunities could 
be made visible and explicit by a new type 
of roadmap activity organised around small 
IP vendors and developers. We also point out 
some potentially important areas for policy-
related research. These include new approaches 
for regional policies that facilitate the growth of 
local hot-spots in global innovation ecosystems, 
and research on the enablers of the open source 
development model in the hardware domain. The 
latter we consider important, as the open source 
model has shown its potential to lead to very 
fast growth in the software domain, as well as its 
capability to reorganise existing industries and 
business logic.
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In the next years, the semiconductor industry 
is about to experience a major discontinuity, with 
vast economic and social ramifications: The end of 
scaling of the physical dimensions of components on 
integrated circuits. When Jack Kilby created the first 
integrated circuit in 1958, it contained two transistors 
and a couple of other components.5 Today it is easily 
possible to package tens of millions of transistors on 
a chip of same size. For fifty years, engineers have 
found ways to print smaller and smaller features on 
silicon wafers. As chapter 2 describes in more detail, 
in the second half of 1990s, when the developments 
in optical lithography were exceptionally fast, the 
physical dimensions of the smallest component 
features declined 30 percent every two years. This 
implied halving of the component area requirements 
in about the same time.
In high-volume semiconductor components, 
such as microprocessors and memory chips, 
this technical advance has been translated 
into rapidly declining component costs. In the 
second half of the 1990s, the cost of a transistor 
on	 a	 microprocessor	 chip	 declined	 60	 percent,	
annually. This was exceptionally fast, but typically 
the declines of quality adjusted prices have been 
over 40 percent on annual basis.
We can imagine an economic crisis, where 
the stock market value drops 50 percent in a 
year, resembling what we saw in 2008. Then we 
have to imagine that this crisis continues without 
abatement, 35 years. That gives a rough scale of 
the change that has occurred in the semiconductor 
processor industry.
5 Kilby’s patent application, filed in February 1959, shows 
two transistors, eight resistors, and two capacitors. 
Robert Noyce, from Fairchild Semiconductor, filed a 
patent in July the same year, with one transistor, two 
diodes, three resistors, and two capacitors. The Noyce 
patent became the foundation of the planar process of 
making integrated circuits.
The end of semiconductor scaling will 
therefore be a major technical disruption. It will 
also occur at a time when it is possible to package 
more transistors on a chip than most applications 
need, and also more than designers are able to 
effectively use. As Bass and Christensen noted 
some years ago:
“This is precisely the juncture at which the 
microprocessor market has now arrived. Price and 
performance, fuelled by the industry’s collective 
preoccupation with Moore’s Law, are still the 
metrics valued in essentially all tiers of the market 
today. Even so, there are signs that a seismic shift 
is occurring. The initial, performance-dominated 
phase is giving way to a new era in which other 
factors, such as customization, matter more.”6
Although commentators of the industry tend to 
highlight bleeding-edge advances in the industry, 
the real action is often elsewhere. Strictly speaking, 
the most advanced semiconductor technologies 
are used for niche products. Although the cost of 
transistors has radically declined during the last six 
decades, a low-cost transistor on a bleeding edge 
semiconductor chip now costs over 50 million 
USD	to	create.	Basic	economics	means	that	these	
chips can only be used for products that can be 
sold in tens of millions of copies. It may be odd 
to call these products niche products, as hundreds 
of	millions	 of	 consumers	 use	 PCs,	DVDs,	 digital	
set-top boxes, MP3 players, digital cameras, and 
mobile phones.7 In practice, however, bleeding 
edge technologies are used only in a small number 
6	 Bass	&	Christensen	(2002,	35).
7 According to estimates from Gartner, Inc., in 2007 the 
top ten original equipment manufacturers accounted for 
USD	91	billion	of	semiconductor	consumption,	or	about	
a third of the total. The biggest semiconductor users were 
Hewlett-Packard and Nokia. Today, about two-thirds of 
semiconductors are used for PCs and mobile phones.
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products are built using technologies that were 
new ten or twenty years ago. The most technically 
amazing advances in semiconductor technology, 
therefore, tend to be irrelevant for many potential 
users of information technology. More importantly, 
great potential for future innovations in ICTs can 
be found from this “long tail” of semiconductor 
technology,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	6.
Christensen, quoted above, is known for his 
research on disruptive technological change in the 
computer industry. According to Christensen, the 
leading firms tend to fail and new entrants usually 
become industry leaders when the underlying 
technology does not improve incrementally.8 
A recurring pattern in many technology-
based industries, including mainframe, PC, 
and automobile production, has been that the 
source of competitive advantages moves from 
performance to reliability, then to convenience 
and finally to customization. When performance 
starts to exceed user requirements, the market 
becomes segmented into tiers, where only few 
customers are focusing on high performance 
at any cost. Most customers are willing to trade 
off cost and performance. Further, the product 
characteristics that customers were willing to 
pay for shift from leading-edge performance to 
reliability, convenience and customization. Bass 
and Christensen conclude that:
“The fact that microprocessor designers are 
now ‘wasting’ transistors is one indication that 
the industry is about to re-enact what happened 
in other technology-based industries, namely, 
the rise of customization. ...Modular designs by 
definition force performance compromises and a 
backing away from the bleeding edge.”9
On a more macroeconomic scale, the 
discontinuity created by the end of scaling will 
8	 Cf.,	 Bower	 &	 Christensen	 (1995),	 Rosenbloom	 &	
Christensen (1994), and Christensen (1997).
9 Bass and Christensen (2002).
match the neo-Schumpeterian interpretations of 
long waves in economic growth and productivity. 
The end of scaling, therefore, could be interpreted 
as the end of the most recent Kondratieff wave.10 
Below we argue, however, that advances in the 
semiconductor industry have been profound 
enough to break the historical patterns that created 
the Kondratieff waves, making semiconductor IP 
an especially interesting opportunity for future 
growth.
3.1. The New Paradigm of Knowledge 
Economy
The present study focuses on intellectual 
property -based business models in the 
semiconductor industry. IP-based businesses 
rely on copyrights and patents, as they need 
to publish specifications of their knowledge-
based products. The actual licensing agreements 
are made between known parties, and can 
therefore be completed as normal business 
contracts. Intellectual property rights, however, 
are important for protecting created knowledge 
and products against unauthorized copying and 
use. Technical and legal protections for IP are 
therefore actively developed and promoted by 
semiconductor industry firms and associations. 
Until recently, many semiconductor firms have, 
for example, been reluctant to locate design 
activities in China due to the perceived lack of 
IPR enforcement and protection.
The protection of outputs of the IP industry 
is an important issue for IP vendors. More 
fundamentally, however, the IP-based industry is 
a knowledge-based industry, where the critical 
inputs are intellectual assets. It is fundamentally 
an industry driven by innovation. To understand 
the IP-based business models and their economic 
impact, we, therefore, have to adopt a broad view 
10 Kondratieff waves in economic development have 
usually been described as large-scale fluctuations in 
global economic growth patterns that last about 40 to 
60	years.	For	references	and	discussion,	see	section	3.3.	
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on intellectual assets generated in the industry. 
Some of these are traditional intellectual property 
assets; the role of traditional IPR, however, is also 
becoming less visible as design firms focus on 
continuous rapid innovation and the development 
of innovation ecosystems.
Today, intellectual assets are still rarely 
included in national and business accounts.11 
Typically, investments in knowledge are interpreted 
as final or intermediate consumption. Preliminary 
estimates in countries such as Finland, Japan, the 
U.K., the Netherlands, and the US put the annual 
investments in intellectual assets at around ten 
percent	 of	 GDP.12 In the US, the investments in 
intangible assets exceeded the investments in 
tangible assets in the 1990s, and in the late 1990s, 
11 Intellectual assets are often defined to include 
investments in research and development, patents, 
software, human skills, and structural and relational 
capital in organizations.
12	 Cf.	OECD	(2008a).
the US non-farm output was underestimated by 
about	 1	 trillion	 USD	 and	 the	 business	 capital	
stock	by	3.6	trillion	USD	due	to	the	invisibility	of	
investments in intellectual assets.13
The estimated size of the knowledge-
based economy is now rapidly growing, both 
because knowledge is becoming visible in the 
national and organizational accounting systems 
but also because business success is becoming 
increasingly dependent on knowledge and 
innovation. One indication of this is the increasing 
patenting activity around the world. According to 
the 2007 Edition of the WIPO Patent Report there 
13	 Corrado,	 Hulten,	 Sichel	 (2005;	 2006).	 Corrado	 et 
al. estimate that “bricks and mortar” investments 
accounted for less than 8 percent of total output growth 
per hour in the period 1995-2003 in the US. Corrado 
et al. Categorize intellectual asset investments into three 
major groups: computerized information, innovative 
property	(R&D	and	design),	and	economic	competences	
that include brand equity, firm-specific human capital 
and organizational capital. All these forms of assets 
clearly depend on ICTs.
Figure 1: Resident and non-resident patent applications in different countries, 2005
Source: WIPO, 2007
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es were	approximately	5.6	million	patents	 in	 force	
worldwide at the end of 2005, and more than 
1,6	million	 applications	were	 filed	 in	 the	 same	
year. As can be seen from the Figure 1, the fastest 
growth in patent applications was in China.
Whereas patents represent one output of the 
knowledge economy, research and development 
is	one	of	 its	key	 inputs.	 In	 the	OECD	countries,	
R&D	expenditure	climbed	 to	USD	817.8	billion	
in	2006,	up	from	USD	468.2	billion	in	1996.	In	
real	 terms,	 R&D	 spending	 grew	 at	 between	 3.2	
and	3.4	percent	a	year	from	1996	to	2006.	In	the	
present	decade,	China	has	rapidly	grown	its	R&D	
expenditures.	 In	 2006,	 China’s	 gross	 domestic	
expenditure	on	R&D	(GERD)	reached	USD	86.8	
billion,	 or	 about	 one	 third	 of	 EU	 GERD	 at	 the	
same year.14
The concept of intellectual property is not 
a trivial one, and some sophistication is needed 
when policies are developed in IP-related domains. 
Knowledge is not a “thing” that can be possessed 
and owned as material assets. Knowledge gains 
and loses value in social and material contexts, 
and it also reflexively changes those contexts. In 
general, new knowledge potentially changes the 
underlying systems of value.15 Classical economic 
concepts, therefore, can not in any straightforward 
way be used to analyze knowledge economy. 
Knowledge is also an inherently social and 
relational phenomenon. Knowledge is embedded 
in culturally meaningful technologies and social 
practices. The concept of intellectual property, 
therefore, is in many ways theoretically broken, 
and it easily misses many characteristics that are 
important when we try to understand knowledge-
based economy.16 Yet the concept originates from 
concrete social and economic problems that need 
to be addressed also today.
14	 Data	from	(OECD	2008b).
15 Tuomi (1999).
16 For an overview, see, e.g., Jaffe and Lerner (2004).
The Statute of Anne, which laid down the 
modern principles of intellectual property rights 
in 1710, aimed at balancing two conflicting 
interests: the wide diffusion of new knowledge 
for the benefit of the society, and the economic 
interest of the creator of the new knowledge. 
The Statute solved this problem by granting the 
creator the monopoly rights for copying books for 
fourteen years, after which the knowledge was 
put in the “public domain,” where it was freely 
available for anyone.17 The Statute noted that 
frequent copying without the consent of authors 
or proprietors had lead to their “great detriment, 
and too often to the ruin of them and their 
families.” On the other hand, the monopoly was 
limited, as monopolies were considered to be 
harmful, for example, because they were usually 
associated with artificially high prices.18
The Statute of Anne focused on copyrights. 
Following its logic, the broader concept of 
“intellectual rights” was introduced in the 
U.S. Constitution in 1787.19 Intellectual rights 
became known as intellectual property rights 
as publishers started to argue that authors have 
“natural rights” to the ownership of their works. 
Publishers argued that intellectual rights should 
be perpetual, as they were a form of property.20 
This view was particularly influential in France, 
where, for example, the Paris Book Guild hired 
the	 encyclopaedist	 Denis	 Diderot	 to	 write	 a	
treatise that would promote the Guild’s interest in 
literary rights.21
17 The copyright monopoly could be extended for another 
fourteen years if the author was still alive when the 
original copyright period expired.
18 The Statute therefore also included a clause that enabled 
anyone to make a complaint if the price of the book 
seemed to be artificially high (Tuomi 2004a).
19 Specifically, the Constitution stated: “the Congress shall 
have the power…to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries.” 
20 Ewing (2003).
21	 Diderot	argued	that	intellectual	property	was	the	highest	
form of property. He asked: “What form of wealth could 
belong to a man, if not a work of the mind...if not his 
own thoughts...the most precious part of himself, that will 
never perish, that will immortalize him?” (Ewing 2003).
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The justifications and the impact of 
intellectual property laws, therefore, have been 
debated for long time.22 In recent years, the 
debate has again been very active. Many experts 
now claim that the intellectual property system is 
seriously flawed. For example, many innovations 
are system innovations that cumulatively build 
on earlier innovations and knowledge. When 
monopoly rights are granted for such incremental 
system improvements, they tend to constrain 
future innovation, instead of promoting it. 
This happens particularly in domains where 
technology develops fast and product life-cycles 
are short. Semiconductor IP blocks are often 
used in such system settings, and IPR regimes 
can therefore have strong influence on patterns 
of technology development in this domain. The 
intellectual property system is also widely used 
against its original intent. For example, the US 
patent system allows applicants to postpone 
the issue of a patent and keep it secret until 
someone else builds a business on the same idea. 
Such “submarine” patents have frequently been 
used to create extraordinary returns also in the 
semiconductor industry.23 The innovative quality 
of granted patents is frequently questioned, 
in particular in domains such as software 
development, where innovation is typically based 
on relatively straightforward engineering work 
and where prior art has not been systematically 
archived. In such environments, patents often act 
mainly as barriers for competition. This is a major 
problem for small firms and innovators who are 
not able to use their existing patent portfolios for 
cross-licensing.24
22 See, e.g., Machlup and Penrose (1950).
23	 Graham	(2006).
24	 Cf.	Shapiro	(2001),	Hall	&	Ziedonis	(2001),	Samuelson	
(2004).	 For	 example,	 Hall	 and	 Ziedonis	 (2001:110)	
quoted an estimate that a new semiconductor 
manufacturer should have spent $100 to $200 million 
of revenues to license what were considered basic 
manufacturing principles but which did not transfer any 
currently useful technologies. This, in practice, makes 
entry impossible for firms who do not have extensive 
patent portfolios with which they can bargain.
Although it is difficult to revise existing 
intellectual property regulation, business firms are 
now actively experimenting with models that could 
overcome some of the problems in the current IPR 
regimes. For example, many firms are now trying 
to use open innovation models.25 The underlying 
logic is based on the idea that modern ICT makes 
it possible to create large innovation ecosystems 
where value is created by continuous and rapid 
innovation. As the global innovation system is 
now producing innovations at high rates, the 
value of intellectual property monopolies tends to 
decrease, and in many industries the competitive 
edge can only be created by innovating faster 
than the competitors. For many technologies, 
such as software, the time of securing patent 
monopoly often exceeds the product lifetime, thus 
making the benefits from patents questionable. 
Furthermore, as the enforcement of patent rights 
tends to be very expensive and difficult, many 
firms now experiment with business models 
where intellectual property is not monopolized. 
For example, Sun Microsystems now licenses the 
designs of its SPARC microprocessors using an 
open source license. In the software domain, this 
open source approach, of course, has been widely 
used, and, for example, both Google and Nokia 
license their mobile phone operating systems as 
open source software.
25 The concept of open innovation has been promoted 
especially by Chesbrough and refined with his 
colleagues (Chesbrough 2003; Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke,	 and	West	2006).	The	key	 starting	point	
for	Chesbrough	was	corporate	R&D,	 IPR	management,	
and the observation that an increasing amount of 
knowledge exists and is generated outside the focal 
firm. In this sense, Chesbrough’s open innovation 
concept aligns with the earlier knowledge management 
literature that emphasized the importance of intellectual 
capital (including customer and network capital) as a 
key productive asset in knowledge-based firms (e.g., 
Wiig	(1993),	Sveiby	(1997),	Edvinsson	&	Malone	(1997),	
Roos et al.	(1997),	Brooking	(1996)).	The	realization	that	
key knowledge sources exist outside the focal firms 
also underlies knowledge management and innovation 
literature that focuses on organizational learning 
(e.g.	 Brown	 &	 Duguid	 (1991;	 2001)),	 organizational	
knowledge	 creation	 (e.g.	 Nonaka	 &	Takeuchi	 (1995)),	
and organizational networks (e.g., Powell et al. 
(1996),	Hastings	(1993)).	An	alternative	model	of	open	
innovation is based on user-centric innovation models. 
We discuss these in the next section.
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Ecosystems
The importance of distributed networks 
has been one of the leading themes in recent 
innovation research. The traditional view 
on innovative activity emphasized “heroic 
innovators,” who developed their ingenious 
insights into new products and services. This 
model was adapted to organizational product 
development, which was managed as a 
fundamentally linear sequence of phases that led 
from ideas to finished products and their eventual 
diffusion in the marketplace. More recently, 
it has been realized that the process is highly 
iterative and that users are also important sources 
of product development knowledge.26 Current 
research on innovation and product creation 
has therefore moved toward “open” innovation 
models that extend the innovation process beyond 
firm boundaries and “downstream” innovation 
models, where users actually become the focus 
of innovation.27
In the theoretically strongest interpretation 
of downstream models, innovations materialize 
when social practices change and when latent 
technical opportunities are taken into use in 
the society.28 Such downstream models have 
their roots in empirical research on technology 
adoption and also theoretical and empirical 
studies on social learning and knowledge creation. 
26 Von Hippel (1988) focused on the role of users as 
sources of new knowledge and product innovations. 
27 This includes von Hippel’s recent work, where he has 
emphasized the importance of distributed innovation 
models (e.g., Von Hippel 2005; Lakhani and von 
Hippel 2003; Von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). Along 
similar lines, a more theoretically grounded model was 
presented by the current author (Tuomi 2002a), who 
studied the evolution of Internet-related innovations, 
including basic networking technologies and the Linux 
operating system. This downstream innovation model 
was based on the observation that the focus of innovation 
can increasingly be found from user communities who 
actively reinterpret and reinvent the meaning of emerging 
technological opportunities. Similar emphasis on users as 
innovators can be found in studies on social construction 
and domestication of technologies (for a review of these, 
see	Oudshoorn	&	Pinch	(2003)).
28 Tuomi (2002a).
We briefly introduce some key ideas underlying 
this view, as these new models of innovation 
have potentially important consequences for both 
business and policy development.
In strong downstream models, “upstream” 
innovation is taken for granted. This approach 
may at first look counter-intuitive and radical. 
It is, however, supported by many detailed 
studies of technology development. Upstream 
innovation, in fact, rarely represents a bottleneck 
in the innovation process: Instead, reinvention 
and parallel discovery typically dominate in the 
upstream, and innovative ideas are often over-
abundant. This is not always immediately obvious, 
as historical retrospection tends to sketch linear 
paths of progress, often adjusting historical facts 
to make a story that fits our expectations of how 
innovation should happen.29 At the same time, 
historical accounts obscure the fact that firms and 
scientists	 rarely	 create	 new	 ideas.	 Downstream	
innovation models are based on the observation 
that, in practice, the key bottleneck is in the social 
adoption of latent innovative opportunities.
In the strong downstream models, the users 
are perceived, not as individualistic consumers, 
but as members of social communities that 
maintain specific pools of knowledge and 
related practices that make new technological 
opportunities meaningful.30 In contrast to 
traditional models of innovation, the focus of 
innovation, therefore, is perceived to be on the 
29 For example, official histories of the emergence of packet-
switching computer networks and the Internet reorganize 
events in time and selectively forget facts that do not fit 
the linear story line (Tuomi 2002a, chap. 9).
30 We contrast here “user-innovator” and “pure” 
downstream models. In the user-innovator models (e.g. 
von Hippel), the users contribute new ideas to a quite 
traditional upstream innovation process. In the pure 
downstream models, innovation, in contrast, becomes a 
process of socio-technical change that occurs in social 
practices. Although “upstream” actors (e.g. business 
firms) can feed new technical opportunities into the 
process, innovation can also occur, for example, 
by reinterpreting and “misusing” existing products. 
Developments	 in	 computer	 and	 communication	
technologies, in fact, have often been driven by 
unanticipated uses.
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innovative and creative activities that occur in the 
context of use.31 One important locus of innovation 
can be found in communities of practice, where 
social learning and shared interpretations of the 
world provide the basis for knowledge creation.32 
Upstream and downstream innovators, therefore, 
are not simply individuals with bright ideas. 
Instead, innovation occurs in a social structure 
that consists of a network of specialized 
communities.33 An important consequence of 
this view is that knowledge is not universal, and 
the world of knowledge is not “flat.” ICT reduces 
barriers created by geographical distance; social 
boundaries, however, remain highly important 
for knowledge diffusion and production.34
Research on innovation communities has 
emphasized the fact that innovators rely on 
social networks and socially mobilized material 
and cognitive resources. Also cognition, itself, 
is often distributed among people and technical 
artefacts. This has important consequences for 
innovation management in business firms. For 
example, the downstream view highlights the 
point that informal social networks that cross 
organizational boundaries provide the foundation 
31 The underlying theoretical foundations have been 
discussed in the contexts of knowledge management, 
innovation theory, and information systems theory by 
Tuomi	(1999;	2002a;	2006).
32 The “community of practice” model was developed 
in Lave and Wenger (1991), and applied in innovation 
and organizational learning context first by Brown and 
Duguid	(1991).	Nonaka	and	his	colleagues	have	proposed	
an alternative model of the loci of innovation, based on 
the concept of “ba” that was originally developed by the 
Japanese philosopher Nishida (Nonaka, Toyama, and 
Hirata 2008). Ba, according to Nonaka et al., provides 
the shared dynamic context where new meaning and 
knowledge is created. In contrast to communities of 
practice, which are based on relatively stable social 
structures and technology-enabled practices, the concept 
of ba emphasizes more transient interactions among 
social participants. The underlying epistemic concepts are 
rather sophisticated, and have been discussed in detail in 
Tuomi	(2002a;	2006).
33	 Brown	and	Duguid	(2000;	2001),	Tuomi	(2002a).
34 These social boundaries are essentially boundaries 
of local meaning systems. Social practices and local 
meaning systems are connected, for example, by 
boundary objects that are shared across communities of 
practice (Star and Griesemer 1989), and which include 
concrete artefacts, design schematics, and, for example, 
databases (Bowker and Star 1999, chap. 9).
for the creation of new knowledge. Innovation 
management, therefore, can not be a purely 
internal affair in business firms; instead, it has to 
be based on strategic management of knowledge 
creation and knowledge flows that occur in the 
broader innovation environment.35
When different types of knowledge and 
expertise are combined and synthesized for 
new ideas and products, the continuously 
evolving innovation system can also be viewed 
as an ecosystem.36 Such a view on mutual co-
evolution of actors can result from a relatively 
straightforward metaphorical use of ecological 
concepts. At a more substantial level, it leads 
to fundamentally social views on technological 
development. Innovation is not something that 
happens inside firms. Instead, it is a process 
where many actors, ideas and technical artefacts 
co-evolve and provide resources and constraints 
for change. Most importantly, innovation can 
not be understood in any simple way as purely 
technical improvement, as improvement itself can 
only be understood in a social context that makes 
the underlying technology meaningful. Although 
in the industrial society this social context 
evolved relatively slowly, making it in many cases 
possible to forget and take for granted the social 
dimension of technology and innovation, today 
we live in a world where this rarely is the case.
3.3. Policy at the End of Kondratieff 
Waves
Innovation has been a somewhat awkward 
topic for many economists in the recent decades, 
as the neoclassical theory starts from equilibrium 
models that are, strictly speaking, incompatible 
with the idea of innovation. Innovation, therefore, 
has often been defined in economics as the 
35 In this sense, downstream models share the starting 
point of “open innovation,” as described by Chesbrough 
(2003).
36	 Cf.,	Moore	(1996),	and	Hagel	and	Brown	(2005).
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es unexplained component of growth.37 Research 
on the economics of innovation, therefore, has 
often been influenced by socially and historically 
grounded theories of economy.38 In recent years, 
a particularly influential stream of research has 
formed around studies inspired by the pioneering 
work of Schumpeter.
A basic question in the Schumpeterian 
framework is how innovation and technology 
influence economic growth. Schumpeter’s early 
work focused on long-term economic growth 
patterns and their links to innovation. This 
pioneering work has led to a large body of neo-
Schumpeterian literature that tries to explain 
large-scale patterns in the economic history 
by the underlying changes in key transport, 
communications, and production technologies.39
For example, Perez40 has highlighted the point 
that the economic history can be understood as a 
sequence of techno-economic paradigms, where 
long-term growth periods have been driven by the 
wide application of a new general-purpose key 
technology. According to Perez, the statistically 
observable long waves of economic growth since 
the first Industrial Revolution to the emergence 
of steam power and railways, electrical and 
heavy engineering, mass production, and, most 
recently, microelectronics, have been associated 
with profound changes in the dominant 
production paradigms. The realization of the 
economic potential of a new general-purpose 
key technology requires mutual co-evolution and 
alignment of social institutions and practices, 
including legal frameworks, management 
practices, and industrial relations. Historically, 
the changes in techno-economic paradigms have 
37 Solow’s residue, which includes all those sources of 
productivity growth that cannot be explained, is the 
most famous example here. Economists have often 
defined technical progress as the factors that underlie 
Solow residue.
38 For a discussion of earlier work on innovation and 
economic theory , see e.g., Rosenberg (1982).
39 See Freeman and Louçã (2001). 
40 Perez (1985; 2002).
been associated with new sources of competitive 
advantage, new geographical growth patterns, 
and the decline of old economic centres.
An important outcome of the neo-
Schumpeterian analysis lies in its observation 
that social change is the constraining factor when 
technological opportunities become transformed 
into economic value. Technology and the 
capabilities it affords can efficiently be integrated 
with social practices only after a gradual 
process of alignment. As a result, the diffusion 
of new technologies is strongly constrained by 
the speed of social and institutional change.41 
Policy, therefore, can also play a crucial role in 
this change. When new key technologies lead to 
radical changes in the modes of production, by 
definition, these changes do not occur easily, and 
they create conflicts among prevailing interests 
and powers. This, indeed, can be understood as 
the fundamental reason why the long waves of 
economy are long.42
The long wave model of economic growth is 
a controversial issue, and it has been debated for 
several decades, both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds.43 One may, however, ask where are we 
in the wave of ICT-induced growth? Is the golden 
age in the future, or is it already in the past?
Indeed, it has been recently argued that we are 
currently experiencing the end of long waves. For 
example,	Hagel,	Brown	and	Davison	argue	that:
“Major technical innovations like the 
steam engine, electricity, and the telephone 
brought forth powerful new infrastructures. 
Inevitably, these disruptive innovations 
transformed industry and commerce, but 
41 This view, therefore, implicitly adopts the downstream 
innovation model discussed above.
42 As Kuhn (1970)argued, dominant paradigms often 
change only after their proponents die.
43 Influential contributions include, for example, (Freeman, 
Clark, and Soete 1982) and (Kleinknecht 1987). For a 
discussion on the earlier debates, see Mandel (1995, 
chap.	6)⁠
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eventually they became stabilizing forces, 
once businesses learned to harness their 
capabilities and gained confidence in their 
new order. That historical pattern –disruption 
followed by stabilization– has itself been 
disrupted. A new kind of infrastructure is 
evolving, built on the sustained exponential 
pace of performance improvements in 
computing, storage, and bandwidth. Because 
the underlying technologies are developing 
continuously and rapidly, there is no prospect 
for stabilization.”44
In other words, if rapid developments in key 
ICT technologies continue also in the future, it is 
not obvious that the social institutions, including 
management practices, ways to organize work, 
legal frameworks, and geographical focal 
points of production would be well aligned 
with the technical opportunities available. The 
next productivity growth wave, to be created 
by the wide adoption of ICTs, could simply be 
destroyed by the same wide adoption of ICTs that 
also leads to constant reconfiguration of value 
systems. If social institutions do not “catch up” 
with the requirements of technology before new 
key technical opportunities emerge, the social 
infrastructure does not necessarily have time to 
stabilize. It has been argued that this, indeed, 
could be the essence of the “new economy”:
“One of the consequences of the 
Internet may be that technology development 
is increasingly unlinked from local social 
institutions. ... Linux –and other Internet-based 
innovations– provide examples of socio-
technical development that perhaps escape 
the logic of long waves, and which potentially 
break long waves into continuous ripples.”45
The “constant disruption” model of Hagel et al. 
assumes the existence of continuous improvements 
in computing, storage, and bandwidth. The 
44	 Hagel	Brown,	Davison	(2008,	82)⁠
45	 Tuomi	(2002a,	216).
present study, however, argues that we are about 
to see a radical disruption in the key technology 
–integrated circuits– that underlies computing, 
storage, and bandwidth improvements, and that the 
rapid continuous improvement in semiconductor 
technology is about to end. The end result, 
however, may be the same. A qualitative change 
has already occurred in the global innovation 
system, and we do not necessarily need any further 
developments in the underlying technology to end 
the long-wave phenomenon. In other words, the 
basic technological innovations are already there, 
and the essential components of the knowledge 
society infrastructure are in place: now the focal 
areas of innovation move to business models and 
new applications where the social and cultural 
dimensions of technology are increasingly visible.
This does not mean that the rate of 
innovation would slow down. On the contrary, 
the present study argues that with appropriate 
policies, new rapidly growing domains of 
innovation may become available. Although 
innovation can not be based on semiconductor 
scaling and its consequences in the future, the 
basic semiconductor technologies are becoming 
commodities. The focus of innovation can then 
move to the uses of the available technological 
opportunities, also making downstream 
innovation models increasingly important and 
visible in practice. This transition may imply new 
management methods, business models, sources 
of key knowledge in the semiconductor and ICT 
industries, and new geographical focal points 
of economic growth, even when the long-wave 
model itself would, for the time being, be dead.
The full impact of the new innovation 
regime obviously extends beyond semiconductor 
IP industry. It is, however, important to note 
the possibility that a new innovation regime is 
emerging where old policy assumptions are not 
valid anymore. For example, it is possible that 
technology development is becoming increasingly 
driven by the fact that market structures and 
policies can not catch up and become stabilized 
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new technical functionalities become critical. It is, 
for example, possible that continuous disruption 
implies that system reconfigurability is becoming 
an increasingly important source of value. We 
return to this possibility in the next chapters.
It is also useful to note that technical 
developments in semiconductor industry 
have been a major source of macro-economic 
productivity growth in recent years. Many 
influential studies have argued that the production 
and use of ICTs is a key factor in explaining 
productivity growth and its differences among 
countries in recent years. Although it has been 
rarely pointed out, the rapid development in 
semiconductors is the main factor that underlies 
these arguments. In a somewhat simplified way, 
the measured productivity growth rates have 
followed the scaling of semiconductors. This is 
because output volumes have been corrected 
by price indexes that adjust for the technical 
improvements of integrated circuits.46
Although the present study describes 
developments in an industry that is 
conventionally called “intellectual property 
-based semiconductors,” the scope of the study 
therefore goes beyond traditional intellectual 
property, such as patents and copyrights. The 
industry segment that we study could better 
be called the “intangible semiconductor 
industry.” One could argue that this is the most 
innovation-intensive part of the semiconductor 
industry, and the foundation of future 
information and communication technologies. 
It is therefore also a good example of the 
knowledge economy, itself.
46 In practice, the increasing number of transistors on 
a chip becomes measured as an increase in output 
volume, even when in purely economic terms output 
does not grow. As the current-dollar price of new chips 
at introduction has remained relatively stable over the 
years, the growth in number of transistors becomes 
translated into productivity growth. The very fast pace 
of technical improvements in CMOS technology thus 
pops-up in macroeconomic studies on growth and 
productivity. For a detailed discussion, see Tuomi 
(2004b).
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4.1. The Semiconductor Value System
4.1.1. Overview of Semiconductor 
Consumption and Production
Semiconductors are key components in the 
roughly	 1,400	 billion	 USD	 electronics	 industry	
and provide the foundation for the modern 
information economy and society. In 2007, the 
global revenues of the semiconductor industry 
were	about	USD	260	billion,	according	to	several	
market research studies.47 In November 2008, 
the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS) 
estimated the global semiconductor market to 
grow 2.5 percent in 2008 from the previous year, 
to	USD	 261.9	 billion.	 Exactly	 the	 same	 revenue	
47 Semiconductor Industry Association reported global 
sales	 of	 $255.6	 billion,	 the	 Global	 Semiconductor	
Alliance	 reported	 $267.5	 billion,	 Gartner	 reported	
$273.9	billion,	and	iSuppli	reported	$268.9	billion.	SIA	
reports data from WSTS member organizations, thus 
giving smaller numbers than, for example, Gartner.
4. The Current Context of the Intellectual Property 
Architectural Blocks Industry
Figure 2: Billings by semiconductor firms in different regions, 1977-2008
  33 
Since the previous downturn in 2001, the semiconductor market has gr wn at high rates, with Asia-
Pacific leading the growth. This can be seen from Figure 2, which shows th  annual booki gs of 
semiconductor firms in the different regions of the world. The annual totals are calculated from the 
three-month moving averages, as reported by the Semiconductor Industry Association, which 
somewhat undercounts consumption in China. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, China used 
in 2007 more than a third of the ICs developed worldwide.48
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Figure 2: Billings by semiconductor firms in different regions, 1977-2008. 
According to the most recent WSTS estimates, in 2008 the total sales of discrete semiconductors 
will be USD 17.7 billion, optoelectronics 18 billion, sensors 5.4 billion, and integrated circuits 
220.8 billion. The more detailed breakdown forecast for integrated circuits is shown in Table 2. 
Billions of USD 2007 2008 2009 2010
Integrated circuits 217,81 220,82 214,66 228,15
48 Pausa et al. (2008) . 
Source: calculated from SIA data.
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is	expected	by	Gartner	Dataquest,	 although	 their	
estimate actually represents a 4.4 percent decline 
from 2007. The global downturn has led to a very 
rapid decline in semiconductor consumption, 
and in the fourth quarter of 2008 the global 
semiconductor revenue declined almost one fourth 
from the previous quarter. The latest estimates by 
Gartner	Dataquest	now	expect	the	global	revenues	
to	 shrink	 16.3	 percent	 in	 2009,	 with	 worldwide	
revenues	reaching	USD	219.3	billion.
The largest consumer is Hewlett Packard, 
which consumed about $15 billion worth of 
semiconductors in 2007, followed with Nokia, at 
about	 $13	 billion,	 and	Dell	 and	 Samsung,	with	
over $11 billion. Although historically computer 
manufacturers have been the biggest consumers of 
semiconductors, in recent years communications 
and consumer electronics products such as mobile 
phones, computer games and digital multimedia 
devices have become the most important growth 
driver in the industry. In 2007, data processing 
represented about 37 per cent, communications 
electronics 28 percent, consumer electronics 
18 percent, industrial electronics 9 percent and 
automotive 8 percent of the total consumption, 
according	 to	 Gartner	 Dataquest.	 The	 top	 10	
original equipment manufacturers accounted for 
about a third of all semiconductor consumption.
Since the previous downturn in 2001, the 
semiconductor market has grown at high rates, with 
Asia-Pacific leading the growth. This can be seen 
from Figure 2, which shows the annual bookings 
of semiconductor firms in the different regions of 
the world. The annual totals are calculated from 
the three-month moving averages, as reported 
by the Semiconductor Industry Association, 
which somewhat undercounts consumption in 
China. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
China used in 2007 more than a third of the ICs 
developed worldwide.48
According to the most recent WSTS estimates, 
in 2008 the total sales of discrete semiconductors 
will	 be	 USD	 17.7	 billion,	 optoelectronics	 18	
billion, sensors 5.4 billion, and integrated circuits 
220.8 billion. The more detailed breakdown 
forecast for integrated circuits is shown in Table 
2.
In 2007, the share of European semiconductor 
device makers was about 10 percent of the global 
market. Four European-based firms were among 
the top 25: STMicroelectronics, Infineon, NXP, 
and Qimonda. In the first three quarters of 2008, 
Qimonda dropped 15 positions to number 30, and 
NXP fell from the 10th position to 15th, according 
to data from IC Insights. Since then, Qimonda 
has started insolvency proceedings. In general, 
mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, and technology 
cycles have historically generated large swings 
in the market size rankings, and market estimates 
vary somewhat between data providers. In 2008, 
eight of the top 20 device producers were based 
in the US, seven in Japan, two in South Korea, and 
three in Europe.49 There were no Chinese firms in 
the top 25 semiconductor device suppliers.
48 Pausa et al. (2008).
49 The full list, with headquarter locations, is detailed in 
Table 4.
Table 2: Integrated circuit market, 2007-2010, WSTS Autumn 2008 estimate
Billions of USD 2007 2008 2009 2010
Integrated circuits 217,81 220,82 214,66 228,15
Analog 36,45 37,60 35,83 37,81
Micro 56,21 57,08 54,71 57,60
Logic 67,29 77,06 77,38 81,20
Memory 57,85 49,08 46,75 51,54
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4.1.2. Current Business Models
The history of the semiconductor industry 
has created a complex and rich ecosystem of 
inter-related actors. Integrated device production 
started in vertically integrated firms, which 
since	 the	 early	 1960s	 have	 spun-off	 specialized	
industries, including semiconductor equipment 
manufacturing and silicon wafer production, 
and since the 1980s, software companies that 
specialize in electronic design automation 
tools. Early on, the internal specialization was 
implemented at a global scale, as was discussed 
in the previous chapter. Subsequently, this division 
of labour led to the emergence of specialist 
firms that now form the globally networked 
semiconductor production ecosystem.
The core of the semiconductor value system 
is conventionally understood to be the process 
that generates semiconductor components for 
electronic equipment manufacturers. In the next 
subsections, three different business models are 
briefly outlined. The first is the traditional integrated 
device	manufacturer	(IDM)	model,	which	designs,	
manufactures, and sells integrated circuits and also 
discrete semiconductor components. This is the 
model that historically defines the semiconductor 
industry. The second business model emerges as a 
variation	of	the	IDM	model:	the	“fabless”	model.	It	
is based on a close cooperation among specialist 
semiconductor fabrication firms, or foundries, 
and device producers that operate without their 
own fabrication plants. The third model is the 
“chipless” model that focuses on creating and 
selling designs.
4.1.2.1. The Integrated Device Manufacturer 
(IDM) Model
The historical evolution of semiconductor 
industry has proceeded from extensive vertical 
integration towards specialization and value-
chain disintegration.
Up to 1980s, the industry was dominated 
by independent integrated device manufacturers 
(IDMs),	who	relied	on	their	own	wafer	fabrication	
facilities and internally developed design tools to 
make and package integrated circuits. The vertical 
integration	of	IDM	firms,	such	as	IBM,	Motorola,	
Texas Instruments, and Siemens often extended all 
the way to electronic equipment manufacturing, 
using the internally developed chips.
Today,	the	leading	IDM	is	Intel,	with	revenues	
of	about	USD	38	billion	in	2007.	Intel	provides	PC	
and mobile device chipsets, and networking and 
memory chips, and it is the leading producer of 
microprocessors. The research and development 
costs	 of	 Intel	 were	 about	 USD	 5.7	 billion	 and	
the	net	income	about	USD	7	billion	in	2007.	At	
the	end	of	2007,	it	had	total	assets	of	USD	55.6	
billion, of which property, plant and equipment 
was	USD	17	billion.
4.1.2.2. The Fabless Model
As	the	industry	has	been	very	cyclical,	IDMs	
often have had excess manufacturing capacity 
that	 they	 can	 sell.	 Today,	 most	 IDMs	 therefore	
provide their chip manufacturing or “foundry” 
capacity to companies that do not have their 
own fabrication facilities. For example, IBM 
Microelectronics was the fifth largest provider of 
foundry	services	in	2007,	with	revenues	of	USD	
605	million,	according	to	Gartner.50	In	total,	IDM	
foundry	services	had	about	16	percent	of	the	total	
wafer manufacturing market in 2007.
At	other	 times,	 IDMs	 lack	capacity	and	are	
willing to buy it. Integrated device manufacturers 
now therefore also frequently outsource some of 
their chip manufacturing to pure-play foundries 
that	 focus	 on	 chip	 manufacturing.	 IDMs	 that	
extensively use wafer fabrication outsourcing are 
often described to follow a “fab-lite” business 
model.
50 According to IC Insights, IBM was the sixth IC foundry 
in	2007,	with	sales	of	USD	570	million.	 IBMs	foundry	
revenues partly originate from its extensive IP licensing. 
The actual fabrication is often outsourced. Some 
commentators, therefore, call IBM a “fabless foundry.”
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Currently,	 key	 IDMs	 are	 transforming	
themselves toward the fabless model. For 
example, Texas Instruments, one of the largest 
semiconductor producers, has increasingly used 
independent foundries. In 2007, it announced 
that it will stop its internal development at the 45 
nanometre process, the current state-of-the-art, 
and rely on its foundry partners to create chips 
in the more advanced process nodes. Similarly, 
AMD	 announced	 in	 October	 2008	 that	 it	 will	
become a fabless firm and spin off its fabs to a 
new foundry company that will be majority 
owned	by	 the	Abu	Dhabi	Advanced	Technology	
Investment Company (ATIC). ATIC has committed 
up	to	USD	6	billion	to	the	new	firm.
The next section briefly describes the foundry 
firms that enable the fabless business model in 
the semiconductor industry.
4.1.2.3. Foundries
A semiconductor foundry is a service 
organization that processes and manufactures 
silicon wafers. A typical output of a foundry is a 
50-300 mm silicon disk, or wafer, that contains 
several billions of transistors in a dozen or more 
layers. A single wafer typically contains several 
hundred chips, or dies, that are separately 
packaged when the dies are assembled into a 
finished and tested integrated circuit product. 
The foundry business is now dominated by 
pure-play foundries that do not make their own 
semiconductor products.
TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Company) created the dedicated semiconductor 
wafer foundry industry in 1987. Although 
there existed some firms that specialized in the 
manufacturing of semiconductor wafers already 
before, the foundry business was a small niche 
until the end of 1980s. Advances in design 
tools and the standardization of both design 
and manufacturing processes have facilitated 
the transfer of product designs to independent 
foundries. In the 1990s, the growing markets of 
telecommunications and multimedia generated 
increasing aggregate volumes for the new pure-
play foundries, accelerating their move down 
the learning curve. All new semiconductor 
manufacturers launched after 1990 have been 
fabless firms that rely on their foundry partners to 
fabricate their products.
Two Taiwanese pure-play foundries, TSMC 
and UMC, followed by SMIC in mainland 
China and the Singapore-based Chartered 
Semiconductor now dominate the market.51 The 
top four now have a market share of about 70 
percent of the total foundry market, including 
foundry	services	provided	by	IDMs.52
Seven of the top 10 foundries have 
headquarters in the Asia-Pacific region, two in 
the	 US	 –the	 merchant	 IDM	 foundries	 of	 IBM	
and Texas Instruments– and one in Europe.53 
The European firm, X-Fab, which makes analog 
and mixed-signal and specialty semiconductors, 
was the only non-Asian pure-play foundry in 
the top 14, according to IC Insights data for 
2007.54	 As	 the	 previously	 confirmed	 USD	 1	
billion incentives in New York were transferred 
in	early	2009	from	AMD	to	the	new	AMD-ATIC	
foundry company, now called Globalfoundries, 
it will become the first pure-play foundry on 
the American continent. In addition to building 
a	 new	 USD	 4.2	 billion	 pure-play	 facility	 in	
Saratoga County, New York, Globalfoundries is 
also	 expanding	 its	 facilities	 in	 Dresden	 with	 a	
new facility towards the end of 2009.
51	 Total	 foundry	 sales	 were	 22.2	 billion	 USD	 in	 2007	
according to Gartner, and 24.5 billion according to IC 
Insights. 
52	 Gartner	reports	72.7	percent	and	IC	Insights	68	percent.
53 Gartner and IC Insights give different revenues and 
rankings for the major IC foundries. According to IC 
Insights, Texas Instruments was the fifth-largest foundry 
in 2007. IC Insights top-ten foundry ranking for 2007 
includes the pure-play foundries TSMC (Taiwan), UMC 
(Taiwan),	SMIC	(China),	Chartered	(Singapore),	Dongbu	
(South Korea), Vanguard (Taiwan), and X-Fab (Germany); 
and	IDMs	Texas	Instruments,	IBM	and	Samsung.
54 The location of X-Fab headquarters is in Erfurt, Germany. 
It	has	about	2,600	employees,	and	manufacturing	sites	
in the US, the UK, Malaysia, and Germany.
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The foundry industry is heavily concentrated, 
the leading firm, TSMC, having a market share of 
over 40 percent. TSMC currently employs over 
20,000 people worldwide. Historically, Taiwanese 
firms have dominated the independent foundry 
industry since its formation. It is, however, notable 
that China is rapidly catching up: SMIC, now the 
third largest foundry firm, built its first foundry 
in 2001. China has now three foundries among 
the top 14. Semiconductor firms have specifically 
been promoted by policies in China, including 
the internationally debated Circular Number 
18, which reduced the VAT rates of Chinese 
semiconductor	firms	to	maximum	6	percent,	and	
then lowered the tax burden to 3 percent.55 We 
discuss developments in China in more detail in 
the next chapter.
55 Cf. “China’s Semiconductor sector shake-up”, People’s 
Daily	Online,	September	8,	2004.	Circular	18	created	
loud protests both in the US and EU, and tax rules for 
semiconductor industry have since been modified. The 
new Chinese Corporate Tax Income law is discussed in 
detail below.
Before the global downturn was clearly 
visible, the Fabless Semiconductor Association 
(now Global Semiconductor Alliance) predicted 
that,	from	2006	to	2011,	pure-play	foundry	sales	
display a 15 percent compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR), almost double the eight percent total 
IC industry expected CAGR during the same time 
frame.	In	contrast,	the	IDM	foundry	business	was	
forecast to grow at a rate of 12 percent. Pure-play 
foundries were forecast to represent 85 percent of 
total foundry sales in 2007.56
The overall worldwide foundry capacity 
and the main alliances in 2007 are shown 
in Figure 3.57 As the picture shows the actual 
foundry capacity, including capacity that is used 
internally, firms such as Intel and Samsung take 
big slices of the total pie. Samsung, in fact, also 
has an independent “pure-play” foundry that 
provides capacity to outside customers. Since 
2007, the alliances have continued to be shaped 
and, for example, Toshiba, STMicroelectronics, 
56 FSA Semiconductor Market Report, October 2007.
57 Kunkel (2007).
Table 3: Top 10 foundries by revenue, 2007
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Figure 3: Top 10 semiconductor foundries by revenue, 2007. 
Before the global downturn was clearly visible, the Fabless Semiconductor Association (now 
Global Semiconductor Alliance) predicted that, from 2006 to 2011, pure-play foundry sales display 
a 15 percent compound annual growth rate (CAGR), almost double the eight percent total IC 
indus ry expected CAGR during the same tim  frame. In contrast, the IDM foundry business was 
forecast to grow at a rate of 12 percent. Pure-play foundries were forecast to represent 85 percent of 
total foundry sales in 2007.56
The overall w rldwide foundry capacity and the main alliances in 2007 ar  shown in Figure 4 
below.57 As the picture shows the actual foundry capacity, including capacity that is used internally, 
firms such as Intel and Samsung take big slices of the total pie. Samsung, in fact, also has an 
independent “pure-play” foundry that provides capacity to outside customers. Since 2007, the 
alliances have continued to be shaped and, for example, Toshiba,  STMicroelectronics, and the new 
AMD-ATIC foundry company have joined the Common Platform alliance. 
protests both in the US and EU, and tax rules for semiconductor industry have since been modified. The new 
Chinese Corporate Tax Income law is discussed in detail below. 
56  FSA Semiconductor Market Report, October 2007. 
57  Kunkel (2007) . 
Source: Gartner (April 2008).
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and	 the	new	AMD-ATIC	 foundry	company	have	
joined the Common Platform alliance.
4.1.2.4. Fabless firms
Many	IDMs	have	drifted	towards	the	fab-lite	
and fabless model during the last years. This has 
been possible because of the increased capacity 
and capabilities of pure-play foundries. The 
growth of pure-play foundries, in turn, mainly 
results from the rise of new fabless semiconductor 
firms that focused on chip design. In 1989, almost 
70 percent of all memory, logic and processor 
chips were produced for the PC market. Since 
the early 1990’s, mobile communications, 
computer games, audio, and image processing 
have become important end uses for ICs. Often 
these applications require design capabilities for 
both digital and analog electronics, as well as 
processing of real time data streams.
Due	to	the	small	initial	size	of	these	markets,	
lack	 of	 interest	 from	 large	 IDMs,	 and	 relatively	
high costs of customized manufacturing, a large 
number of specialized IC design houses emerged 
in the 1990s. When they started to sell their ICs 
to electronics equipment manufacturers, they 
had to search for outsourced wafer fabrication 
capacity.	At	first,	this	was	provided	by	the	IDMs,	
at times when their own capacity utilization rates 
were low. In general, this was a difficult business 
niche, as small IC firms were low on the priorities 
of	the	IDMs.58
The emergence of independent pure-play 
foundries, including TSMC and UMC, changed 
the picture radically. Fabless firms that never have 
had their own wafer manufacturing capability 
now include important semiconductor firms, such 
as	Qualcomm,	Xilinx,	NVIDIA,	Broadcomm,	and	
Creative.
There are now several hundreds of fabless 
firms worldwide. Future Horizons classifies 121 
58	 Shelton	 (2001);	 and	 Dhayagude,T.,	 M.	 Jayagopal,	 T.J.	
Manayathara, S. Suri, and A. Yaga (2001).
Figure 3: Alliance landscape in semiconductor wafer manufacturing
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Source:Kunkel (2007)
Figure 4: Alliance landscape in semiconductor wafer manufacturing
4.1.2.4. Fabless firms 
Many IDMs have drifted towards the fab-lite and fabless model during the last years. This has been 
possible because of the increased capacity and capabilities of pure-play foundries. The growth of 
pure-play foundri , in turn, mainly results from the rise of new fab ess semiconduct r firms that 
focused on chip design. In 1989, almost 70 percent of all memory, logic and processor chips were 
produced for the PC market. Since the early 1990's, mobile communications, computer games, 
audio, and image processing have become important end uses for ICs. Often these applications 
require design capabilities for both digital and analog electronics, as well as processing of real time 
data streams. 
Due to the small initial size of these markets, lack of interest from large IDMs, and relatively high 
costs of customized manufacturing, a large number of specialized IC design houses emerged in the 
1990s. When they tarted o sell their ICs to electronics equipment manufacturers, they had to 
search for outsourced wafer fabrication capacity. At first, this was provided by the IDMs, at times 
Source: Kunkel (2007).
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Figure 5: Fabless semiconductor firms, 1999-2007.
The largest semiconductor producers are listed in Table 3, which also shows the core business 
models and headquarter locations of the firms. The ranking is based on sales in the first three 
quarters in 2008, as reported by IC Insights. 
Source: GSA, 2008.
Table 4: Top 20 semiconductor vendors in 2008
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Table 3: Top 20 s miconductor vendors in 
2008.
Rank Company Headquarters Business model
1 Intel US IDM
2 Samsung South Korea IDM / Foundry
3 Texas Instruments US IDM / Fab-light
4 Toshiba Japan IDM
5 TSMC Taiwan Foundry
6 STMicroelectronics Europe IDM
7 Renesas Japan IDM
8 Hynix South Korea IDM
9 Qualcomm US Fabless
10 Sony Japan IDM
11 Infineon Europe IDM
12 AMD US IDM / Fabless
13 NEC Japan IDM
14 Micron US IDM
15 NXP Europe IDM
16 Freescale US IDM
17 Fujitsu Japan IDM
18 Broadcom US Fabless
19 Panasonic Japan IDM
20 Nvidia US Fabless
Source: data from IC Insights 2008
As can be seen from the table above, IDMs are still the largest semiconductor vendors, when ranked 
using their sales revenues. This is, however, somewhat misleading as the different business models 
cannot really be compared simply by using the generated revenues. Part of the attractiveness of the 
fabless model is the fact that foundries can amortize their plant and R&D costs among many 
customers. To be viable, IDMs need to generate more revenues than fabless firms to cover their 
higher costs in fixed assets. The IC Insight rankings also include pure-play foundries, such as 
TSMC, which represent inputs to the device producing industry. The largest fabless firm in the 
table, Qualcomm, also gains much of its revenues by licensing its technology to IDMs. In fact, 
Qualcomm combines two different business models; it is both a traditional fabless integrated device 
manufacturer and a “chipless” semiconductor firm that sells patent rights and designs, instead of 
finished products. The next section provides an overall view of the chipless model. The following 
sections then discuss this model and its variations in more detail. 
4.1.2.5. Chipless IP firms 
The key characteristic of the semiconductor IP business is that it does not transfer ownership; 
instead, semiconductor IP firms sell rights to use and copy the designs. The designs are called with 
various names, including “virtual components,” “IP blocks,” and “IP cores.” The revenue streams 
Source: data from IG Insights, 2008.
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semiconductor firms in Europe and Israel as 
fabless companies.59 According to the Global 
Semiconductor	 Alliance	 (GSA),	 there	 were	 600	
fabless firms in North America, 150 in Europe, 
500 in Asia, and 50 in Israel in year 2007. 
According to GSA, the public fabless revenue 
totalled	USD	53.1	billion,	or	about	20	percent	of	
the global semiconductor sales in the same year. 
The total number of fabless firms, as reported by 
GSA,	is	shown	in	Figure	6.
The largest semiconductor producers are 
listed in Table 4, which also shows the core 
business models and headquarter locations of 
the firms. The ranking is based on sales in the first 
three quarters in 2008, as reported by IC Insights.
As	can	be	seen	from	the	table	above,	IDMs	
are still the largest semiconductor vendors, 
when ranked using their sales revenues. This is, 
however, somewhat misleading as the different 
business models cannot really be compared 
simply by using the generated revenues. Part of 
the attractiveness of the fabless model is the fact 
that	foundries	can	amortize	their	plant	and	R&D	
costs	among	many	customers.	To	be	viable,	IDMs	
need to generate more revenues than fabless firms 
to cover their higher costs in fixed assets. The IC 
Insight rankings also include pure-play foundries, 
such as TSMC, which represent inputs to the 
device producing industry. The largest fabless 
firm in the table, Qualcomm, also gains much 
of its revenues by licensing its technology to 
IDMs.	In	fact,	Qualcomm	combines	two	different	
business models; it is both a traditional fabless 
integrated device manufacturer and a “chipless” 
semiconductor firm that sells patent rights and 
designs, instead of finished products. The next 
section provides an overall view of the chipless 
model. The following sections then discuss this 
model and its variations in more detail.
59 Future Horizons: The European Fabless Semiconductor 
Report, 2007 Edition.
4.1.2.5. Chipless IP firms
The key characteristic of the semiconductor 
IP business is that it does not transfer ownership; 
instead, semiconductor IP firms sell rights to use 
and copy the designs. The designs are called with 
various names, including “virtual components,” 
“IP blocks,” and “IP cores.” The revenue streams 
typically originate in license fees that can be one-
time, annual, based on the number of customer 
designs that use the licensed IP, or a mixture 
of these; royalty payments that are calculated 
based on the number of products that the 
customer has shipped which include the licensed 
design; and complementary services, such as 
training, technical support, customization, and 
development tools. As the product is an intangible 
product, the terms of sale can be defined as a 
business contract. For example, the vendor may 
restrict the use to specific geographic markets, 
industry segments, or, for example, for products 
that do not compete with the vendor’s other 
products.
Typical semiconductor IP licensing models 
are shown in Table 5.
Semiconductor IP blocks are licensed by 
many different types of firms. Foundries provide 
large libraries of pre-designed and pre-tested IP 
that is optimized for the foundry’s fabrication 
process. Such foundry IP often consists of basic 
logic components and “standard cells,” and also 
more complex IP cores developed by third-party 
IP vendors, and it is often available for customers 
without license or royalty fees. Similarly, design 
tool vendors typically provide large libraries of 
pre-designed IP with their design software. In 
recent	years,	also	IDMs	and	fabless	semiconductor	
firms have increasingly started to license their in-
house developed reusable designs.
A special case among fabless firms is the 
FPGA vendors, including the market leaders 
Xilinx and Altera. FPGA chips provide a platform 
onto which different designs can be downloaded. 
As the complexity of implemented designs has 
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increased, designers now typically use IP blocks 
provided by the FPGA vendor as components 
in their designs. These IP blocks are typically 
optimized for the FPGA chip in question, 
and range from vendor-developed embedded 
processor cores to cost-free entry-level cores 
that are bundled with the FPGA vendors design 
tools and development boards. FPGA suppliers 
also have extensive partnership projects for 
independent IP vendors who target their designs 
for the suppliers FPGA technology.
The semiconductor IP industry therefore 
consists of a large variety of rapidly evolving 
business models. At one extreme is the “pure-
play IP” or “chipless” model. Pure-play IP 
vendors do not have their own semiconductor 
device products; instead they focus on creating 
and licensing designs to chip designers. Typically, 
IP blocks are used by independent design service 
firms and fabless semiconductor firms, and they 
are	also	licensed	by	traditional	IDMs.
Due	to	the	rapid	evolution	and	large	variety	
of the IP business models, market analysts 
and experts use many alternative definitions 
and sometimes incompatible terminology in 
describing the IP industry. IP blocks can contain 
digital or analog circuitry, or a combination of 
these.	 Digital	 components	 are	 used	 to	 design	
logic functions and complete systems-on-
chip. Analog components, in turn, are used, for 
example, to convert real-world signals such as 
radio waves and sensor data into digital format. 
Three main categories of digital IP components 
are commonly distinguished. These three types 
of components roughly map with the outputs of 
the three main steps in the digital chip design 
process: functional specification, logic design, 
and physical design.
Soft cores are IP blocks that describe the 
functionality of the IP component. Soft cores 
are usually delivered using high-level hardware 
description languages derived from computer 
programming languages.60 A soft core, therefore, 
typically consists of a set of text files that contain 
the “source code” for an IP block. When a high-
level specification is provided, the specification 
can further be “compiled” into a lower-level 
“netlist” that describes how the underlying 
elementary logic components or “gates” are 
connected. This generation of logic “circuitry” 
from a higher level hardware description is known 
as logic synthesis. Soft cores that are delivered 
in a hardware description language format are 
therefore also known as synthesizable cores. The 
lower-level netlist format is also widely used to 
deliver soft cores. The netlist format is mainly 
used because it protects the vendor’s trade secrets 
and intellectual property better than the higher-
level source code.
Soft cores are typically independent of the 
specific manufacturing process used to make 
the chips. Soft cores define the architecture 
and functionality in a form that can be read by 
synthesis tools that convert the description into 
60	 The	two	main	hardware	definition	languages	are	VHDL,	
derived	 from	 the	 ADA	 programming	 language,	 and	
Verilog, derived from the C programming language.
Table 5: Typical semiconductor IP licensing models.
Per Use Time Based Royalty Based Access Based
Purpose Fee for each IP on defined 
user scope
Multiple uses over a period 
of time
Share risk and reward Fee for an IP portfolio over 
a period of time
Payments Event Based Time Based Value Based Subscription Based
Structure One time fee Fee for all designs within a 
given time
Some or all fees spread 
across units
Up Front Fee plus 
discounted use fee
Scope Per Design
Per Device
Multiple Uses
Per Device
% of Device Value Multiple IPs per 
Organization
36
4.
  T
he
 C
ur
re
nt
 C
on
te
xt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
lle
ct
ua
l P
ro
pe
rt
y 
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
al
 B
lo
ck
s 
In
du
st
ry
 
features on semiconductor die; typically, however, 
the design incorporates very little information on 
the physical layout or the specific requirements 
of a manufacturing technology to be used to 
make the chip. Soft cores are also widely used to 
configure FPGAs. It is, for example, possible to 
download a complete microprocessor architecture 
onto a FPGA chip. Such soft microprocessors 
are provided by the FPGA suppliers and they 
are also available as open source code. A 
common scenario is that a new custom-designed 
semiconductor is first implemented using a FPGA 
chip and later manufactured in higher volumes 
as an ASIC chip. As IP cores that are optimized 
for FPGAs can rarely be used as such on ASIC 
designs, both FPGA vendors and foundries 
provide services that help in translating the 
designs from one platform to another.
The major advantages of soft cores include 
their customizability. A soft core is specified 
in high-level description language that looks 
like source code for a computer program. Its 
functionality, therefore, is relatively easy to 
modify and can be configured according to 
the specific needs of the user. As the core is 
delivered in a form that is typically independent 
of the specifics of the manufacturing process, the 
same core can with some translation effort be 
manufactured in many different processes. This 
means, for example, that the user can source the 
manufacturing from competing semiconductor 
foundries.
Hard IP cores, in contrast, are closely tailored 
to the specific manufacturing process used to 
make the chip. Hard IP cores, also known as hard 
macros, are delivered in the form of a mask-level 
layout.61
Hard IP cores have the advantage that 
they require little extra work before they can 
61 More accurately, they are delivered as data files that 
describe the layout. The data files typically use the 
industry-standard	 GDS	 II	 stream	 format,	 or	 the	 newer	
OASIS format supported by SEMI.
be implemented on a semiconductor die. The 
logic gates are arranged in a specific geometric 
pattern that takes into account the characteristics 
of the wafer manufacturing process to be used in 
production. The exact size the core will need on 
the die, its power consumption, and other physical 
characteristics including speed and operating 
temperature are also known. Hard IP cores are 
often also used for analog and mixed-signal 
logic cores, where physical characteristics are 
important for the design. Hard cores, therefore, 
are widely used, for example, in multimedia 
devices and mobile phones.
The main benefit of hard IP cores is that they 
can be pre-tested in a specific manufacturing 
process. This typically means faster time-to-market 
with less risk and less development cost. As a hard 
IP core is optimized for a specific manufacturing 
process, it is, however, usually impossible for the 
end-users to modify or configure hard IP cores. 
When leading-edge chips are manufactured, the 
physical characteristics of the design become 
very important. In practice, cores for leading-
edge manufacturing process technologies are, 
therefore, hard cores.
The third main category of pre-designed IP 
components consists of physical IP components. 
Physical IP components typically have relatively 
low functional complexity, and they provide 
the basic building blocks such as standard logic 
functions, also known as “standard cells,” and 
basic input-output IP and memory compilers that 
generate on-chip memory blocks. Physical IP 
components are always optimized for and tested 
in	 a	 specific	 manufacturing	 process.	 Designers	
can use libraries of physical IP to build more 
complex functions, IP cores and even complete 
systems-on-chip.
IP cores and physical components form the 
basic products of the semiconductor IP design 
industry. To cover the broader IP ecosystem, the 
industry is also sometimes divided into three 
complementary segments, one comprising 
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of “silicon IP” that focuses on the actual 
semiconductor designs; another comprising of 
“verification IP,” including libraries of test cases 
that are used to check that created designs perform 
according to standards and specifications; and a 
third segment that consists of software, such as 
hardware-specific drivers, algorithms, operating 
systems, and development tools. Silicon IP, in 
turn, is sometimes sub-divided into two segments: 
“design IP” that consist of IP cores and physical 
components, and “technology licensing” that 
focuses on patent licensing.
A schematic representation of these 
semiconductor IP classes is shown in Figure 5. 
Leading firms typically provide a combination 
of products in these different categories. For 
example, ARM has separate divisions for IP 
cores, physical IP and software. Rambus, in turn, 
generates revenues from licensing its patented 
technologies, while also supplying design IP 
based on the same technologies.
A large number of chipless firms exist today. 
The	 Design	And	 Reuse	 web	 site	 lists	 about	 400	
silicon IP vendors.62 Chipestimate, in turn, lists 193 
62 http://www.design-reuse.com/
IP vendors as its partners.63 The Future Horizons 
2007 European Fabless Report lists 72 European 
chipless firms.64 Many of these firms are very small. 
Industry insiders estimate that top 10 vendors 
represent about 70 percent of total semiconductor 
IP revenues, and that the next 150 firms have 
revenues	around	USD	1.5	million,	on	average.
Europe has some important first-tier chipless 
firms, including ARM (£298.9 million in revenues 
in	 2008),	 Imagination	 Technologies	 (£64.1	
million in 2009), and ARC International Ltd. 
(£17.0 million in 2008). The chipless market 
and vendors are described in more detail in the 
following chapter.
The boundaries between design houses, 
chipless firms, fabless firms, and design software 
vendors	are	blurred	ones,	and	also	many	 IDMs,	
foundries and electronics firms sell IP blocks to 
the semiconductor community. The accuracy 
of data about this segment is often limited both 
by definitional challenges and data availability. 
For	 example,	 the	 In-Stat/MDR	 study65 on the 
63 http://www.chipestimate.com/
64 ibid.
65	 In-Stat/MDR	 (2004)	 Independent	 IP	 Logic	 Market,	
August 2004.
Figure 5: Types of semiconductor IP
Semiconductor IP
Silicon IP Verification IP Software IP
Design IP Technology licensing
Physical IP
Soft IP cores
Hard IP cores
Source: Meaning Processing
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independent IP logic market excludes the design 
software and IP vendor Synopsys, whereas Gartner 
market share analysis list Synopsys as the third 
largest design IP vendor worldwide. Including IP 
block revenues of large design software vendors 
and non-logic IP vendors, Gartner adds the total 
world market for semiconductor design IP in 2007 
to	USD	1,4	billion,	and	technology	licensing	up	
to	USD	550	million.	The	preliminary	numbers	for	
2008	 are	USD	1,486	 for	 design	 IP	 and	 587	 for	
technology licensing. The detailed breakdown 
was shown in Table 1.
Not all semiconductor IP is visible in market 
studies, however. As was noted before, perhaps 
over 80 percent of reusable IP is created inside 
semiconductor and electronics firms, and never 
sold to outsiders. Also open hardware projects, 
inspired by successful open source and open 
content initiatives, have created numerous IP cores 
that are licensed for free, typically using GPL or 
BSD	-type	licenses.	Initiatives	in	this	area	include	
OpenCores.org,66 Open Collector,67 the Hamburg 
VHDL	archive,68 and the OpenSparc.net.69
As was pointed out before, the revenues 
of chipless firms cannot really be compared 
with	 IDMs	 or	 fabless	 semiconductor	 vendors.	
Traditional semiconductor device producers, 
including fabless firms, use the outputs of 
chipless IP firms as their inputs. The IP creation 
activity, however, is the key source of value in 
the	 semiconductor	 industry.	 Developments	 in	
the chipless segment can therefore potentially 
reorganize the value system in the semiconductor 
industry. More importantly, the emergence of 
reusable designs as a separate product category 
can also have profound consequences for 
innovation models that underlie developments in 
the broader ICT industry and, thus, for the entire 
knowledge economy.
66 http://www.opencores.org/
67 http://www.opencollector.org/
68 http://tams-www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/vhdl/
69 http://www.opensparc.net/
4.1.3. The Semiconductor Value Chain
The semiconductor value system consists of 
firms that follow the above discussed business 
models, as well as several other key actors. These 
include	electronic	design	automation	 (EDA)	 tool	
suppliers, semiconductor assembly and testing 
services (SATS), semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment suppliers, lithography photomask 
merchants, silicon wafer suppliers, and other 
materials suppliers. In this section we briefly map 
the main segments of the value chain.
Integrated circuits are created in a very 
disaggregated and globally distributed network 
of activities. The basic starting point, however, 
is clear. To create a chip that can be used in 
an electronics product, the chip has first to 
be designed. Most of the design work is done 
internally	 by	 IDMs	 and	 fabless	 firms	 but	 design	
work is also increasingly outsourced and 
predesigned IP components are commonly used 
as noted above. The design service and IP market 
was	about	USD	2.8	billion	in	2007.
The outputs of the design phase are used 
to create optical masks that are used to “print” 
microscopic components on silicon wafers. As 
modern chips can consist of tens of layers that 
need to be exactly aligned to produce a working 
chip, a set of optical masks required to expose 
a silicon wafer can easily cost over a million 
USD.	The	optical	mask	manufacturing	processes	
are highly automated, and the equipment are 
supplied by a relatively small number of firms 
that apply sophisticated technologies and state-
of-the-art knowledge to make the manufacturing 
process possible. Mask making is also nowadays 
a very computer intensive task. In the advanced 
semiconductor fabrication processes, where the 
wavelength used to expose the mask image onto 
the wafer greatly exceed the desired feature sizes, 
masks are computed so that their interactions with 
the actual fabrication process create the desired 
features on the wafer. In the bleeding-edge, the 
mask features are purely computational, with no 
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visual correspondence with the image produced. 
Today, many semiconductor manufacturers 
outsource mask making to specialist firms. This 
merchant photomask market was about 2.3 
billion	USD	in	2007.
Similarly, polished semiconductor wafers 
are produced by firms that specialize in growing 
silicon crystals. Although wafers represent the 
most critical raw material for the industry, in the 
sense that the wafers provide the actual physical 
substance onto which chips are formed, the 
industry also uses many other materials, including 
an increasing number of rare metals, and gases 
such as helium and silane. For example, the market 
for	photoresists	was	about	USD	1.2	billion	in	2007.	
In total, the semiconductor materials market was 
about	28	billion	USD	in	2007,	and	roughly	half	of	
that, about 12.5 billion, was for silicon wafers.
At present, about 25 percent of the cost 
of setting up a semiconductor factory consists 
of optical lithography machinery that is used 
to expose the wafers. The future generation 
extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines 
are	 expected	 to	 cost	 about	 USD	 100	 million	
per unit, or more than a Boeing 737.70 In total, 
the semiconductor manufacturing equipment 
industry	had	revenues	of	about	45	billion	USD	in	
2007. The capital equipment spending declined 
dramatically at the end of 2008, and Gartner, 
Inc. now expects equipment spending to contract 
to 21 billion in 2009. The capital equipment 
spending	breakdown	is	shown	in	Figure	6,	based	
on	December	2008	data	from	Gartner,	Inc.71
After semiconductor wafers are exposed 
and processed, they are cut into chips that are 
further wired and packaged into components. As 
the creation of semiconductor wafers is difficult, 
typically only a fraction of the dies in a wafer 
are flawless. The dies, therefore, are tested in 
several ways before they are processed further. 
Today, packaging, assembly and testing are 
70 The comparison comes from Risto Puhakka from VLSI 
Research.
71 Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International 
(SEMI) gives a wafer processing equipment market of 
USD	31.95	billion,	assembly	and	packaging	USD	2.84	
billion,	test	equipment	5.06	billion	and	other	equipment	
2.92 billion, with total 42.77 billion for 2007.
Figure 6: Semiconductor equipment spending, 2007-2012
  50 
At present, about 25 percent of the cost of setting up a semiconductor factory consists of optical 
lithography machinery that is used to expose the wafers. The future generation extreme ultraviolet 
(EUV) lithography machines are expected to cost about USD 100 million per unit, or more than a 
Boeing 737.70 In total, the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry had revenues of about 
45 billion USD in 2007. The capital equipment spending declined dramatically at the end of 2008, 
and Gartner, Inc. now expects equipment spending to contract to 21 billion in 2009. The capital 
equipment spending breakdown is shown in Figure 7, based on December 2008 data from Gartner, 
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Figure 7: Semiconductor equipment spending 2007 2012
After semiconductor wafers are exposed and processed, they are cut into chips that are further wired 
and packaged into components. As the creation of semiconductor wafers is difficult, typically only a 
fraction of the dies in a wafer are flawless. The dies, therefore, are tested in several ways before 
they are processed further. Today, packaging, assembly and testing are widely outsourced to 
specialized SATS firms, mainly located in Asia. According to Gartner, semico ductor assembly and 
70  The comparison comes from Risto Puhakka from VLSI Research. 
71  Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) gives a wafer processing equipment market of USD 
31.95 bil i n, as e bl  and pack ging USD 2.84 billion, test equipm nt 5.06 billion and other equipment 2.92 
billion, with total 42.77 billion for 2007. 
Data from Gartner, Inc., 2008
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widely outsourced to specialized SATS firms, 
mainly located in Asia. According to Gartner, 
semiconductor assembly and testing services was 
about	a	USD	20.6	billion	industry	in	2007.	The	top	
vendors	include	ASE	Group,	with	revenues	of	USD	
3 billion and market share of 15 percent, Amkor 
Technology	(USD	2,7	billion),	SPIL	(USD	2	billion),	
STATS	ChipPAC	(USD	1.6	billion),	and	UTAC	(USD	
756	million).	The	SATS	 industry	has	been	one	of	
the growth segments in the semiconductor value 
chain during the last seven years.
The design of semiconductors relies today 
on sophisticated software tools that can be 
used to support the functional design of chips 
and	 their	 layouts.	Due	 to	 the	complex	nature	of	
even relatively simple semiconductor chips, it is 
impossible to create them without specialized 
computer-aided engineering (CAE) or electronic 
design	 automation	 (EDA)	 tools.	 The	 market	 is	
dominated by four US companies, Synopsys, 
Cadence,	Mentor	Graphics,	 and	Magma	Design	
Automation, although a large number of smaller 
specialist	 EDA	 vendors	 also	 exist.	 According	
to	 data	 from	 EDA	 Consortium	 Market	 Statistics	
Service, global revenues for CAE products were 
about	USD	2.3	billion	 in	2007.	 In	addition,	 the	
EDA	 industry	 gets	 revenues	 from	 IC	 physical	
design and verification tools, printed circuit 
design tools, design services, and semiconductor 
IP	 licensing.	 According	 to	 EDAC,	 the	 total	
revenues	were	about	USD	5.8	billion,	of	which	
about 1.0 billion was for semiconductor IP.72
The users of CAE tools are the actual 
designers of semiconductor components. These 
design activities occur in various points of the 
semiconductor	value	system.	For	example,	IDMs	
employ large numbers of design engineers. Large 
electronics manufacturers such as Sony, Samsung, 
Nokia, Motorola, and Philips have traditionally 
had large captive design groups developing 
application specific integrated circuits for their 
own products, although recently they have started 
to spin off and outsource much of their design 
activities. Independent design service houses such 
as the Indian Wipro and the Taiwanese Global 
Unichip Corporation now provide services for 
semiconductor design, and there are hundreds 
of small specialized design houses around the 
world. Also electronics manufacturing services 
(EMS) firms, such as Flextronics, have extended 
their services by providing semiconductor design 
services as part of their service package.
72	 EDAC	collects	data	from	its	member	firms	and	complements	
it with data from other sources. The exact data collection 
methodology is not known but the IP data probably include 
some revenues from independent IP vendors.
Design Services for Future Technologies
Global Unichip Corp. (GUC), is a dedicated full service SoC (System On Chip) Design Foundry based 
in Taiwan. It was founded in 1998. GUC provides total solutions from silicon-proven IPs to complex 
time-to-market SoC turnkey services. GUC provides the most advanced silicon solutions through 
close partnership with the leading pure-play foundry TSMC, GUC’s major shareholder, and other 
key packaging and testing power houses. With state of the art EDA tools, advanced methodologies, 
and experienced technical team, GUC promises to ensure the highest quality and lowest risks to 
achieve first silicon success. GUC has established a global customer base throughout Greater China, 
Japan, Korea, North America, and Europe. Revenues for GUC were about 295 million USD in 2008, 
representing an annual growth of 33 percent.
GUC works closely with TSMC, and they are therefore able to develop design tools and verify their 
semiconductor IP for bleeding-edge technologies ahead of competition. GUC is currently working on 
developing a 32nm test chip, which they expect to be out in 2009.
GUC has recently established branch offices in Europe and Korea, stating the need to be close to 
important competitors and big ASIC users.
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The semiconductor value chain with 2007 
revenues is shown in Figure 7. In practice, firms 
can reconfigure their value adding activities in 
many	 different	 ways.	 For	 example,	 some	 IDMs	
and fabless firms develop their own CAE tools 
and they also license internally developed 
semiconductor IP components to outside 
customers. A relatively new phenomenon is also 
the emergence of manufacturing service firms 
that manage the creation of customer chips from 
design to integration of third-party IP, coordinating 
work with foundries and assembly and test firms. 
An example of such “value chain producer” is 
eSilicon, based in Sunnyvale, California.
IP aggregators are service firms that provide 
access to third-party semiconductor IP. Two 
important	aggregators	are	Design	&	Reuse,	based	
in Grenoble, France and ChipEstimate.com, 
based in San Jose, California.73 Both allow the 
users to search for third-party IP components, 
and	 they	 also	 act	 as	 news	 portals.	 Design	 &	
Reuse also allows potential IP buyers to request 
new IP components from the pool of suppliers. 
A different type of IP aggregator is IPextreme. It 
focuses on licensing semiconductor IP that has 
been	developed	in	IDMs	and	OEMs.
The independent semiconductor IP vendors 
are discussed in detail in the following chapter.
73	 ChipEstimate	was	acquired	by	the	EDA	vendor	Cadence	
in March 2008.
Figure 7: The semiconductor value chain, 2007.
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IP aggregators are service firms that provide access to third-party semiconductor IP. Two important 
aggregators are Design & Reuse, based in Grenoble, France and ChipEstimate.com, based in San 
Jose, California.73 Both allow the users to search for third-party IP components, and they also act as 
news portals. Design & Reuse also allows potential IP buyers to request new IP components from 
the pool of suppliers. A different type of IP aggregator is IPextreme. It focuses on licensing 
semiconductor IP that has been developed in IDMs and OEMs. 
73 ChipEstimate was acquired by the EDA vendor Cadence in March 2008. 
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Figure 8: The semiconductor value chain, 2007.
Source: Meaning Processing
42
4.
  T
he
 C
ur
re
nt
 C
on
te
xt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
lle
ct
ua
l P
ro
pe
rt
y 
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
al
 B
lo
ck
s 
In
du
st
ry
 
Electronics Manufacturing Services for Chip Makers
eSilicon is an electronics manufacturing service for semiconductor manufacturing. It calls itself a Value 
Chain Producer (VCP). It provides a comprehensive suite of design, productisation and manufacturing 
services, managing the production of devices for companies who don’t want or are unable to deal with 
the complexities of the semiconductor value chain. The company delivers chips to system OEMs and 
fabless semiconductor companies.
Prior to 2000, electronics companies that didn’t own their own semiconductor fabrication facility had 
two choices for the development and manufacture of their application-specific integrated circuits 
(ASICs). They could work with a large integrated device manufacturer (IDM), which locked them into 
limited facilities and a narrow intellectual property (IP) portfolio; or they could attempt to manage the 
process themselves by working directly with a pure-play foundry, and take on the associated risks and 
challenges.
eSilicon provides a third alternative. In this model, eSilicon offers a wide variety of design services; a 
broad portfolio of proven IP solutions and tools; and a full range of manufacturing support, including 
the delivery of packaged, tested chips. eSilicon creates an optimized semiconductor Value Chain for 
each customer and each design - from design services and tools, to IP and materials vendors, to test 
and packaging providers. It can take customer-created layout data files and manage the fabrication, 
packaging, test and delivery of the final silicon; a netlist and perform the physical design, and manage 
all subsequent manufacturing operations, including fabrication, packaging, test and delivery; or a 
completed IC design and provide full production support, including planning, supplier management 
and qualification, delivery flexibility programs and supply chain visibility.
eSilicon was founded in 2000, and it has about 115 employees. It was named ‘Rising Star’ in Deloitte’s 
Technology Fast 500 program, January 2006.
In December 2007, eSilicon acquired the existing products and certain assets of the Swedish fabless 
firm SwitchCore AB. Through this acquisition, eSilicon extended its production services business 
model to the customers of companies that have made a decision to exit all or part of their existing 
businesses. Through this new service, eSilicon is able to extend the availability of these product lines 
by providing a continued supply of devices for the systems which incorporate them. This saves the 
customers of these product lines the financial and supply risks associated with the end-of-life buys 
they would have otherwise faced had the products been obsolete.
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5.1. The IP Market
Different	 definitions	 of	 revenue	 streams	
and different methodologies lead to somewhat 
different estimates of the semiconductor 
intellectual property market size, at present giving 
estimates	ranging	from	the	low	one	billion	USD74 
to	over	two	billion	USD.	As	there	are	many	small	
vendors and many firms are privately owned, 
market studies are based on estimates. More 
importantly, different studies differ as they include 
different firms and revenue categories. For larger 
firms, revenues also greatly depend on how they 
book revenues from license and royalty contracts 
and exceptional income from legal settlements. 
74	 EDAC	 Market	 Statistics	 Service	 gives	 1,043	 million	
USD	 revenues	 for	 2007,	 excluding	 IC	 physical	 design	
and	verification	(valued	at	$1,567	million)	and	services	
($337	million).	EDAC	MSS	collects	mainly	data	through	
the	partner	organizations	of	the	EDA	Consortium;	in	the	
IP area it, however, uses also “available public sources,” 
without detailing them.
The global revenues from semiconductor IP, 
including technology licensing and design IP, are 
shown in Figure 8 using data from Gartner, Inc.
Market researchers do not always describe 
their data collection methodology in detail, 
and it is therefore difficult to know how exact 
the numbers are. In particular, it is not obvious 
how the market for foundry IP and IP provided 
by	 EDA	 firms	 should	 be	 counted.	 Major	 IP	
vendors also get revenues from design services, 
consulting, training, and design software. An 
independent verification of the revenues of the 
top 20 IP vendors, using public filings in 2007, 
complemented with the estimated volume for 
the about 450 firms that actively market their 
IP,	 leads	 to	 an	 estimate	 of	 USD	 1.8	 billion	 in	
2007, which is close to Gartner estimate of 1.9 
billion. The revenue structures are discussed in 
more detail below. According to preliminary 
data from Gartner, Inc., the IP market will be 2.1 
billion in 2008, growing 7.7 percent from 2007. 
5. The Intellectual Property Business
Figure 8: Semiconductor intellectual property market, 1999-2008
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Figure 9: Semiconductor intellectual property market, 
1999 2008
Market researchers do not always describe their data collection methodology in detail, and it is 
therefore difficult to know how exact the numbers are. In particular, it is not obvious how the 
market for foundry IP and IP provided by EDA firms should be counted. Major IP vendors also get 
74  EDAC Market Statistics Service gives 1,043 million USD revenues for 2007, excluding IC physical design and 
verification (valued at $1,567 million) and services ($337 million). EDAC MSS collects mainly data through the 
partner organizations of the EDA Consortium; in the IP area it, however, uses also “available public sources,” 
without detailing them. 
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Source: Gartner, Inc., various years.
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The	microprocessor	 IP	market	will	 be	USD	582	
million, and digital signal processing IP market 
about 52 million.75
The estimated growth of the semiconductor 
IP markets is shown in Figure 9. The data for the 
figure comes from iSupply, 2007. As recently 
as in June 2008, Gartner, Inc. expected the 
independent IP and chip design services to grow 
at a compound rate of 11.4 percent from 2007 to 
2012,	to	reach	USD	4.8	billion	at	the	end	of	the	
period. The rapid economic downturn towards 
the end of 2008 will lead to revised estimates, 
perhaps cutting the 2009 revenues down in the 
25 percent range. This will most probably lead to 
the exit of many small IP vendors, many of which 
have difficulties in finding financing for their 
unprofitable operations.
75 See Table 1.
5.2. IP Customers
Semiconductor IP is purchased by three 
main customer groups. The most important of 
these is integrated device suppliers. Both fabless 
semiconductor	 firms	 and	 IDMs	 use	 third-party	
IP to create new devices. For example, Intel has 
licensed ARM’s processor cores since 1997, and 
both Qualcomm and Texas Instruments use ARM 
cores in their mobile phone chips.
Second, semiconductor IP is also licensed by 
electronics manufacturers who develop their own 
ASICs and SoCs, or who need access to patented 
technologies.
Third, semiconductor IP is licensed to 
design houses, who design systems and chips for 
equipment manufacturers, and to independent 
IP vendors, who develop their own software, 
semiconductor, and verification IP that can be 
combined with the purchased IP. Although small 
design houses and IP vendors create relatively 
small revenue streams, major IP vendors actively 
support this customer group. This is because the 
Figure 9: iSuppli semiconductor IP revenue forecast, 2004-2011
revenues from design services, consulting, training, and design software. An independent 
verification of the revenues of the top 20 IP vendors, using public filings in 2007, complement d 
with the estimated volume for the about 450 firms that actively market their IP, leads to an estimate 
of USD 1.8 billion in 2007, which is close to Gartner estimate of 1.9 billion. The revenue structures 
are discusse  in more detail bel w. According to preliminary data from Gartner, Inc., th  IP market 
will be 2.1 billion in 2008, growing 7.7 percent from 2007. The microprocessor IP market will be 
USD 582 million, and digital signal processing IP market about 52 million.75
The estimated growth of the semiconductor IP markets is shown in Figure 10. The data for the 
figure comes from iSupply, 2007. As recently as in June 2008, Gartner, Inc. expected the 
independent IP and chip design services to grow at a compound rate of 11.4 percent from 2007 to 
2012, to reach USD 4.8 billion at the end of the period. The rapid economic downturn towards the 
end of 2008 will lead to revised estimates, perhaps cutting the 2009 revenues down in the 25 
percent range. This will most probably lead to the exit of many small IP vendors, many of which 
have difficulties in finding financing for their unprofitable operations. 
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Figure 10: iSuppli semiconductor IP revenue forecast, 2004-2011. 
75  See Table 1. 
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Source: iSuppli, 2007
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success of an IP core and its broader architecture 
typically depends on vibrant ecosystems of third-
party developers and designers.
In many cases, the IP licensee could also use 
its internal design team to create the required IP, 
or outsource the design task to a design service 
firm. The make or buy decision is influenced by 
factors such as time-to-market, cost, availability of 
competent engineers, the competitive advantages 
created by proprietary designs, and product life-
cycle considerations. Furthermore, as purchasing 
of IP cores requires both technical evaluation 
of the quality of the IP and the assessment of 
economic and legal risks, the purchasing process 
is often complicated. The main decision criteria, 
as perceived from a potential design IP purchaser’s 
point	of	view,	are	outlined	below	in	Table	6.
IP vendors typically have to address the above 
requirements if they want to be economically 
viable. In practice, they usually have to make 
trade-offs, and focus on customers whose demand 
matches with the characteristics of supply. In 
general, the economics in the semiconductor IP 
sector improve the competitiveness of the largest 
firms.
The globally leading IP vendor is ARM 
Holdings, plc. ARM has grown rapidly partly 
because it was able to provide processors that have 
been particularly suitable for mobile phones, and as 
Table 6: Main criteria for semiconductor IP make-or-buy decisions.
Time to market The main attraction of IP cores is that they can considerably accelerate product development and shorten the 
time to market. An IP core can embed several dozens of years of engineering effort. By reusing a core, much of 
this effort can be avoided, and a new product can be launched rapidly.
Availability of 
skilled designers
Semiconductor IP design requires sophisticated skills and experienced developers. When the IP addresses 
specialist domains, the designers also need expert knowledge in these application domains. Typically, the 
required skills are in short supply.
Development cost 
and commercial 
risk
Although commercial high-quality semiconductor IP is not necessarily cheap, it is almost always cheaper than if 
the same core would be developed internally. This is because IP vendors can usually amortize their development 
costs over many customers. Semiconductor IP contracts also typically consist of three cost components: one-
time front-end license fee, support, and royalties. Royalty payments are bound to the number of final products 
actually shipped. If the product does not ship, there are no royalty payments.
Technical risks IP cores are complex and the designs almost always have design errors and bugs. The majority of ASIC 
development costs is today related to the testing and verification of the designs. Commercial IP that is widely 
used has lower risks. The leading commercial IP cores are usually tested for several manufacturing processes 
in many foundries. They therefore have considerably smaller technical risks that designs that are implemented 
for the first time.
Legal risks Internally developed IP can also have legal risks, as someone may claim that the designs infringe existing 
intellectual property rights.
Benefits from 
proprietary 
designs
Firms may want to develop IP internally if the design contains unique proprietary knowledge that can lead to 
competitive advantages. If the IP is widely available and does not differentiate products, there is little reason to 
develop it internally. Commercial IP may also be attractive if it contains unique functionality that could lead to 
competitive advantages, or if the vendor has patent rights to critical technological solutions.
Product lifecycle 
management
IP users typically plan for product lifecycles that consist of several product versions. If the IP vendor is able to 
invest in continuous improvements in its IP, the user may benefit from new innovation and technical advances.
Sourcing risks When customers build their products using licensed IP cores, their products become dependent on these cores. 
The user may have problems if the core does not work as expected, or if the vendor is unable to maintain it 
throughout the end-product lifetime. Vendor reliability and financial and technical capabilities, therefore, are 
important factors when cores are licensed.
Vendor support The integration of IP cores into new designs often requires experience and expert knowledge. IP users need to 
know whether the vendor can provide such expertise when needed.
IP ecosystems Large IP vendors support third-party developers who build complementary IP, for example, compatible cores, 
verification IP and development tools. These can increase design flexibility and decrease economic and 
technical risks.
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the largest mobile phone maker Nokia decided to 
use third-party processors and chips in its phones. 
ARM revenues by destination, defined as location 
of customers are shown in Figure 10. The data come 
from ARM annual reports, 1998-2007.
A more detailed breakdown of ARM 
revenues by destination, defined as location of 
customers, for years 2007 and 2008 is shown 
in Figure 11.
Figure 10: ARM revenues by customer location, 1996-2007
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008
Figure 11: ARM customer locations, 2006-2007
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Figure 12: ARM customer locations 2006 7
5.3. IP Providers 
In semiconductor design, intellectual property can be created as copyrights, mask works, and 
patents. Revenues can be generated by licensing the intellectual property, by collecting royalties 
when the IP is used, by providing complementary products and services, such as development tools 
and contract services, or by using IP internally to gain competitive advantages. IP vendors typically 
combine several of these revenue streams. 
Most of the IP vendors are very small firms, often with less than five employees. The barriers for 
entry are low, as IP can be designed by anyone with access to a PC, design tools, and relevant 
design skills. Two types of small IP firms are common. In the first case, small independent IP 
vendors code some specialist knowledge about a specific application domain into a design that can 
be licensed. These IP firms often have their roots in universities where new ideas for electronic 
design or new algorithms have been developed. In the second case, small design houses start to sell 
their accumulated IP as an independent product. These firms typically have their roots in design 
expertise.
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008
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5.3. IP Providers
In semiconductor design, intellectual property 
can be created as copyrights, mask works, and 
patents. Revenues can be generated by licensing 
the intellectual property, by collecting royalties 
when the IP is used, by providing complementary 
products and services, such as development tools 
and contract services, or by using IP internally to 
gain competitive advantages. IP vendors typically 
combine several of these revenue streams.
Most of the IP vendors are very small firms, 
often with less than five employees. The barriers 
for entry are low, as IP can be designed by anyone 
with access to a PC, design tools, and relevant 
design skills. Two types of small IP firms are 
common. In the first case, small independent IP 
vendors code some specialist knowledge about a 
specific application domain into a design that can 
be licensed. These IP firms often have their roots 
in universities where new ideas for electronic 
design or new algorithms have been developed. 
In the second case, small design houses start 
to sell their accumulated IP as an independent 
product. These firms typically have their roots in 
design expertise.
In the 1990s, there were great expectations 
that independent semiconductor IP firms 
would rapidly become the next big thing in the 
semiconductor industry. This did not happen, 
partly because of the ICT downturn in year 2000, 
but also because the independent IP vendor 
model is difficult to make economically viable 
for a number of reasons. First, as noted above, 
IP users need reliable and predictable vendors, 
who can provide support and maintain their IP as 
long as the user needs it. Such product lifecycle 
management typically requires considerable 
resources. Second, the users often need flexible 
and large portfolios of IP. Larger vendors 
therefore have a clear advantage. They have also 
an advantage if they can provide components 
that match well together and which can easily be 
integrated with each other. The smaller IP vendors 
often therefore try to join partnership programs 
set up by the key actors. An example of such IP 
ecosystem is the ARM Connected Community.76
Small successful design-oriented IP firms do 
exist. An example, Arteris, SA, is detailed in the 
box on the next page.
As firms in recent years have started to actively 
manage their intellectual capital portfolios, many 
firms have realized that they could benefit from 
licensing their semiconductor IP to outsiders. In 
practice, however, licensing typically requires 
considerable effort. For example, the IP has to 
be documented in a form that makes it useful for 
outsiders. In practice, the legal and managerial 
effort required to negotiate licenses also often 
exceeds the benefits of licensing IP designs. 
Semiconductor firms have therefore often 
used their IP in a form of patents. Large patent 
portfolios can be used both to limit competition 
and to improve their competitive position through 
cross-licensing. For example, Texas Instruments 
has used its IP to create chips for their customers 
and to limit competitor activity, but it rarely 
licenses its designs to external developers.77 Also 
some independent IP firms have converted their 
business models toward patent licensing. An 
example, Patriot Scientific, Inc., is detailed in the 
second box on the next page.
Also large semiconductor firms gain 
considerable revenues by licensing patent rights. 
For example, a large fraction of Qualcomm’s 
9.7	billion	USD	 revenues	 and	over	half	 of	 its	 6	
billion gross profit comes from patent licensing. 
Qualcomm, however, is not counted as an IP 
vendor in market studies. If it would license its IP 
cores, it would easily become the globally largest 
IP vendor.
76 http://www.arm.com/community/
77 In fact, the strengthening of the US patent rights, and 
the resulting increase in patenting, are often associated 
with the change in Texas Instruments patent policy in 
the early 1980s.
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Arteris, Inc.
Arteris, Inc. is now headquartered in San José, California, with its main base in Paris. It was founded 
in February 2003 to develop and sell Network-on-Chip IP. Network-on-Chip (NoC) is used to link the 
various IP cores on a System-on-Chip in a somewhat similar way as the Internet connects computers. 
As the SoC architectures become increasingly complex, NoC architectures can make chip design 
easier and allow optimized connection topologies. The founders were Alain Fanet, César Douady and 
Philippe Boucard, with a joint history first at Matra and then as founders of T.Sqware. T.Sqware was 
sold to GlobespanVirata for over USD 200 million in 2000.
The company moved its headquarters to San José in 2007. It had about 26 employees in Paris and 8 
in San José.
Arteris is a venture-capital backed start-up. Its first-round investors included the Palo Alto -based 
Crescendo Ventures, Munich-based TVM, and French Ventech, and Atlas Venture. It raised over USD 
12 million in the first round of investment in 2003, and received 1.5 million euro interest-free loan 
from Anvar, the French agency that operates under the aegis of the Ministries of Industry, SMEs and 
Research. The second round of investments was led by the current EDA leader Synopsys, raising 
USD 8.1 million in 2007. The third round was led by the Japanese DoCoMo Capital in 2008, raising 
USD 7.5 million. According to the Arteris press announcement, this brings the total investment in the 
company to USD 25 million, with more than USD 32 million in equity funding from an international set 
of investors.
Arteris introduced it first product in March 2005. This was  globally the first commercial implementation 
of a Network-on-Chip. The NoCSolution consists of NoCexplorer that can be used to design the 
network on chip, and NoCcompiler that creates the actual logic that is implemented on the chip to 
connects its various IP blocks. The product is available on either per project license or royalty pricing 
models. When the product was first introduced, the pricing was announced to start at USD 350,000. 
Its customers include STMicroelectronics, Texas Instruments, Thales, and NEC.
In 2007, Arteris had product sales of 113,000 € and service sales of 360,000 €, and its operating 
income included 2.133 million € assets produced in-house. The operating income was – 4.884 million 
Euros and its profit was -4.5 million Euros.
Patriot Scientific Corporation
Patriot Scientific was founded in 1987 with technologies applicable for U.S. Department of Defence 
applications. In 1994, the company developed a 32-bit microprocessor architecture and in 2001 it 
began licensing its microprocessor chip as an IP core.
Patriot Scientific evolved in 2005 into a IPR holding company, unifying its patent portfolio with the TPL 
group, which focuses on IPR management services, including the maximization of cash return of IPR 
portfolios. The Patriot Scientific patents are commercialized by Alliacence, a TPL Group enterprise, 
which according to its own description employs a cadre of IP-licensing strategists. TPL and Patriot 
assert that their jointly owned patents protect techniques used in almost all microprocessors, 
microcontrollers, digital signal processors, embedded processors, and SoC implementations. Patriot 
and TPL believe that at least three of their patents are elemental to virtually every microprocessor 
design. These include:
•	 U.S.	5,809,336:	Clocking	CPU	and	I/O	Separately
•	 U.S.	6,598,148:	Use	of	Multiple	Cores	and	Embedded	Memory
•	 U.S.	5,784,584:	Multiple	Instruction	Fetch.
The patents were granted in 1998 and they are valid through 2015. The Patriot patent portfolio is licensed 
by Intel, AMD, HP, Casio, Fujitsu, Sony, Nikon, Olympus, Kenwood, and Nokia, among others.
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A purely IP-based firm, which licenses IP 
designs and also heavily relies on patent licensing, 
is Rambus, based in Los Altos, California. The 
total	 revenues	of	Rambus	were	180	million	USD	
in 2007. It gains the majority of its revenues by 
licensing its broad portfolio of memory interface 
patents to semiconductor and systems companies. 
These licenses are royalty-bearing. In 2007, the 
three	largest	licensees,	AMD,	Fujitsu	and	Qimonda,	
generated royalty revenues of about 72 million 
USD.	 Rambus,	 however,	 also	 extensively	 sells	
its design IP. These “product licenses” typically 
include one-time fixed-cost components and 
ongoing license fees. As the integration of Rambus 
technologies often require detailed knowledge on 
the provided IP, the contracts also usually include 
a fixed cost engineering component. For Rambus, 
these engineering contract revenues were about 
14 percent of total revenues in 2007. Royalty 
revenues, which include patent royalties and IP 
license	fees,	were	154.3	million	USD	in	the	same	
year.
A somewhat special characteristic of Rambus 
is that a large fraction of its royalty revenues has 
been created through litigation. Rambus had over 
680	patents	and	about	540	patent	applications	at	
the end of 2007, and it claims to hold valid patents 
for some key memory technologies, including 
synchronous dynamic random access memories 
(SDRAM)	 and	 double	 data-rate	 (DDR)	 memory	
interfaces. These technologies are critically 
important in many digital devices and related 
Rambus IP rights have been contested by major 
semiconductor	 manufacturers.	 During	 the	 last	
years, the patent litigation expenses of Rambus 
have	been	close	to	40	million	USD,	annually.
New business models are currently emerging 
that aim to commercialize captive semiconductor 
IP that until now has been difficult to utilize. For 
example, IPextreme, Inc., based in Campbell, 
California, provides standardized license 
agreements that allow third parties to access IP 
from major semiconductor firms. The IP can be 
downloaded from the IPextreme’s web portal. A 
similar service was launched in February 2008 by 
Think Silicon Ltd., a design service and IP core 
provider, based in Patras, Greece. Its IP Partnership 
programme is aimed towards companies and 
contractors who have developed IP cores for 
internal use, but are unable or unwilling to sell 
and support their designs in the market. Think 
Silicon works closely with those companies to 
allow them to commercialize their designs by 
utilizing its IPGenius platform and providing 
them with live usage status. The IPs are obtained 
in source code form with simple licensing terms 
and delivered to users through a web portal. 
IPextreme is further detailed in the box below.
IP Aggregators
IPextreme is an example of IP aggregator that focuses on commercializing captive IP from large 
semiconductor and systems firms. IPextreme now provides access to IP from Freescale, Infineon, 
Cypress, National Semiconductor, NXP, and Mentor Graphics. Its online marketplace, the Core Store, 
offers IP to all interested parties for a fixed price, without having to conduct further negotiations or 
work through middlemen.
Freescale Semiconductor was among the first IPextreme’s Core Store partners, making its ColdFire V1 
32-bit processor core available for licensing through the Core Store in January 2008. For a fixed rate 
of $10,000 per single user, systems designers will be able to license and download the ColdFire V1 
code in encrypted Verilog format, plus documentation and integration testbech and tests. According 
to Freescale, such IP would typically made available to the market at $100,000 to $300,000. Freescale 
is providing its IP through IPextreme in an attempt to attract new cost-conscious users for its IP.
At present, also National Semiconductor provides fixed-price IP through Core Store. For example, one 
can download a smart card interface from National Semiconductor for 2,000 USD.
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A major problem with the independent IP 
model is the need to negotiate licensing contracts. 
As complex SoCs can include dozens of IP blocks, 
the legal effort easily overwhelms the technical 
complexity of integrating IP blocks from different 
vendors. This challenge is specifically addressed 
by services such as the SignOnce Program 
supported by Xilinx, the leading provider of FPGA 
chips. Since 2001, the SignOnce IP licenses have 
been used to provide common license terms for 
FPGA-based soft IP. Users of IP therefore do not 
have to negotiate separate licenses for third-party 
IP. Instead, they can use a standardized contract 
to access all the IP provided by the partners in the 
SignOnce	Program.	In	June	2008,	there	were	476	
cores available through SignOnce.
Large electronics manufacturers have 
also created spin-offs to commercialize their 
semiconductor IP. For example, in April 
2007, Philips spun-off Silicon Hive B.V., as 
an independent IP supplier. Silicon Hive, 
headquartered in Eindhoven, has developed a 
fast media processing architecture, which it sells 
to semiconductor and consumer electronics 
industry, targeting communications, video, 
and image applications. Silicon Hive also sells 
software development tools that support the 
development of systems that use its IP cores. The 
company employs now about 50 people.
Many fabless semiconductor firms both 
use their IP internally to develop chips and 
also license it to other system developers. For 
example, Silicon Image, Inc., based in Sunnyvale, 
California, is one of the leading providers of 
digital video cores. It uses IP licensing as a 
complementary revenue stream for its product 
sales, as well as to facilitate the adoption of 
technologies where it has intellectual property 
rights. Most of the IP it licenses has field of use 
restrictions that prevent the licensee from building 
chips that compete directly with Silicon Image’s 
products. In fiscal 2007, Silicon Image had total 
revenues	 of	 about	 320	million	 USD.	 Licensing,	
royalties and related development work generated 
16	percent,	or	50.8	million	of	the	total.	In	2006,	
the revenues form licensing, royalties and related 
development	work	were	44.6	million,	 including	
about 12 million of royalty revenues originating 
from a settlement agreement with Genesis 
Microchip. Its IP licensing agreements generally 
include a nonexclusive license for the underlying 
IP. Fees under these agreements typically include 
license fees, maintenance and support, and 
royalties payable following the sale of products 
incorporating the licensed technology.
5.3.1 Top 20 IP Core Vendors
The largest IP vendors are listed in Table 7 
below. The table shows revenues generated from 
licensing IP, excluding one-time legal settlement 
fees. For year 2007, the table shows revenues 
for each company from its fiscal year ending in 
2007. As the fiscal years end in different months 
for different firms, the numbers do not exactly 
correspond to the industry revenues in year 2007. 
TTPcom, based in Melbourne, UK, and a leading 
supplier of wireless IP in the early years of the 
decade,	was	 acquired	 in	 2006	 by	Motorola.	 Its	
numbers are estimated from its last registered 
annual	report,	for	a	period	ending	31	December	
2006.78	Data	for	privately-owned	US	firms	is	based	
on estimates, where a number of data sources are 
used. For Tensilica, Inc., we use unverifiable data 
from its web site, giving the employee count of 
120. The 2007 revenues for Tensilica are estimated 
at	USD	30	million,	based	on	market	studies	from	
earlier years and company news reports. This is 
considerably more than the sales estimate by 
Hoover’s,	 at	 the	 USD	 9	 million.	 Tensilica	 is	 a	
privately owned company based in Santa Clara 
that focuses on configurable and synthesizable 
78	 The	9	month	period	ending	in	31	December	2006	shows	
third-party contract revenues of £25 million and licensing 
to	Motorola	for	£7.9	million.	In	addition,	it	shows	R&D	
services to Motorola worth of £21.5 million. The average 
number	of	employees	for	the	year	ending	March	2006	was	
464,	and	for	the	nine	month	period	ending	31	December	
2006	it	was	375.	We	use	assume	that	the	employee	count	
declined linearly after the acquisition to arrive a year end 
count	of	286	employees.
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digital signal processing cores. It has over 120 
licensees,	 including	 AMD,	 Broadcom,	 Fujitsu,	
Intel and STMicroelectronics. Similarly, accurate 
data for the privately-owned Analog Bits, Inc., is 
not available. As a reference for earlier years, we 
use data provided by iSuppli.79
Rankings provided by market research 
firms are very popular among vendors as the top 
positions are useful for marketing. The reality 
behind the rankings, however, is complex as 
the firms have very different revenue stream 
structures. The rankings of IP vendors also changed 
considerably during 2007 due to a number of 
mergers and business re-orientations. Silicon 
Image acquired the German sci-worx, previously 
a fully-owned subsidiary of Infineon, in January 
2007. In Table 7 the revenues from sci-worx for 
2007 are included in Silicon Image’s revenues. 
79 The revenues estimated by iSuppli are different but 
roughly consistent with estimates from Gartner/
Dataquest.	However,	for	TTPCom	the	Gartner	numbers	
are almost double. The iSuppli estimate looks very low. 
One potential source of discrepancy is that iSuppli uses 
GBP	numbers	for	TTPCom,	instead	of	USD.
Mosaid sold its semiconductor IP product business 
to	 Synopsys	 for	 15.3	million	USD	 in	 June	2007.	
Mosaid now focuses on patent licensing. Lisbon-
based Chipidea, the leading supplier of analog 
and mixed-signal IP cores, was acquired by MIPS 
Technologies in August 2007, and is now called 
MIPS Technologies Analog Business Group. When 
IP revenues have not been included in the fiscal 
year revenues for the acquiring company, the table 
shows entries for both.
In 2008, the list of top 20 IP vendors 
continues to change. At the beginning of 2008, 
Motorola effectively closed down TTPcom, when 
it announced redundancies for about 155 of its 
employees.
In	June	2008,	Cadence	Design	Systems	Inc.,	
the	leading	EDA	vendor	made	a	hostile	bid	for	the	
third	 largest	EDA	vendor	Mentor	Graphics	 Inc.,	
for	USD	1.6	billion.	The	bid	didn’t	go	 through,	
and subsequently Cadence fired its CEO and 
landed in the midst of an accounting scandal as 
the firm had overstated its revenues by booking 
possible future income as revenues. Historically, 
Table 7: Top 20 IP vendor revenues and average employee counts, 2007
Rank Rank
Company
Employees
2007
IP Revenue ($M) Growth
2006 2007 2007 2006 2005 07/06 2007 Cumulative
1 1 ARM 1728 516 484 419 6,6% 29,2% 29,2%
2 2 Rambus 430 180 194 157 -7,4% 10,2% 39,4%
3 3 Synopsys 5 196 97 91 74 6,6% 5,5% 44,9%
7 4 Motorola-TTPcom* 286 87 43 53 102,0% 4,9% 49,8%
4 5 MIPS 196 83 76 59 9,2% 4,7% 54,5%
6 6 Mosaid 112 57 54 40 5,9% 3,2% 57,8%
10 7 Silicon Image 635 51 33 19 54,9% 2,9% 60,7%
5 8 Virage Locic 417 47 57 51 -18,4% 2,6 63,3
8 9 Imagination Technologies 366 43 39 29 11,2% 2,4% 65,7%
9 10 SST 715 40 37 37 7,6% 2,3 68,0%
11 11 CEVA 192 33 33 36 2,2% 1,9% 69,9%
12 12 Chipidea 310 33 32 25 3,1% 1,9% 71,7%
13 13 Tensilica* 120 30 27 20 11,1% 1,7% 73,4%
14 14 ARC 196 29 25 19 15,6% 1,6% 73,4%
15 15 Mentor Graphics 4 358 25 25 23 0,0% 1,4% 74,8%
16 16 Wipro-Newlogic 350 21 19 14 10,5% 1,2% 76,0%
19 17 Dolphin Integration 164 17 13 13 30,0% 1,0% 76,9%
17 18 Mosys 184 14 15 12 -4,7% 0,8% 77,7%
18 19 Analog Bits* N/A 13 13 11 0,0% 0,7% 78,5%
20 20 sci-worx 172 - 12 9 - 0,0% 78,5%
Others 350 220 204 59,1% 19,8% 100,0%
Total 1 766 1 542 1 323 14,5% 100,0%
Source: Author´s calculations based on company reports; iSuppli, 2007.
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Cadence has tried to avoid competing with 
independent IP vendors that create IP for the 
users of Cadence tools. Mentor appears on the 
table above, as it also creates substantial revenue 
streams from IP licensing.
Focusing on revenues easily misses important 
aspects of the IP core ecology. New start-up firms 
typically do not create revenues for several years. 
When they do, they are often acquired by existing 
firms. The innovation and revenue creation models 
are also changing today. As many open source 
projects have shown, it is possible to develop high-
quality technical systems outside business firms. 
Although the economic impact may be large, 
these initiatives are almost invisible in economic 
indicators. The open source model is rapidly 
gaining popularity also in the semiconductor IP 
field. The box below highlights some developments 
in open source semiconductor IP.
Will Open Cores Revolutionize the IP Industry?
Several open source software projects have proved the viability of self-organized distributed innovation 
and development models that rely on networked communications and content sharing. During the 
last decade, it has often been suggested that this development model could successfully be used 
beyond software development. For example, von Hippel (2005) states that there exists a clear analogy 
between innovation communities that develop sports equipment and open source software innovation 
communities. Rarely, however, innovation researchers have discussed in detail the requirements that 
make the open source model possible and successful. It therefore remains unclear whether the open 
source innovation model actually can be applied in other domains, for example, in innovative design 
and engineering of physical products such as semiconductor devices.
One success factor in open source software projects has been the fact that software is both 
the description of a system and the system (Tuomi, 2002a). In almost all other technical domains, 
descriptions are only abstract representations of the system. This has important consequences for the 
underlying innovation dynamics, in particular, when the innovation process is distributed.
Several initiatives exist today that try to extend the open source development model to IP cores. These 
include the OpenCores initiative, which acts as a portal for a large number of open core projects, 
OpenSPARC, which, for example, provides the source code for Sun’s UltraSPARC processors, and 
the GRLIB IP core architecture from Geisler Research, which includes, for example, the GNU GPL 
licensed definitions of the configurable LEON3 processor and in-chip bus controllers.
Although, for example, OpenCores claims that more than a million engineers from more than 10,000 
organizations world wide have downloaded IP from OpenCores in the first 8 years of its existence, 
there is no accurate data on the viability of the open hardware model. As IP cores are implemented 
as physical systems, their designs and implementations are distinct. This is one of the reasons why 
the verification costs of IP cores is rapidly increasing when the complexity of cores increases and the 
feature sizes decreases.
Yet, as the history of the Linux operating system kernel shows, technical development can be 
very fast if a “core kernel” can be stabilized so that peripheral innovation becomes possible. Such 
development dynamics require standardized interfaces and a relatively stable “core” that provides 
a shared foundation for measuring progress and comparing alternative designs. If semiconductor IP 
architectures have such a central core, they may have innovation dynamics that resemble open source 
software.
A preliminary statistical analysis of open IP core projects, conducted in parallel to the present study, 
indicates that IP core projects are different from typical open source software projects. With appropriate 
enablers and infrastructure, open source semiconductor IP could become highly important for future 
developments in ICT.
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5.3.2. The Geographic Dimension
As noted above, historically the semiconductor 
industry has been a leader in globalization. The 
offshoring of semiconductor production started 
already	 in	 1961	 when	 Fairchild	 launched	 its	 first	
assembly plant in Hong Kong. From this beginning, 
the industry rapidly diffused to other East Asian 
locations, forming a complex network of production 
activities. A key driver in this geographic expansion 
was the availability of cheap labour. Gradually, 
however, knowledge and availability of technical 
skills have become increasingly important. Today, 
semiconductor industry consist of a geographically 
differentiated system of production where 
knowledge and production activities concentrate in 
a small number of global hubs.
The semiconductor IP and design activities 
represent the most knowledge intensive part of 
this value system. Although IP firms tend to locate 
close to the major hubs of semiconductor industry, 
when the industry becomes globally networked it 
is not possible anymore to be close to the centre. 
Even the smallest IP firms have to be globally 
networked to be successful. Yet, many small IP 
firms are also geographically concentrated and 
rely on locational advantages. A major driver is 
the location of university and industry research 
centres, from which many IP start-ups have spun 
off. Similarly, small IP firms often have succeeded 
because of a close proximity and tight social 
networks with a major customer. In Europe, 
the key customers have included the large 
telecommunications and consumer electronics 
manufacturing firms, and, for example, aerospace, 
car, and industrial automation enterprises.
To study the geographic dimension, we used 
a	proprietary	dataset	of	682	semiconductor	design	
and IP firms. The firms in the data set consist of 
businesses that actively market design IP products, 
as well as European fabless semiconductor firms 
and design houses. In addition, the next chapter 
will analyze in more detail developments in China.
Using the dataset, a rather clear picture 
emerges. Of these firms, 210, or 31 percent are 
headquartered in the US. In Europe, the UK is 
clearly the largest host country of design and 
IP vendor firms. Israel also has a very strong 
concentration of semiconductor design and IP 
Figure 12: Geographic distribution of semiconductor IP creators
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Chinese and Indian firms market their IP globally. As was noted in the section on India, there are 
about 130,000 people working in electronics design services in India, and about 17,000 of these 
work in VLSI design industry. This is slightly more than the total employment in the top 20 IP 
vendors. Over half of the Indian ICT design employment, however, is in multinational firms and a 
large majority of the rest is in captive units of Indian design service firms. Only few Indian firms, 
therefore, arket their IP as independent products. Similarly, although China has over 500 
semiconductor design firms, as discussed in the next chapter, only few of these market their IP. In 
addition, ome Chinese IP firms have set up their headquarters in Silicon Valley, where inter ational 
customers are easy to access. 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008
Figure 13: Geographic distribution of semiconductor IP creators
The geographic concentration of IP vendors becomes clearly visible when the headquarter address 
locations are shown on the map. This can be seen in Figure 14, which shows markers for firms 
headquartered in the US. As can be seen from a close-up on the San Francisco Bay area on top of 
the map, Silicon Valley has a very considerable concentration of firms specializing  in this domain, 
with almost one hundred firms within a 20 kilometre distance from the centre of Mountain View.  
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
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vendor firms, with 54 firms. The distribution of 
these firms in different countries is shown in Figure 
12. The relatively low count of firms in China and 
India in the figure reflects the fact that only few 
Chinese and Indian firms market their IP globally. 
As was noted in the section on India, there are 
about 130,000 people working in electronics 
design services in India, and about 17,000 of 
these work in VLSI design industry. This is slightly 
more than the total employment in the top 20 
IP vendors. Over half of the Indian ICT design 
employment, however, is in multinational firms 
and a large majority of the rest is in captive units 
of Indian design service firms. Only few Indian 
firms, therefore, market their IP as independent 
products. Similarly, although China has over 500 
semiconductor design firms, as discussed in the 
next chapter, only few of these market their IP. In 
addition, some Chinese IP firms have set up their 
headquarters in Silicon Valley, where international 
customers are easy to access.
The geographic concentration of IP vendors 
becomes clearly visible when the headquarter 
address locations are shown on the map. This can 
be seen in Figure 13, which shows markers for firms 
headquartered in the US. As can be seen from a 
close-up on the San Francisco Bay area on top of 
the map, Silicon Valley has a very considerable 
concentration of firms specializing in this domain, 
with almost one hundred firms within a 20 kilometre 
distance from the centre of Mountain View.
Focusing on Europe, the UK, France, and 
Germany emerge as the countries with the highest 
number of firms. This can be seen in Figure 14.
Figure 13: Semiconductor IP vendors in the US.
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Figure 14: Semiconductor IP vendors in the US
Focusing on Europe, the UK, France, and Germany emerge as the countries with the highest 
number of firms. This can be seen in Figure 15. 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
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For the EU27 countries, the distribution of fabless semiconductor firms, semiconductor design 
firms, and IP vendor firms is shown in Figure 16 below. The total number of these firms is 305. Not 
all these firms market their semiconductor IP, as the data shown in the figure also include fabless 
firms and design houses that use their IP only internally. The data include firms that have their 
headquarters in EU27 or which otherwise are known to have roots there.  As the graph shows only 
the number of firms, the actual number of establishments is much larger. The full list of 
establishments would include, for example, subsidiaries in other EU27 countries, and also 
establishments of firms headquartered outside EU27. Although an establishment level analysis 
would be useful for mapping the actual design competences in Europe, we have not done this in the 
present study. 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
Figure 15: Fabless semiconductor firms, design houses and IP vendors headquartered in EU27, year 2008.
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Figure 16: Fabless semiconductor firms, design houses and IP 
vendors headquartered in EU27, year 2008. 
A small number of European and Asian firms have moved their headquarters to the US, mainly to 
Silicon Valley, at the same time retaining the majority of their activities in their original locations. 
Similarly, some European firms have been acquired by firms based in the US and India, while still 
maintaining the European firms as relatively independent subsidiaries. To the extent that the real 
locus of activities remains in Europe, the numbers above have been adjusted. For example, Wipro-
Newlogic, now fully owned by the Indian Wipro, is counted as an Austrian firm, as its main locus of 
activity is in Austria. Similarly, the graph also counts Hantro Oy, which develops video coding IP 
for wireless telecommunications and Bitboys Oy, as a Finnish IP firms, although they are now 
owned by On2, headquartered in New York and Qualcomm, headquartered in San Diego, 
respectively. In addition to the numbers shown above, there are many regional offices and R&D 
centres of international firms in Europe. These are not included in the data above. As the population 
of firms is a dynamic one, the numbers change continuously., and the data above represents the 
situation in July 2008.80
80  For example, we include Gaisler Research AB in EU27. It was recently acquired by Aeroflex Incorporated, based in 
the US. Similarly, we count as an Austrian firm the NewLogic, which is now fully owned by Wipro, and which also 
has a subsidiaries in France and Germany. 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
For the EU27 countries, the distribution of 
fabless semiconductor firms, semiconductor 
design firms, and IP vendor firms is shown in 
Figur  15. The total number of these firms is 305. 
Not all these firms market their semiconductor 
IP, as the data shown in the figure also include 
fabless firms and design houses that use their IP 
only internally. The data include firms that hav  
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their headquarters in EU27 or which otherwise 
are known to have roots there. As the graph 
shows only the number of firms, the actual 
number of establishments is much larger. The 
full list of establishments would include, for 
example, subsidiaries in other EU27 countries, 
and also establishments of firms headquartered 
outside EU27. Although an establishment level 
analysis would be useful for mapping the actual 
design competences in Europe, we have not 
done this in the present study.
A small number of European and Asian firms 
have moved their headquarters to the US, mainly 
to Silicon Valley, at the same time retaining 
the majority of their activities in their original 
locations. Similarly, some European firms have 
been acquired by firms based in the US and India, 
while still maintaining the European firms as 
relatively independent subsidiaries. To the extent 
that the real locus of activities remains in Europe, 
the numbers above have been adjusted. For 
example, Wipro-Newlogic, now fully owned by 
the Indian Wipro, is counted as an Austrian firm, 
as its main locus of activity is in Austria. Similarly, 
the graph also counts Hantro Oy, which develops 
video coding IP for wireless telecommunications 
and Bitboys Oy, as a Finnish IP firms, although 
they are now owned by On2, headquartered in 
New York and Qualcomm, headquartered in San 
Where are the Bitboys?
Bitboys Oy was founded in 1991 by two young computer hackers Mika and Kaj Tuomi. The firm was 
based in Noormarkku, a community of about 6,000 inhabitants on the west coast of Finland. The 
closest city is Pori, with about 80,000 inhabitants.
The firm was set up to develop computer graphics that was in high demand in the demo scene. In 
the demo scene computer enthusiasts competed in trying to create impressive audio and graphics 
programs, often for the Commodore 64 and Amiga microcomputers. Originally, the demos were short 
inserts that computer crackers added to programs while circumventing their copy protections, but the 
development of independent demos started to gain popularity in towards the end of 1980s. Since 1992, 
the Finnish demo scene was organized around the internationally well-known Assembly meetings that 
has gathered thousands of computer hobbyists to its annual programming parties.
At first, Bitboys tried to develop its own graphics chips. This became difficult as the competition 
increased rapidly in the 1990s. Fabs also declined to make chips for the firm as it was too small and 
risky. In 2002, Bitboys focused on video IP for mobile phones, leaving the PC graphics business.
In 2006, Nokia indirectly revealed that it is a customer of Bitboys and that it had earlier invested about 
four million Euros to the company. Soon after, the fabless graphics chip firm ATI bought Bitboys, paying 
35 million Euros for the firm that had revenues of about 5 million and 45 employees. The CEO of Bitboys 
became responsible for ATI’s mobile phone graphics division. The firm changed its name to AMD Finland 
a couple of months later, when the processor maker AMD bought ATI. In January 2009, AMD Finland was 
sold to Qualcomm for 50 million in cash. The firm has now 50 employees in Noormarkku and Espoo. The 
firm has licensed its IP cores to most mobile phone makers and many mobile chip makers. In analyzing 
the geographic distribution of firms, we count the firm as a Finnish IP firm.
An important design criteria for mobile phone processors is small die space and low power 
consumption. In contrast to desktop PCs, where both processing power and electricity is abundant, 
the technical limitations of mobile phone platforms resemble the constraints of a Commodore 64. 
Demo programmers have, therefore, been well equipped to program and design mobile phones.
The founders are now in their late 30s. CEO Mikko Saari, a childhood friend of the founders, noted in 
an interview in 2007:
“University education is still light years behind the leading edge. We, and firms like us, are 
the real university.”
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Diego,	 respectively.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 numbers	
shown above, there are many regional offices 
and	R&D	centres	of	international	firms	in	Europe.	
These are not included in the data above. As 
the population of firms is a dynamic one, the 
numbers change continuously., and the data 
above represents the situation in July 2008.80
80 For example, we include Gaisler Research AB in EU27. 
It was recently acquired by Aeroflex Incorporated, 
based in the US. Similarly, we count as an Austrian firm 
the NewLogic, which is now fully owned by Wipro, and 
which also has a subsidiaries in France and Germany.
Figure 16: Locations of chipless firms in Europe.
  76 
The dataset contains 271 firms located in EU27, Norway and Switzerland, and 56 firms located in 
Israel. In EU27, Norway and Switzerland, over 150 firms actively market their IP cores. The 
locations of these pure-play IP firms are shown in the picture below. 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008
Figure 17: Locations of chipless firms in Europe
The UK is clearly the leading EU country when the number of semiconductor firms is counted. 
Partly this is because of historical reasons, related to the early expansion of IDMs to low cost 
regions such as Scotland. We detail the historical developments that have led to the strong 
concentration of semic nductor activities  the box below. 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
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The dataset contains 271 firms located 
in	 EU27,	 Norway	 and	 Switzerland,	 and	 56	
firms located in Israel. In EU27, Norway and 
Switzerland, over 150 firms actively market their 
IP cores. The locations of these pure-play IP firms 
are shown in the picture below.
The UK is clearly the leading EU country 
when the number of semiconductor firms is 
counted. Partly this is because of historical 
reasons,	 related	 to	 the	 early	 expansion	of	 IDMs	
to low cost regions such as Scotland. We detail 
the historical developments that have led to the 
strong concentration of semiconductor activities 
in Table 8.
In the top 20 IP vendor list, the nine firms 
shown in Table 8 have the locus of their activities 
and roots in Europe. Four of the firms actually still 
have their headquarters in Europe; the rest have 
recently been acquired by non-European firms.
As noted in Table 8, TTPCom was acquired 
by	 Motorola	 in	 2006,	 and	 its	 operations	 were	
considerably scaled down in 2008. At present, it 
is not known whether TTPcom will have any IP 
activities in 2009. CEVA is currently headquartered 
in Silicon Valley. It was formed by merging the IP 
businesses of Parthus Technologies plc, located 
in	 Ireland,	 and	 DSP	 Group,	 headquartered	 in	
Silicon Valley but with roots and heavy presence 
in	Israel,	in	2006.	The	Silicon	Valley	based	MIPS	
acquired ChipIdea in 2007. Chipidea, founded 
in 1997 by three university professors from the 
Technical University of Lisbon, is now the Analog 
Business Group of MIPS Technologies. It has 
The Story of UK Semiconductor Industry
Today there are over 110 semiconductor design firms in the UK, making it the clear leader in the EU. This 
set of firms includes both fabless firms, such as Cambridge Silicon Radio, Wolfson Microelectronics, 
and XMOS, and firms such as the chipless IP market leaders ARM, Imagination Technologies, and 
ARC International. Design firms are concentrated around three main geographical locations: Silicon 
Fen (Cambridge), Silicon Glen (Scotland), and Silicon Gorge (Bristol).
The reasons for the large number of design firms in the UK deserve further study. Some key factors, 
however, are well known.
Since the 1960s, Scotland was the preferred location for the US semiconductor firms that wanted 
to access the EEC and the British defence market. The fact that a 17 percent EEC tariff was levied 
on the value added during the production process, meant that firms such as Motorola and National 
Semiconductor set up high-value adding fabs in Scotland, shipped the wafers to East Asia for assembly 
and testing, and then imported the products back to Europe. Scotland was an attractive location partly 
because skilled workers were available at low cost, and as the universities in the area were able to 
produce skilled workers at adequate quantities. According to Henderson (1989: 129), semiconductor 
firms were also able to circumvent labour conflicts with less-skilled workers by recruiting young 
women, resisting unionization, adopting new bonus systems, and by locating their plants in new 
industrial areas. The activities of various central and local state agencies and government subsidies 
also played a role. By 1983, Scotland produced 79 percent of  British and 21 percent of European 
integrated circuits. The emergence of a local production complex with complementary capabilities has 
further strengthened the position of Scotland as a regional hub in the semiconductor industry.
Future Horizons argues that one reason for the large number of UK design firms is the massive 
streamlining, restructuring and privatization of electronics firms since the 1970s, which released large 
numbers of skilled managers and researchers to set up their own firms. The earlier exodus of British 
engineers to the US had also created a substantial pool of expatriates who understood business. 
Combined with cuts in defence spending, semiconductor designers had to find new competitive 
business models. The role of government initiatives and national champions, including INMOS and 
GEC-Plessey, as well as innovative entrepreneurs, such as Clive Sinclair and Herman Hauser, have 
also been important.
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engineering centres in Portugal, France, Belgium, 
Poland Macau and China. ARC International, 
in turn, is still firmly based in Saint Albans, 
UK. NewLogic, based in Austria, has been fully 
owned	by	the	Indian	Wipro	since	2005.	Dolphin	
Integration is based in Meylan, France, and it has 
offices also in Germany and Canada. Sci-worx 
has been headquartered in Hannover, Germany. 
In 2007 it was acquired by Silicon Image, Inc., 
based in Silicon Valley.
Table 8 also gives the average number of 
employees in the top ranking IP firms and adds 
a rough estimate of the employer count in other 
Table 8: Top 20 IP firms with locus of activity in Europe.
In the top 20 IP vendor list, the nine firms shown in Table 7 below have the locus of their activities 
and roots in Europe. Four of the firms actually still have their headquarters in Europe; the rest have 
recently been acquired by non-European firms. 
As noted above, TTPCom was acquired by Motorola in 2006, and its operations were considerably 
scaled down in 2008. At present, it is not known whether TTPcom will have any IP activities in 
2009. CEVA is currently headquartered in Silicon Valley. It was formed by merging the IP 
businesses of Parthus Technologies plc, located in Ireland, and DSP Group, headquartered in Silicon 
Valley but with roots and heavy presence in Israel, in 2006. The Silicon Valley based MIPS 
acquired ChipIdea in 2007. Chipidea, founded in 1997 by three university professors from the 
Technical University of Lisbon, is now the Analog Business Group of MIPS Technologies. It has 
engineering centres in Portugal, France, Belgium, Poland Macau and China. ARC International, in 
turn, is still firmly based in Saint Albans, UK. NewLogic, based in Austria, has been  fully owned 
by the Indian Wipro since 2005. Dolphin Integration is based in Meylan, France, and it has offices 
also in Germany and Canada. Sci-worx has been headquartered in Hannover, Germany. In  2007 it 
was acquired by Silicon Image, Inc., based in Silicon Valley. 
Rank Employees
2007 Company 2007 2007
1 ARM 1728 516
4 Motorola-TTPcom 286 87
9 Imagination Technologies 366 43
11 CEVA (Parthus, DSP Group) 192 33
12 MIPS Analogue Group (Chipidea) 310 33
14 ARC 196 29
16 Wipro-Newlogic 350 21
17 Dolphin Integration 164 17
20 sci-worx (now part of Silicon Image) 172 -
Others 1000 150
Total EU (est.) 4764 929
IP Revenue 
($M)
  78 
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
Figure 17: Number of engineers employed by European semiconductor design and IP firms.
Source: Author´s calculation based on data from Future Horizons, 2007
engineering employees
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smaller European IP firms. It should be noted 
that the European IP firms employ an increasing 
number of people outside Europe, and that the 
estimated number does not include captive 
design activities or most research and design 
units owned by firms headquartered outside 
Europe. The employee counts, therefore, do 
not map in any direct way to employment in 
Europe.
Figure 17 shows the number of different sizes 
of European fabless, chipless and design firms, 
based on the number of design engineers they 
employ. The data comes from Future Horizons, 
2007, and it includes a subset of firms that we 
used above. The actual number of employed 
persons is considerably higher, as the Future 
Horizons data only include engineers, and as 
it also in some cases seems to count engineers 
based on somewhat outdated data. The data, 
however, gives a good picture of the distribution 
of the firm sizes.
In the next section, we describe in more 
detail the Swedish IP vendors, including their 
worker compensation.
5.4 An In-Depth Look at Swedish IP 
Vendors
In the present study, we analyzed in detail 
Swedish semiconductor IP vendors to get a close-
up view on the smaller firms engaged in the 
area. In general, it is difficult to know what these 
firms are doing, as most of them are small private 
firms, and as media reports on them are not 
always completely accurate. We therefore first 
collected data on all semiconductor activities in 
Sweden, located firms that market their products 
and services to outside customers, and analyzed 
the annual financial reports of those firms that 
market IP cores. In Sweden, business firms are 
required to file annually their financial records, 
and these are available through the public 
registrar.81
Sweden has over 80 firms that in recent years 
have been engaged in semiconductor design 
activities. Many of the larger ones are design 
departments in diversified global companies. LM 
Ericsson is the historically most important of these, 
but, for example, ABB, Cambridge Silicon Radio, 
Catena, Flextronics, Huawei, Infineon, Nokia, 
Saab	 and	 Zarlink	 all	 have	 had	 semiconductor	
research and design centres in Sweden. Several 
reorganizations have changed the company 
landscape in recent years, however. For example, 
Ericsson Microelectronics was acquired by 
Infineon in 2002. The chip fab in Kista was shut 
down	 in	 August	 2004,	 and	 the	 R&D	 activities	
were moved to Germany and Asia in 2007. At that 
time the Infineon offices in Linköping were taken 
over	by	Signal	Processing	Devices	AB,	which	also	
hired most of the designers.
In	 our	 dataset,	 we	 have	 16	 semiconductor	
design and IP vendor firms that have their 
headquarters in Sweden, and which actively 
market their services to outside customers. Nine 
of these license semiconductor IP cores. One is 
Mocean Labs, which focuses on car entertainment 
systems, and which provides a Media Oriented 
Systems Transport (MOST) controller for Xilinx 
FPGA chips. There is no data available on the 
revenues from this product, and we therefore have 
excluded Mocean from a more detailed analysis.
The eight companies that can be categorized 
as IP core vendors are listed in Table 9. The data 
is from the last financial report registered by June 
2008.82 The currency is converted from SEK to 
81 Although small firms do not have to state their financial 
reports using international accounting practices, 
Swedish reporting practices are well developed and 
to some extent more detailed than in other countries. 
For example, Swedish companies normally report the 
number of male and female employees, worker absence 
rates, and management compensation in detail. The 
reports are available in Swedish.
82 As some of the firms have financial periods that end mid-
year,	the	most	recent	available	report	is	for	fiscal	2006.
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euro from 31.12.2007, and given in thousands 
of Euros. 83 As some of the firms have reported 
periods that are over 12 months, the revenue 
numbers are for a 12 month period. The table 
also shows average annual employee counts.
Measured in terms of revenue and employees, 
BitSim AB is the largest Swedish IP vendor. Most 
of its revenues, however, come from design and 
consulting activities. The second largest is Gaisler 
Research, which specializes in configurable IP 
cores used in demanding environments such as 
aerospace. The third largest vendor is Logipard. It 
specializes in video coding and image processing. 
Its core design team originated in C-Technologies, 
moved to Anoto AB, and was spun-off from Anoto 
in	 December	 2006.	The	 fourth	 is	Wavebreaker,	
which is currently part of Flextronics. 
Wavebreaker focused on wireless technologies. 
The fifth is InformAsic. It mainly does customer 
development projects for FPGA and ASIC chips. 
It also sells IP cores for security and encryption 
applications. A relatively rapidly growing IP 
vendor	 is	 Signal	 Processing	 Devices	 AB	 (SP	
Devices).	It	focuses	on	signal	processing	software	
and IP cores for telecom, medical technologies, 
and	measurement.	In	2007,	SP	Devices	received	
venture funding of about 3 million Euros from 
SEB	Venture	 Capital.	 SP	 Devices	 took	 over	 the	
offices and hired designers from Infineon when 
Infineon closed down its office in Linköping. 
At	 the	 end	 of	 2007,	 SP	 Devices	 had	 about	 20	
83 Using exchange rate 0.1059 €/SEK.
employees. RealFast (RFHC RealFast Hardware 
Consulting AB) has not yet filed its report for the 
fiscal 2007. It is single person owned firm that 
seems now to be focusing mainly on education.84 
Coresonic, in turn, is a start-up that develops its 
LeoCore processor architecture for wireless and 
digital	television	applications.	At	the	end	of	2006,	
Coresonic had four employees.
5.4.1. Description of the Swedish IP Vendors
A description of the firms is shown on the 
next page. The table shows average employee 
counts and key financial data for the last 
available year.
84 The web site for RFHC RealFast Harware Consulting 
AB is maintained by RFE RealFast Education AB. In 
ChipEstimate its cores are listed under Real Fast with 
a P.O.Box address in Colorado. In Xilinx SignOnce 
licensing partner list, it is listed as RealFastOperating 
Systems AB, which links to Prevas AB, which is 
registered	as	the	vendor	for	RealFast	Sierra16	Operating	
System Accelerator. RealFastOperating Systems AB does 
not exist in the Swedish registers.
Table 9: Swedish IP vendors, revenues, profits, and employment.
  81 
euro from 31.12.2007, and given in thousands of Euros. 83 As some of the firms have reported 
periods that are over 12 months, the revenue numbers are for a 12 month period. The table also 
shows average annual employee counts. 
Table 8: Swedish IP vendors, rev nues, profits, and 
employment.
Name Founded Employees
BitSim AB 2004 2006 4793 76 37 3014 1221 81
Gaisler Research 2001 2007 2370 1154 11 786 1380 71
Logipard AB. 2000 2007 1282 62 10 586 1778 59
Wavebreaker AB 2004 2007 691 -607 15 945 255 63
InformAsic AB 2004 2006 531 23 5 381 184 76
SP Devices 2001 2007 529 -742 15 975 1428 65
RealFast 2001 2006 463 -41 4 491 372 123
Coresonic 2006 2007 0 -280 2 165 305 82
Total 10660 -356 99 7343 6924
Financial
Year
Revenues
(12 mo.)
Profit
(12 mo.)
Personnel
Costs
Total
Assets
Personnel cost
per employee
Source: Author's calculations based on company reports
Measured in terms of revenue and employees, BitSim AB is the largest Swedish IP vendor. Most of 
its revenues, however, come from design and consulting activities. The econd larg st is Gaisler 
Research, which specializes in configurable IP cores used in demanding environments such as 
aerospace. The third largest vendor is Logipard. It specializes in video coding and image 
processing. Its core design team originated in C-Technologies, moved to Anoto AB, and was spun-
off from Anoto in December 2006. The fourth is Wavebreaker, which is currently part of 
Flextronics. Wavebreaker focused on wireless technologies. The fifth is InformAsic. It mainly does 
customer development projects for FPGA and ASIC chips. It also sells IP cores for security and 
encryption applications. A relatively rapidly growing IP vendor is Signal Processing Devic s AB 
(SP Devices). It focuses on signal processing software and IP cores for telecom, medical 
technologies, and measurement. In 2007, SP Devices received  venture funding of about 3 million 
Euros from SEB Venture Capital. SP Devices took over the offices and hired designers fr m 
Infineon when Infineon closed down its office in Linköping. At the end of 2007, SP Devices had 
about 20 employees. RealFast (RFHC RealFast Hardware Consulting AB) has not yet filed its 
report for the fiscal 2007. It is single pers  owned firm that seems now to be focusing mainly on 
education.84 Coresonic, in turn, is a start-up that develops its LeoCore processor architecture for 
wireless and digital television applications. At the end of 2006, Coresonic had four employees. 
83  Using exchange rate 0.1059 €/SEK. 
84  The web site for RFHC RealFast Harware Consulting AB is maintained by RFE RealFast Education AB. In 
ChipEstimate its cores are listed under Real Fast with a P.O.Box address in Colorado. In Xilinx SignOnce licensing 
partner list, it is listed as RealFastOperating Systems AB, which links to Prevas AB, which is registered as the 
Source: Author´s calculations based on company reports
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BitSim AB 
Employees: 37 Personnel costs: SEK 
28,461,063 
Revenue: SEK 
45,259,024 
Operating Profit: SEK 
714,142 
Assets: SEK 11,530,171 
Data from year 2007 Founded 2000 
BitSim is an independent design house specializing in FPGA and ASIC designs. It also sells its BADGE IP core 2D graphics accelerator that can 
be embedded in FPGA or ASIC designs. The firm is based in Sweden in several locations and offers a broad range of services from a design 
consultation to undertaking of an entire project. BitSim also offers design of circuit boards and complete systems. BitSim also outsources 
its projects to external consultants (materials and outsourcing were 12 million SEK in 2007; personnel costs were 28 million). During 2001 
BitSim became a qualified consultant partner with Altera and Xilinx. The initial end markets Telecom and Industrial expanded during 2005 
into Defence and Medtech. During 2006, BitSim expanded with new offices in Lund (Southern part of Sweden), Gothenburg (Western region) 
and Uppsala (North of Stockholm). During the fall of 2006 BitSim started an educational service offering, BitSim Education.
At the end of 2007, BitSim had 43 employees, a growth of 42 per cent from the previous year. It opened offices in Göteborg and Uppsala. It 
licensed the first ASIC version of its BADGE graphics core. New customers included Ericsson in Göteborg, Elektrobit, Sustinere, VSYSTEMS, 
Host Mobility and Scheider.
Coresonic 
Employees: 2 Personnel costs: SEK 
1,554,257 
Revenue: SEK 0 Operating Profit: SEK 
-2,647,053 
Assets: SEK 2,881,831 
Data from year 2006 Founded 2004 
Coresonic AB is a privately owned Swedish company developing and marketing semiconductor intellectual property for baseband 
processor technology. Coresonic has developed a novel, patent pending, processor architecture enabling flexible multimode 
communication applications at low cost and low power consumption. The technology is suited for all types of mobile wireless devices 
from mobile phones and PDAs to wireless networking and digital broadcasting. The company was founded in 2004 to commercialize 
a programmable baseband processor technology from a research project at Linköping University, led by Prof. Dake Liu. Coresonic’s 
main office is in Linköping, Sweden.
Gaisler Research 
Employees: 11 Personnel costs: SEK 
7,423,677 
Revenue: SEK 
22,383,923 
Operating Profit: SEK 
10,900,315 
Assets: SEK 13,028,686 
Data from year 2007 Founded 2001 
Gaisler Research AB, based in Gothenburg, provides IP cores and supporting development tools for embedded processors based on 
the SPARC architecture. The key product is the LEON synthesizable processor model together with a full development environment 
and a library of IP cores (GRLIB). Gaisler Research has a long experience in the management of ASIC development projects, and 
in the design of flight quality microelectronic devices. The company specializes in digital hardware design (ASIC/FPGA) for both 
commercial and aerospace applications. The products consist of user-customizable 32-bit SPARC V8 processor cores, peripheral IP-
cores and associated software and development tools. The GRLIB architecture is mainly available through open source licensing, with 
commercial extensions.
Gaisler Research was acquired by Aeroflex Inc., in July 2008. Aeroflex is a global provider of high technology solutions to the 
aerospace, defence and broadband communications markets. 
InformAsic AB 
Employees: 5 Personnel costs: SEK 
3,593,840 
Revenue: SEK 5,014,459 Operating Profit: SEK 
215,555 
Assets: SEK 1,741,165 
Data from year 2007 Founded 2001 
InformAsic designs custom ICs for customers in the telecom and datacom industry. The InformAsic IP Cores for integrating Security 
and Cryptography in FPGA or ASIC designs have all been designed for flexibility, scalability, performance and ease of integration. The 
IP Cores are delivered with a project based license to be used in one FPGA or ASIC, and that can be instantiated one or several times 
in the same project design. InformAsic started in 2001 with the aim to offer its customers help in developing and delivering solutions 
built into cost effective integrated circuits with optimized functionality. The majority of the founders came from Ericsson, where they 
had been developing solutions at the front edge of technology and built personal networks within the international high tech industry.
The customers are ranging from global high tech companies to SME with less competence and experience in designing electronic 
solutions. InformAsic takes the responsibility for the complete development process - from concept via prototypes to a finished 
product or component. They have also developed an ASIC for encryption of serial communication that has been delivered to security 
vendors. InformAsic is privately held and has its headquarters at the Chalmers Campus in Goteborg, Sweden.
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Logipard AB. 
Employees: 10 Personnel costs: SEK 
5,997,000 
Revenue: SEK 
13,117,000 
Operating Profit: SEK 
632,000 
Assets: SEK 16,789,000 
Data from year 2007 Founded 2006
Logipard offers a portfolio of Video Codec IP Cores for implementation into customer ASICs and ASSPs. Our portfolio today consists of 
six generations enabling video codec functionality for all major codec standards such as H.263, H.264, MPEG-4, VC-1, AVS, MPEG-2 
in resolutions up to full HD (1080p) The most important benefit of our solution is its very competitive Silicon footprint combined with 
its technical flexibility.
Logipard is a spin-off from Anoto AB, which owns 80 percent of its shares. The rest is owned by the employees and management.
In financial 2007, 77 percent of Logipard’s costs were R&D costs.
RealFast 
Employees: 4 Personnel costs: SEK 
4,635,286 
Revenue: SEK 4,372,367 Operating Profit: SEK 
-385,570 
Assets: SEK 3,514,621 
Data from year 2006 Founded 2001 
RFHC Realfast AB designs ICs for the automotive and industrial market sectors. The company has many years of experience in the 
areas VHDL/Verilog/FPGA/PLD/ASIC design and test/verification. The company also sells IP cores. The company is approved for HW/
SW design of safety systems according to IEC 61508.
RealFast had an innovation loan for 910.000 SEK, with conditional payback if a specific project would be commercialized or sold 
before 2010. The project was cancelled in 2006, and the loan was recorded as exceptional income for 2006. 
SP Devices (Signal Processing Devices Sweden AB)
Employees: 15 Personnel costs: SEK 
9,210,162 
Revenue: SEK 4,993,360 Operating Profit: SEK 
-7,006,600 
Assets: SEK 13,486,453 
Data from year 2007 Founded 2004
SP Devices’ mission is to develop and market signal processing technology for enhancement of analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion. 
Our proprietary interleaving technology for digital post processing of parallel A/D-converters has been recognized for enabling ultra-
high performance A/D conversion solutions. Our portfolio of products enable our customers to build systems with state-of-the-art 
A/D performance in the area of cellular base station transceiver (BTS) applications, digital imaging, high-speed data acquisition and 
broadband communication.
At the beginning of 2007, SEB Venture Capital invested 30 million SEK in SP Devices. About 15 million SEK of new shares were 
emitted. In September, the firm took over Infineon’s offices and equipment in Linköping, and hired Infineon’s employees. At the end of 
the year the firm employed 20 persons. 
Wavebreaker AB 
Employees: 15 Personnel costs: SEK 
11,160,000 
Revenue: SEK 8,158,000 Operating Profit: SEK 
-7,170,000 
Assets: SEK 2,409,000 
Data from year 2006 Founded 2004 
Wavebreaker AB specializes in system-oriented Silicon-IP for wireless communications. The company has knowledge in the design 
of transceiver systems and integrated circuits for wireless data communication applications and is the owner of a broad technology 
portfolio. Wavebreaker designs IP and develops chip-sets for high data throughput transceivers with focus on multiple-channel RF 
transceivers and MIMO signal processing ASICs for WiFi. Wavebreaker’s business mission is to be a strategic partner to IDMs and 
fabless IC companies in its area of expertise and to become a leading supplier of state-of-the-art Silicon-IP for complex wireless 
communications chip-set solutions.
Wavebreaker was acquired by Flextronics International Sweden on 1 May 2005. Its operations were moved to Flextronics 1 May 
2006. 
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5.5 Where Did the IP Vendors Come 
From? The Innovation Model
An important question for policymakers 
is how new firms are born and what makes 
them grow. As was noted before, in the current 
networked economy, success factors are 
increasingly found from the dynamics of the 
business ecosystems and firm-specific factors 
do not explain successes and failures well. The 
innovation and growth models that underlie the 
development of IP firms and the whole industry 
segment would deserve further study. In this 
section, we briefly describe the emergence of 
ARM Holdings Ltd., as an example.
In general, the European IP industry consists 
of start-ups and spin-offs. Start-up firms are 
formed around an idea, and they build their 
organizations from scratch. There are at least 
three different types of IP start-ups in Europe. 
The first group consists of technology-oriented 
firms that are typically attempts to commercialize 
university research. Examples include Coresonic, 
a spin-off from Linköping University, and Recore, 
a spin-off from the Chameleon reconfigurable 
computing project at University of Twente. The 
second group consists of “business-oriented” 
firms, typically funded by venture capital firms 
that require aggressive growth plans. An example 
of this type of firm is Arteris, discussed above. The 
third start-up path is exemplified by the case of 
Bitboys, described in the previous section. This is 
essentially generated by technology enthusiasts 
who develop competences by addressing 
application-specific challenges.
A second, relatively large, set of firms 
consists of spin-offs from existing firms. These 
typically inherit organizational procedures, 
employees, and customers from the originating 
firm. European examples include ARC 
International, a spin-off from the Argonaut 
computer game firm, Silicon Hive, a spin-off 
from Philips, and the Swedish Logipard that was 
discussed in the previous section.
Policy can address many critical points along 
the development paths of high-tech firms. The 
different types of growth paths, however, require 
different policy approaches and tools. Often the 
most effective policy interventions are based on 
removing obstacles that unnecessarily increase 
business risks and slow down growth. In general, 
the tools have to be matched to the actual context 
where the firms evolve. These contexts are 
often complex and they consist of a mixture of 
factors that are not easily captured by any single 
disciplinary approach. To outline the contours 
of one well-known case, the next sub-section 
describes the development path of ARM, today 
the largest IP vendor, both in terms of revenues 
and employment.
5.5.1. The Case of ARM Holdings
ARM Holdings, plc. has it roots in the Acorn 
RISC Machine, developed in 1983-5 in the U.K.85 
The main designers were Roger (now Sophie) 
Wilson and Steve Furber. Wilson built the first 
Acorn microcomputer kit in 1978 while she was 
undergraduate at Cambridge University, based on 
her home-brewed designs. The ARM1 processor 
was designed to expand the success of Acorn’s 
BBC Micro to business markets, and the processor 
architecture was inspired by the Berkeley RISC 
project.86 As no commercial processors were 
available that could handle a graphical interface 
and the extensible BBC Micro architecture, Acorn’s 
designers decided to build their own processor. 
The first commercial ARM product was the ARM 
Development	 System	 that	 allowed	 developers	 to	
write programs for the ARM processor using the 
BBC Micro. The second commercial product was 
ARM Archimedes, released in 1987.
85 For a compact review of the history of ARM, see Ferriani 
et al. (2007).
86 Berkeley RISC was developed by a group of students 
as part of their VLSI course between 1980 and 1984. 
Berkeley RISC, and the parallel Stanford MIPS reduced 
instruction set computing architecture projects became 
highly influential, the former leading, among others, to 
Sun’s SPARC processors.
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When Apple Computer was designing its 
new revolutionary Newton platform, it realized 
that only the ARM processor had specifications 
that were close to Newton’s requirements. 
Newton needed low power consumption and 
it had to support static operation, where the 
processor clock could be switched off at any time. 
To develop the required extensions to the ARM 
architecture, Apple, Acorn, and VLSI Technology 
Incorporated, the manufacturer of ARM chips, 
jointly formed a new company Advanced RISC 
Machines, Ltd, in November 1990. The firm was 
later listed on the London Stock Exchange and 
changed its name to ARM Holdings plc.
Apple and VLSI both provided funding for 
Advanced RISC Machines, while Acorn supplied 
the technology. The 12 founding ARM engineers 
came from Acorn’s Advanced Research and 
Development	 section	 that	 had	 developed	 the	
ARM processor.
With the introduction of its first embedded 
RISC processor in 1991, ARM signed VLSI as its 
initial licensee. One year later, Sharp and GEC 
Plessey entered into licensing agreements, with 
Texas Instruments and Cirrus Logic following the 
suit in 1993. After the 1993 addition of Nippon 
Investment and Finance (NIF) as a shareholder, the 
company began establishing a global presence, 
opening new offices in Asia, the US and Europe.
Although Apple’s Newton gained some 
enthusiastic users, it never really succeeded in 
the market and the product line was cancelled in 
1997. ARM, however, became highly successful 
as its processor cores were also particularly 
suitable for mobile phones that required low 
power consumption, small die area, and good 
performance at relatively modest processing 
speeds. Nokia, which did not have its own chip 
production capacity, became the key customer 
for ARM. In April 1998, the company listed on 
the London Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. More 
recently,	 in	 December	 2004,	 ARM	 acquired	
Artisan Components, one of the leading US 
providers of low-level physical IP.
ARM cores are now used in about 90 
percent of the world’s mobile phones and 
ARM architectures have become almost de-
facto standards for embedded general purpose 
processors in many domains. The main direct 
competitor is MIPS Technologies, based in 
Mountain View, California, which licenses a 
competing RISC IP core.
Of the nearly three billion ARM processor 
cores that shipped in 2007, almost two billion 
were shipped in mobile phones. In the same year, 
42 percent of revenues came from customers 
in North America, 41 percent from Asia Pacific 
region, and 17 percent from Europe. Royalties 
from China-based chip designers increased by 
27 percent, with seen new licenses signed with 
design teams in China during the year. ARM is 
now a global corporation with more than 1,700 
employees and facilities in 12 countries on three 
continents, with design centres in: Blackburn, 
Cambridge and Sheffield in the UK; Sophia 
Antipolis in France; Bangalore in India; Sunnyvale, 
San	 Diego	 and	 Walnut	 Creek	 in	 California;	
Cary in North Carolina and Austin in Texas. The 
company also maintains sales, administrative 
and support offices in Belgium, China, France, 
Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
the UK and the US.
Industry experts agree that ARM is 
considerably ahead of Intel in designing 
processors for low power consumption and 
small silicon area.87 This domain is critically 
important for mobile devices. Intel, therefore, 
is trying to improve its capabilities in this area, 
for example, using the Atom processor.88 For a 
87 See, e.g., Markoff (2008). Markoff characterizes ARM as 
an upstart, which obviously is not very accurate.
88 Historians of computing may note that the first Acorn 
computer was also called Atom. Acorn’s Proton actually 
became renamed as BBC Micro. Both were designed by the 
same people who later designed the first ARM processors.
66
5.
  T
he
 In
te
lle
ct
ua
l P
ro
pe
rt
y 
B
us
in
es
s
longer term, the real difference between the ARM 
designs and the Intel designs, however, may not 
be	 technical;	whereas	 Intel	 is	 a	 traditional	 IDM	
with	annual	revenues	of	40	billion	USD,	ARM	is	
a pure IP vendor, at the core of a large network 
of synergistic and symbiotic business relations. Its 
own	revenues	are	only	half	a	billion	USD;	yet	its	
economic impact is closer to Intel than normal 
business accounting would reveal.
A recent study by Ferriani et al. (2007) 
attempts to build a generic theoretical model of 
spin-off dynamics using the history of ARM as a 
starting point. As their study shows, successful 
firms never emerge from a vacuum, and often 
their success depends on events that can later be 
only described as lucky accident. In the case of 
ARM, the key success factor has been the vary 
rapid growth of mobile communications that 
occurred at the right time, putting the firm in the 
“sweet spot.” From this location ARM was able 
to build a vibrant ecosystem and place itself at 
the centre of this ecosystem, establishing it as the 
global leader in general purpose pocessor IP.
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The present business models in the 
semiconductor industry result from a long and 
idiosyncratic chain of historical events. Important 
historical factors in the development of the 
industry include military demand for reliable and 
small products, national industry policies, the 
emergence of new dominant technologies and 
end-product classes, and fast swings in business 
cycles.89 More recently, the importance of 
demand from consumer electronics, fast product 
cycles, increasing costs of chip fabrication plants 
and design, and the availability of sophisticated 
design automation tools have become key factors 
in shaping the industry.90
The semiconductor industry is perhaps 
unique, however, in the extent incremental 
technical innovation has shaped its evolution. 
The continuous miniaturization of components 
on semiconductor chips –known as scaling–, 
steep learning curves, and the resulting rapid 
cost declines have led to fast expansion of 
semiconductor markets and new application 
areas	 for	 the	 technology.	 Due	 to	 fundamental	
physical factors, semiconductor industry has 
evolved in an economic context where product 
demand has been practically infinite.91 The 
semiconductor industry is not a typical industry, 
and it is important to understand its rather unique 
dynamic also because it has considerable impact 
on the broader economy and society.
89 Cf. Morris (1990), Henderson (1989).
90 See, for example, Mowery and Rosenberg (1998), 
Langlois and Steinmueller (1999), and Brown and 
Linden (2009).
91 One should note, however, that the actual historical 
demand for semiconductors is not what economists 
usually understand with the concept. Semiconductor 
demand grows because new uses are found for ICs and 
the “demand space” expands. This demand space is in 
constant	 disequilibrium.	 Due	 to	 the	 large	 investment	
costs and granularity of investments in manufacturing 
capacity, the industry has also been very cyclical. For a 
discussion, see Tuomi, (2004b).
Below we describe some key drivers that 
have shaped the industry. These include the 
scaling and the resulting price declines, the 
increasing costs of manufacturing plant and 
IC design effort, and patterns of geographic 
expansion and concentration. The chapter also 
discusses the role of product standardization and 
variability as industry drivers, and highlights the 
possibility that historical trends will lead to the 
increased importance of product configurability 
in the future.
6.1 Semiconductor Scaling
Since the implementation of the first 
integrated circuit in 1958, with two transistors, 
the number of components on chip has grown 
tremendously. Currently the most advanced 
microprocessors contain more than 700 million 
transistors, and memory chips with 1.9 billion 
transistors have been demonstrated.
The continuing shrinking of feature 
dimensions on ICs and the resulting increase in 
component counts on semiconductor chips is 
known as Moore’s Law. The law is named after 
Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, who in an 
influential	 article	 in	 1965	 discussed	 the	 factors	
that underlie the dynamics of scaling in integrated 
electronics. Common versions of the law state 
that the number of transistors on a chip, transistor 
density, cost per transistor, or the processing power 
of microprocessors, doubles approximately every 
eighteen months or two years. There exists very 
many variations on Moore’s Law in professional 
and popular press.92
92 See Tuomi (2002b).
6. Historical Drivers in the Intellectual Property 
Architectural Blocks Industry
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that:	 “In	 1965,	 Intel	 co-founder	 Gordon	Moore	
predicted that the number of transistors on a chip 
would double about every two years.”93 IBM refers 
to the same article, claiming that Moore’s Law 
says that component density is doubling every 
12 to 18 months, and emphasizing that the Law 
only deals with the density of chips.94 Both these 
statement are historically incorrect, as, in fact, 
Moore predicted that the number of transistors 
on the lowest cost chip would double annually, 
taking into account the component scaling, 
increase in the size of the chip, and advances 
93 h t t p : / / d o w n l o a d . i n t e l . c o m / p r e s s r o o m / k i t s /
IntelProcessorHistory.pdf. Intel, however, uses several 
incompatible definitions for Moore’s Law. A backgrounder 
on Moore’s Law claims that “Nearly 40 years ago, Intel 
co-founder Gordon Moore forecasted the rapid pace 
of technology innovation. His prediction, popularly 
known as ‘Moore’s Law,’ states that transistor density on 
integrated circuits doubles about every two years.”
94	 E.g.,	Kahle	(2006).
in design practices.95 In 1975, Moore reviewed 
his original estimate, and argued that the pace 
of development was slowing down, leading to a 
doubling of transistor counts in about two years. 
The two versions of Moore’s estimates are shown 
in Figure 18, together with some historical data.96
95	 Moore	(1965).	
96 The historical data for the first decade include data that 
Moore	used	in	his	1965	article	for	a	graph	on	the	number	
of components per integrated function. Moore’s graph 
seems to represent the maximum number of components, 
and not the minimum cost chips that Moore discusses 
in his paper. Moore’s graph starts at 1959, with one 
component. In 1959, two integrated chips existed: one by 
Kilby and one by Noyce. The former had two transistors 
and ten other components, and the latter had one 
transistor and six other components. We use the number 
of transistors in the graph above to make the numbers 
compatible with data from later decades. For post 1971 
years, we use transistor counts of Intel microprocessors 
as given by Intel in a backgrounder on Moore’s Law. 
This is actually somewhat misleading as only selected 
data points that fit relatively well with Intel’s version 
Moore’s Law are included. A data point for the Nehalem 
processor, introduced in November 2008 is included. 
Figure 18: Moore’s Laws
Source: Meaning Processing.
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As even experts are confused about the 
definitions of Moore’s Law, it is not surprising 
Moore’s Law has become to resemble an urban 
legend. In fact, most variations of Moore’s Law are 
both historically and empirically inaccurate.97 An 
incontestable fact is, however, that miniaturization 
has been one of the main characteristics of and 
drivers in the industry. This can be seen from Figure 
19 below, which shows the year of introduction 
of different generations of semiconductor 
wafer manufacturing processes. The first Intel 
microprocessor used a manufacturing process 
with 10 micron line width (10,000 nanometres). 
The last data point in the figure corresponds to the 
97 In some cases, as for example with the authoritative 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 
(ITRS), we have been unable to find some of the 
historical chips that have been used to graph patterns 
of component counts. It seems that some fictive chips 
in the earlier decades are fitted to exponential growth 
curves as demanded by Moore’s Law, instead of fitting 
the curve to historically existing chips.
32 nanometre process, which is expected to start 
in volume production in 2009.98
The figure also shows two lines that have 
been fitted to the historical data. As can be seen 
from the graph, developments in lithography have 
actually accelerated after 1994. When the linear 
dimensions of component features decrease 
30 percent, the area used for the component 
decreases 50 percent, leading to potential doubling 
98 Technically, the line width is defined as “metal 
half-pitch,” i.e., the smallest distance of two metal 
conductors on the chip. Other features may be 
considerably smaller. For example, insulator layers that 
are used to form transistors are now about 1 nm thick. 
Different	features	scale	at	different	rates.	For	discussion	
and definitions, see: International Technology Roadmap 
for Semiconductors: 2007 Edition, p. 5. http://www.
itrs.net/Links/2007ITRS/ExecSum2007.pdf. The data 
points refer to “lithography frontier,” as reported by VLSI 
Research, except for the 45 nm and 32 nm processes, 
for which we use news releases. The 32 nm process uses 
double exposure and therefore is not, strictly speaking, 
comparable with the earlier lithography generations.
Figure 19: Year of introduction for process line widths
Source: Meaning Processing.
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of the number of components.99 In the 1970-1993 
period, this improvement took about three years. 
Since 1994, it has taken about two years.
The continuing scaling of features in 
integrated circuits has meant that increasingly 
complex functionality has become possible on 
small chips. Shrinking physical dimensions also 
mean that electronic signals propagate faster. As a 
consequence, more information can be handled 
faster. Until recently, scaling implied better 
technical performance and also lower power 
consumption per calculation.
Enormous economic consequences have 
resulted from scaling, combined with the fact that 
the fabrication cost per semiconductor die area 
has remained almost constant for decades for 
leading-edge products. This means that the cost 
per transistor has declined at about the same rate 
as the component size. Smaller components on a 
chip have resulted in smaller costs. To put it the 
99 More accurately, the required linear scaling is , or 29.3 
percent.
other way around, the same amount of money 
has bought every year radically more technical 
functionality. Year after year, this has opened 
completely new markets and applications for 
semiconductor technology.
The increasing performance of ICs and their 
declining costs have led to what we now know as 
the Information Society. It is, however, not easy to 
quantify the decline of cost. The speed of technical 
development means that comparisons across years 
cannot simply be made in normal inflation-adjusted 
currencies. A reasonable first approximation is, 
however, that the manufacturing cost per transistor of 
logic integrated circuits has declined 20 to 40 percent 
annually in the last decades. In the second half of the 
1990s, heavy competition among manufacturers 
increased annual price declines in microprocessors 
to	 over	 60	 percent.100 One of the most detailed 
100 In the second half of the 1990s, also architectural 
innovations probably had an important role. For example, 
large amounts of on-chip memory were added to 
microprocessor chips. Transistors that are used for memory 
are much cheaper to design than logic circuitry, thus 
reducing the average cost per microprocessor transistor.
Figure 20: Constant-quality prices for microprocessors and DRAM memories
Aizcorbe et al.,2006
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studies on the cost developments concludes that the 
constant-quality microprocessor prices per transistor 
declined at an average annual rate of 30 percent 
during 1988-1994, reaching an extraordinary rate of 
63	percent	in	the	1994-2001	period,	slowing	down	
to 40 percent in 2001-2004 period.101
6.1.1. The End of Scaling
Scaling, however, has also led to important 
challenges. These include theoretical and practical 
problems in extending photo-lithographic 
manufacturing methods to feature sizes that are 
smaller than the wavelengths of ultraviolet light 
used to expose chip layers.102 Moreover, as the 
component sizes in advanced semiconductors 
approach atomic sizes, traditional semiconductor 
technology will eventually hit basic physical limits. 
The isolation layers in a leading-edge ICs are now 
about 1.1 nanometres thick, corresponding to 
less than five molecular layers. Industry experts 
usually agree that there are no existing viable 
lithography solutions beyond the 32 nm process, 
to be in production before the end of 2009. The 
basic technologies for the next 22 nm process 
generation are being developed in laboratories 
but	 either	 it	 or	 the	 following	 16	 nm	 process	 is	
already expected by many experts to be the final 
limit for the traditional planar technologies.103 If 
the process nodes would follow each other every 
two years, lithography scaling would therefore 
end in about five years from now.
The fundamental physical limits of scaling 
have already changed semiconductor design 
and manufacturing processes.104 Although 
101	 Aizcorbe,	Oliner	&	Sichel	(2006).
102 Cf. Yoshioka (2005).
103 In his Common Platform Technology Forum presentation, 
30 September 2008, Gary Patton, vice president for IBM’s 
Semiconductor	Research	and	Development	Center,	stated	
that lithography will hit a discontinuity at 22 nm.
104 Cf. Solomon (2002). In the 32 nm process, traditional 
exposure is being replaced by “computational scaling,” 
where the desired features are formed by multiple 
exposures of ultraviolet light through masks that contain 
patterns that are calculated using computers. The 
mask layouts, therefore, do not resemble the physical 
structures of the chip.
new process technologies allow an increasing 
number of transistors to be placed on a chip, 
many of these transistors are now used to 
overcome problems created by scaling. For 
example, advanced microprocessors use an 
increasing number of transistors to switch off 
parts of the chip so that the chip does not melt 
down. In complex semiconductors, the effective 
number of transistors grows much slower than 
their total number. For example, modern double 
core microprocessors power down one of the 
processors on the chip when power consumption 
becomes more important than processing power. 
Similarly, designers manage harmful component 
variance by replacing single transistors with 
several parallel transistors, as well use dummy 
transistors to stabilize the electrical characteristics 
of transistors that are actually used on the chip.
6.1.2. The Long Tail of Semiconductor Products
As bleeding-edge technologies often gain 
visibility in the media, it is important to note that 
older technologies are also widely used. This 
can be seen in Figure 21, which shows recent 
global data for actual wafer starts, based on 
Semiconductor International Capacity Statistics 
(SICAS). For example, whereas Intel moved to 250 
nm technology in 1997 in its microprocessors, 
in the second half of 2007 about 27 percent of 
wafer starts were still for chips with over 300 nm 
half-pitch. In the first half of 2008, almost a fifth 
of semiconductor wafers were still using these 
technologies that were behind the leading edge 
over ten years ago. Although the most advanced 
technologies grow rapidly after their introduction, 
as they are used for the highest-volume chips, 
the old technologies do not fade away. The rapid 
growth of leading-edge, visible in Figure 21 as the 
“less than 120 nm” category, also partially results 
from the fact that the data do not differentiate 
the most advanced technologies, which become 
aggregated in the category as new technology 
generations are introduced.
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The number of semiconductor wafers 
created in the first half of 2008 in different 
process technologies is shown in Figure 22, 
based in SICAS data. The data do not separate 
wafers manufactured in the two most advanced 
technology	generations	 in	use	 today	 (65	and	45	
nm), and these are both included in the “less than 
80 nm” category. In fact, leading-edge lithography 
moved below the 80 nm generation in 2004. 
The relatively high volume of wafers in the most 
advanced process category, therefore, reflects 
the total volume in all technology generations 
introduced since 2003. SICAS data are also based 
on reports from the participating companies, 
which tend to be the biggest leading-edge firms, 
and it therefore undercounts production in older 
technologies. Also because the leading-edge 
technology is mainly used for very high-volume 
products, including PC microprocessors and 
memory chips, the share of these advanced wafers 
is relatively high. One should, however, note that 
except a small number of high-volume products, 
the vast majority of products is manufactured in 
technologies that are several generations older 
than the current state-of-the-art. For example, 
the leading European foundry X-FAB, which does 
not participate in SICAS, focuses on analog and 
mixed-signal chips and offers foundry services in 
the 180 nm – 1000 nm range.
It is impossible to understand the evolution 
of semiconductor industry without the impact and 
effects of scaling. At the same time, it is impossible 
to understand the future of semiconductor industry 
without considering the effects of the end of 
scaling. Although there are many uncertainties, 
it is clear that the industry will take seriously the 
possibility that this key driver for the industry 
will disappear in about ten years time. Given 
that the investment required for leading-edge 
semiconductor manufacturing plant is now 
counted in billions of US dollars, it is clear that the 
investors will carefully consider whether they are 
approaching a technology dead-end in the next 
decade or so. New business models will emerge, 
and it is increasingly probable that currently 
dominant value chains will be reorganized in the 
next years. As the semiconductor industry has been 
the most important driver for macroeconomic 
productivity growth since the early 1990’s,105 this 
105 Tuomi (2004b). 
Figure 21: Actual wafer starts in different technologies, 3Q 2004 - 2Q 2007
Source: SICAS, 2007.
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restructuring will have profound impact on the 
broader economy and society.
The International Technology Roadmap for 
Semiconductors (ITRS) now extends to year 2020. It 
is currently debated whether CMOS technologies, 
or any other semiconductor technologies, 
can actually keep on scaling until that time. 
Although radically new nanotechnologies and 
maskless electron beam technologies could in 
theory continue the miniaturization of digital 
technologies, in the near future they can not 
be used for producing economically viable 
components.106 A recent industry estimate puts the 
availability of nanotechnologies as replacement 
106 Recent advances in maskless direct-write e-beam 
lithography could make it a viable alternative for some 
low volume products when combined with appropriate 
design methods, see (Fujimura 2008).
for CMOS to beyond 2030.107 In his recent 
interview, Moore noted that he believes that the 
scaling can continue perhaps 10 or 15 years, but 
that “no exponential can grow forever.”108 More 
importantly, it is unclear at present whether it is 
economically feasible to continue scaling up to 
its technical limits.
6.2. Manufacturing and Design Costs
The evolution of business models in the 
semiconductor industry has been greatly influenced 
by the fact that IC fabrication costs have been rising 
fast and very large investments are now needed 
when new leading edge manufacturing plants are 
set up. In 2007, a new leading-edge fabrication 
107 Pele (2008a).
108 Moore (2007).
Figure 22: The long tail of semiconductor technology, 2008
Source: Meaning Processing.
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Typically fab costs are also partly covered by 
public funding and investment incentives. Fab 
costs	are	projected	to	be	in	the	USD	5	–	10	billion	
range in the 32 nm process to be in production 
in the second half of 2009.110 IC Insights estimates 
that if a company manufactures its own products at 
32	nm,	it	must	generate	more	than	USD	16	billion	
in annual revenue to achieve an acceptable return 
on investment. Only two firms, Intel and Samsung, 
have revenues in this range.
The increasing costs of semiconductor 
wafer fabs is commonly known as Rock’s Law, 
or “Moore’s Second Law.” It states that fab 
construction costs double about every four years. 
The law is named after Arthur Rock, one of the 
first venture capitalists, who helped to set up 
Fairchild Semiconductor and several of its spin-
offs that later established the Silicon Valley.
In	 1965,	 the	 cost	 of	 setting	 up	 a	 state-of-
the-art semiconductor manufacturing plant was 
USD	1	million;	by	1980	the	cost	had	escalated	to	
about 50 million.111 In 1985 a semiconductor fab 
cost	about	USD	100	million,	when	 the	 industry	
generated total revenues of about 22 billion.112 
In 2007, when the industry had record revenues, 
the cost of state-of-the-art 45 nm plant was 1.5 
percent of the total industry revenue. This may 
be compared with the average fab cost that 
in	 1960	 was	 about	 0.125	 percent	 of	 the	 total	
industry revenue. For the leading-edge 32 nm 
technology, the cost will be 4 percent or more of 
the total industry revenues in 2009, depending 
on the impact of the current economic downturn. 
In	 addition,	 the	 R&D	 investment	 in	 process	
109	 Intel’s	newest	USD	3.5	billion	fab	in	Kiryat	Gat,	Israel,	
was	inaugurated	in	July	2008.	Intel	is	also	investing	USD	
2.5	billion	in	a	new	wafer	fabrication	facility	in	Dalian,	
China.	The	Dalian	Fab	68	is	Intel’s	first	new	wafer	fab	at	
a	new	site	in	15	years.	Due	to	export	restrictions	the	fab	
will probably trail two or more technology generations 
the leading edge when it starts operations in 2010.
110	 GSA	puts	the	cost	of	a	300	mm	32	nm	fab	at	USD	10	
billion.	This	probably	includes	process	R&D	costs.
111 Saxenian (1981).
112 Kanellos (2003).
development for leading-edge 32 nm technology 
is	expected	to	be	about	USD	3	billion.113
Rock’s Law is empirically inaccurate, partly 
because the leading firms have learned to slow 
down the growth of costs. It illustrates, however, 
the point that fabrication facilities are now beyond 
the reach of almost all potential investors. Strictly 
speaking, there are only two or three companies, 
Intel, Samsung, and maybe Toshiba or TSMC, and 
perhaps one country, China, that can make the 
required investment.114 This is the main reason 
why, with the exception of Intel, the firms are now 
clustering around industry alliances that share the 
costs for research in future process technologies.
As the designs become more complex, 
also design costs rapidly increase. A chip with 
millions of transistors cannot be designed without 
automated tools. The revenues for the three leading 
electronic	design	automation	(EDA)	 tool	vendors,	
Cadence, Synopsys and Mentor Graphics were 
USD	 3.7	 billion	 in	 2007.	 It	 has	 been	 estimated	
that the annual software expense for a small 
semiconductor	 company	 was	 about	 USD	 10	
million in 2002, and that a company that earns 
below	USD	1	billion	would	be	below	the	efficient	
scale for in-house design.115 The license fee for 
a	 state-of-the-art	 EDA	 tool	 can	 now	 be	 several	
hundred thousand dollars per designer seat.
The design of complex ICs consists of 
both defining and testing the hardware and the 
software that makes the hardware useful. Brown 
and Linden (2009) quote data that shows that 
about half of the total hours needed to engineer 
a chip in the 130 nm digital logic process is used 
for software development. In the 90 nm process, 
software was responsible for about 45 percent of 
the	 total	design	 investment,	 rising	 to	65	percent	
in the 45 nm process.
113 Ng (2008).
114	 As	 noted	 below,	ATIC,	 based	 in	Abu	 Dhabi,	 has	 also	
recently invested in fabrication capacity.
115 Brown and Linden (2009).
75
Th
e 
Fu
tu
re
 o
f 
Se
m
ic
on
du
ct
or
 In
te
lle
ct
ua
l P
ro
pe
rt
y 
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
al
 B
lo
ck
s 
in
 E
ur
op
eFigure 23: IC design costs at different process nodes
  99 
development. In the 90 nm process, software was responsible for about 45 percent of the total 
design investment, rising to 65 percent in the 45 nm process. 
The overall costs of producing digital chips is shown in Figure 24, based on data from Chartered, 
Synopsys and GSA. 
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As the complexity of designs increases, it also become increasingly difficult to test the fabricated 
chips. In addition to software costs, verification costs have been escalating rapidly as new 
technology generations have been introduced. This can be seen from Figure 25. 
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Figure 25: Design cost breakdown.
6.3. Local Ecosystems and the Asian Competition 
Semiconductor industry has been among the leaders in globalization since the early 1960s. As 
Jeffrey Henderson (1989)  has shown, in its early phases, the industry generated a social and 
technical division of labour that is quite unlike those of most industries. Semiconductor production 
has since the 1960s been characterized by its vertically disaggregated or “technically disarticulated” 
labour processes. In other words, production in the industry consists of relatively independent 
clusters of work tasks, such as design, chip fabrication, assembly, packaging and testing that require 
different labour processes. As a result of this disarticulation, production processes in the 
semiconductor industry have been globally distributed to an extent rarely seen in other industries. 
Technical developments and the rapid growth of market size have also provided opportunities for 
the emergence of specialized firms that fulfil dedicated roles in the production system. The 
semiconductor industry, therefore, is the prototypical example of a business ecosystem that has 
developed through a large number of spin-offs. In the first decade of integrated circuit history, in the 
1960s, internationalization of production occurred mainly inside multinational corporations, and 
spin-offs from these MNCs generated geographically concentrated local hubs. Since the late 1980s, 
the global distribution of production has, however, essentially followed the network model, creating 
Source: Synopsys.
The overall costs of producing digital chips 
is shown in Figure 23, based on data from 
Chartered, Synopsys and GSA.
As the complexity of designs increases, it 
also become increasingly difficult to test the 
fabricated chips. In addition to software costs, 
verification costs have been escalating rapidly 
as n w technology generations have been 
introduced. This can be seen from Figure 24.
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ry 6.3. Local Ecosystems and the Asian 
Competition
Semiconductor industry has been among the 
leaders	 in	 globalization	 since	 the	 early	 1960s.	
As Jeffrey Henderson (1989) has shown, in its 
early phases, the industry generated a social 
and technical division of labour that is quite 
unlike those of most industries. Semiconductor 
production	has	since	the	1960s	been	characterized	
by its vertically disaggregated or “technically 
disarticulated” labour processes. In other words, 
production in the industry consists of relatively 
independent clusters of work tasks, such as 
design, chip fabrication, assembly, packaging and 
testing that require different labour processes. 
As a result of this disarticulation, production 
processes in the semiconductor industry have 
been globally distributed to an extent rarely seen 
in other industries.
Technical developments and the rapid 
growth of market size have also provided 
opportunities for the emergence of specialized 
firms that fulfil dedicated roles in the production 
system. The semiconductor industry, therefore, is 
the prototypical example of a business ecosystem 
that has developed through a large number of 
spin-offs. In the first decade of integrated circuit 
history,	 in	 the	 1960s,	 internationalization	 of	
production occurred mainly inside multinational 
corporations, and spin-offs from these MNCs 
generated geographically concentrated local 
hubs. Since the late 1980s, the global distribution 
of production has, however, essentially followed 
the network model, creating a fundamentally 
global system of production. In this process, 
different geographic regions have emerged as 
globally connected specialized hubs.
During	 its	 history,	 the	 semiconductor	
industry has also created the most prominent 
local concentration of high-tech production, the 
Silicon Valley, in Santa Clara County, California. 
Numerous analysts have studied the emergence 
and development of Silicon Valley, and many 
policymakers have tried to imitate its success 
in other regions of the world.116 In most cases, 
these imitations have proven to be unsuccessful. 
Partly this is because some of Silicon Valleys key 
success factors, indeed, are historical factors that 
are difficult to replicate in other times and other 
regions of the world.
The basic dynamic of simultaneous 
globalization and regional concentration of 
semiconductor activities drives also future 
developments in the industry. As the present 
study also tries to analyze the extent to which 
semiconductor IP and design activities could 
relocate to Asia and China, it is useful to recall 
the key drivers in this dynamic.
6.3.1. The Local Global Hub: Silicon Valley
In the 1950s, several factors facilitated the 
move of the nascent semiconductor industry from 
the Northeast US to Santa Clara. These factors 
included the increasing influence of labour union 
organizations in Northeast, the anti-trust law suits 
that	forced	AT&T	to	liberally	license	semiconductor	
technology, the growth of post-War defence 
industry in California, as well as the proximity of 
the large teaching and research centres in Stanford 
and Berkeley. The origins of the Silicon Valley can 
be traced back to the 1950s; the name, however, 
first appeared in the 1970s, about a decade after 
Fairchild Semiconductors had set up its first 
offshore operation in Hong Kong. The “secret” of 
Silicon Valley, therefore, cannot be found simply 
by searching it from Silicon Valley; instead, it is 
to be found from the new global distribution of 
labour and production that has allowed Silicon 
Valley to become a central coordinating node in 
the semiconductor industry.
The historical concentration of semiconductor-
related activities in Silicon Valley partly results 
from the very rapid growth of the industry, which 
expanded at about 15 percent per year in real terms 
116 See, for example, Castells and Hall (1994) and Kenney 
(2000).
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in	the	1960s.	Inside	Silicon	Valley,	this	lead	to	a	rapid	
increase in the number of semiconductor firms, 
often through spin-offs. Fairchild Semiconductor, 
alone, generated about fifty companies between 
1959 and 1979. The rapidly growing market for 
semiconductors also generated new opportunities 
for vertical disintegration and specialized labour. 
As a result a rich ecosystem emerged, where many 
different types of firms provided expertise, first 
in manufacturing equipment, and later in silicon 
wafer production, optical mask production, test 
and measuring instruments, and in other parts 
of the value chain. In the early phases of vertical 
disintegration, geographical proximity was an 
important factor, as the technologies in use were 
extremely unstable and the complex system of 
specialized actors greatly benefited from regular 
face-to-face contacts. Silicon Valley was also a 
low-cost region. In the late 1970s, the wage rates 
in	 Silicon	 Valley	 were	 about	 30	 to	 60	 percent	
lower than in Northeast, partly because of almost 
non-existent labour unions in Silicon Valley. The 
majority of the industry’s low and semiskilled 
production workers were immigrant Latino and 
Filipino females, who resided in the San Jose area 
(Henderson 1989).
The growth of the Silicon Valley ecosystem 
occurred partly through a formation of many 
specialized producers that addressed demand in 
different product niches. The product volumes 
were low and the production system, therefore, 
was based on small batch production. Partly the 
reason was military demand, which represented 
about 50 percent of all semiconductor production 
in	 the	 1960	 in	 the	 US.	 In	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	
1960s,	 military	 demand	 was	 critical	 for	 the	 IC	
industry and the formation of the Silicon Valley, 
allowing US firms to recover research and 
development costs for new products. This can 
be seen in Figure 25, which shows the share of 
military production of total IC production in the 
US, as well as the average price of ICs sold in 
1962-68.117
117	 Data	 from	Tilton	 (1971,	 91).	 Mowery	 and	 Rosenberg	
(1998, 133) use the same data, quoting only the original 
data sources.
Figure 25: Share of military production and average price of ICs in the US 1962-1968
Source: Meaning Processing.
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semiconductors were increasingly used for 
consumer electronics, leading to larger product 
volumes. The increasing demand from consumer 
electronics also created increasing opportunities 
to internationalize semiconductor production, 
as the earlier demand from military uses also 
meant that only domestic US manufacturers were 
allowed to produce the components.118 The US 
firms easily maintained their competitiveness 
in advanced high-performance components as 
the demand in Europe was mainly in industrial 
applications, and in Japan the demand focused on 
cost-sensitive consumer electronics. In contrast 
to Europe, where governments typically gave 
military contracts to defence-oriented firms, the 
US practice was to order defence-related products 
from industrial and business equipment firms, 
who often were allowed to use new and untried 
technologies.119 As a result, new semiconductor 
innovations were typically introduced in Europe 
and Japan about two years behind the US in the 
1950s	and	1960s.120
One factor that has enabled Silicon Valley 
to become a focal point in semiconductor 
technologies is the fact that it, quite literally, was 
a green field operation, built on orchards and 
citrus fields. The institutional infrastructures of the 
region have co-evolved with the industry, leading 
to a very efficient industrial system. The need 
to manage spin-offs has created services and 
knowledge that supports small rapidly growing 
technology firms. This is in contrast with many 
European locations, where existing industrial and 
institutional structures have provided the context 
for the growth of the semiconductor industry.
Silicon Valley and its infrastructures were 
also born at a time when face to face contact 
was important for knowledge transfer and 
creation. Semiconductor spin-offs were built on 
a complex social network, where key persons 
118 Henderson (1989, 44).
119	 See	Mowery	and	Rosenberg	(1998,	chap.	6).
120 Tilton (1971).
were connected through tight social networks.121 
Knowledge, therefore, was effectively shared 
and accumulated social capital increased the 
efficiency of business transactions.
Also intellectual property rights had a great 
impact on the development of the IC industry in 
Silicon	Valley.	AT&T,	 and	 its	 research	 arm,	 Bell	
Laboratories, licensed freely the core transistor 
patents and shared the related knowledge, partly 
as a result of an antitrust suit initiated by the US 
Justice	 Department	 in	 1949.	 A	 consent	 degree	
ended	the	antitrust	proceedings	in	1956,	requiring	
AT&T’s	manufacturing	 arm,	Western	 Electric,	 to	
license any of its existing patents royalty-free to 
any US firm and all future patents at reasonable 
royalties. As Tilton points out:
“Certainly the great probability that other 
firms were going to use the new technology 
with or without licenses is another reason 
for the liberal licensing policy. Secrecy is 
difficult to maintain in the semiconductor 
field because of the great mobility of 
scientists and engineers and their desire 
to publish. Moreover, semiconductor 
firms, particularly the new, small ones, 
have demonstrated over and over again 
their disposition to infringe on patents. The 
prospect of lengthy and costly litigation in 
which its patents might be overturned could 
not	have	been	very	attractive	to	AT&T.	Even	
if successful, such courtroom battles pitting 
the giant firm against small rivals damage 
public relations.122”
AT&T	 had	 most	 of	 the	 key	 patents	 for	
semiconductors, and it extensively cross-licensed 
these patents with other industry actors. In practice, 
industry	actors	had	to	join	the	AT&T	bandwagon,	
and patents and related knowledge were widely 
shared. As Gordon Moore once noted:
121 See Castilla et al. (2000).
122	 Tilton	(1971,	76).
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“Well, it was probably a different attitude 
about patents. One thing that happened in 
the semiconductor industry... semiconductor 
processes are a long series of steps and the 
patents had gotten pretty broadly spread because 
all of the people working on the technology 
had some of them. And the net result was in 
order for any of us to operate we had to be 
cross-licensed so the participants tended to all 
cross-license one another. So, there was not a 
tremendous advantage to having more patents... 
with a couple of exceptions, there wasn’t much 
net benefit from it.123”
Patenting policies in the semiconductor 
industry changed in the 1980s.124 One may, 
however, argue that the foundations of Silicon 
Valley,	 as	 an	 innovative	 R&D	 intensive	 region,	
were already fully in place at this time, and that 
the current strong patent protection policies have 
not been important for the ICT industry growth in 
Silicon Valley.125 As a result of the strengthening 
of the IPR regime in semiconductors in the 1990s, 
patent portfolios became increasingly important 
for cross-licensing. The dynamic impact of strong 
patent protection was perhaps mainly visible 
in the slowing down competitors in an industry 
where system compatibility and first-mover 
advantages are critical.
The rise of Silicon Valley is, therefore, 
bound to a specific phase of the development 
of the IC industry, where early military demand 
and the rapid growth of markets allowed new 
firms to create new technologies, and where 
competent engineers rotated among the firms, 
123 Moore (1995).
124	 Hall	&	Ziedonis	(2001).
125 In fact, the current strong patent protection policy 
in the semiconductor industry was initiated by Texas 
Instruments, perhaps because it had to compensate 
its competitive disadvantage in accessing the Silicon 
Valley innovation system. Software patents, of course, 
were important in the last years of the 1990s. Their 
importance, however, probably was to a large extent 
symbolic, as they were viewed as a condition for getting 
venture capital. In a sense, software patents were used 
as poison pills that made it expensive for competitors 
to slow down firm growth by binding managerial and 
financial resources in lawsuits. 
enabling rapid competence development and 
broad sharing of critical knowledge. At the 
same time, the institutional infrastructures of 
Silicon Valley, ranging from venture capital and 
law firms to university education and service 
providers, became specialized in serving the 
rapidly growing business. Similar processes of 
mutual institutional adjustment and historically 
developed social networks are, obviously, difficult 
to create today. Some policy initiatives, however, 
aim at “ecosystem” development in ICTs. These 
initiatives move beyond the conventional industry 
cluster policies by taking into account a broader 
set of actors, including the users.126 For example, 
South Korea is now implementing a policy 
initiative that tries to develop its SoC ecosystem, 
including semiconductor design. As successful 
open source software projects have shown, 
today it is also possible to create geographically 
distributed development hubs where knowledge 
flows effectively beyond regional boundaries. 
The future global innovation hubs, therefore, 
only remotely resemble the historical model of 
Silicon Valley, which, itself, now to a large extent 
operates on the Internet.
6.3.2. The Move to Asia
American firms totally dominated the world 
semiconductor production until the early 1980s, 
although much of their production actually 
occurred outside the US. The internationalization 
of the US firms was first driven by two factors: the 
increasing competition in discrete semiconductors 
from Japanese semiconductor firms, and the 
increasing product volumes that enabled 
disaggregation of the production process. First, this 
process led to the establishment of semiconductor 
activities in East Asia, contributing both to the 
economic development of the four Asian Tigers 
126 Examples include some of the European Living Labs 
and some national initiatives, such as the Finnish ICT 
SHOK (one of the Finnish Strategic Centres for Science, 
Technology and Innovation). In general, although the term 
ecosystem is now widely used, there are no well-developed 
research-based frameworks for ecosystem policies.
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Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, 
and to policy discussions on the potential decline 
of earlier high-tech superpowers. Second, in 
the 1990s, the liberalization of investment and 
trade policies in India created a rapid surge 
of offshoring and outsourcing of ICT-enabled 
services, including software programming and 
semiconductor design to India.
6.3.2.1. East Asia and the Four Dragons
The most important determinant in the 
growth of semiconductor production in East 
Asia	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	was	 the	 presence	
of enormous pools of cheap and underemployed 
labour. Cheap labour, however, was not the sole 
factor at play. The US firms first entered East Asia 
through Hong Kong, which had several special 
advantages that made it a particularly attractive 
location. According to Henderson, these included 
political stability, an open financial system with 
no limits on repatriation of profits, and excellent 
telecommunications and transport facilities. These 
characteristics were shared by Taiwan, South 
Korea and Singapore. Hong Kong, however, had 
also the added advantage that in the 1950s it had 
developed a flourishing industrial economy based 
on textiles, garments, plastics, and other labour-
intensive forms of production. It had, therefore, 
well developed international trading networks 
and logistic capabilities. By the late 1950s, Hong 
Kong had extended these production models to 
electronics products, becoming a major location 
for radio assembly.127
Fairchild Semiconductor established the 
first semiconductor assembly plant in Hong 
Kong	 in	 1961.	 General	 Instruments	 followed	
the suit, setting up the first semiconductor plant 
in	Taiwan	 in	 1965,	 and	 Fairchild	 and	Motorola	
then	moved	 to	 South	 Korea	 in	 1966.	 By	 1968,	
Texas Instruments, National Semiconductor and 
Fairchild had set up plants in Singapore. Malaysia 
followed in 1971, and Philippines , Thailand and 
Indonesia a couple of years later. As Henderson 
127 Henderson (1989, 51).
notes, by the mid-1970s, US semiconductor 
plants had been established in every capitalist 
East Asian developing society other than Brunei.
Development,	 however,	 was	 not	 evenly	
distributed. Most of the production in East Asia 
was by US firms for the US markets. Control of 
production, as well as the most knowledge-
intensive tasks, were strongly concentrated in 
the US. Only the most labour-intensive assembly 
processes were done in East Asia, with the 
exception of those territorial units, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, which gradually gained marketing 
responsibilities. All the firms assembling 
semiconductors in the region used basically the 
same model: the wafers were fabricated in the US, 
air-freighted to East Asia, assembled into discrete 
semiconductors or integrated circuits, and then 
air-freighted back to the US for final testing. This 
arrangement was partially encouraged by the US 
tariff regulations that charged import duty only 
on the value added abroad. As the offshore value 
added was mainly generated by cheap unskilled 
labour, import duties remained a relatively 
low barrier for such international division of 
labour.128
By the mid-1980s, the international division 
of labour in the semiconductor industry, however, 
had started to change. In particular, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and to a lesser 
degree Malaysia, had started to climb the value 
ladder, whereas Thailand and Philippines were 
increasingly focusing on large-batch production 
that relied on low-cost labour. Hong Kong 
and Singapore were increasingly moving from 
assembly to more demanding parts of the value 
chain, including testing and, to some limited 
extent, design. Partly the emerging division of 
labour within East Asia resulted from the fact that 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea 
all had educational systems that could produce 
skilled workers. Partly it resulted from the fact that 
the labour costs started to increase rapidly in these 
countries. In some cases, as in Singapore, wage 
128 Henderson (1989, 54).
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increases were driven by explicit policy, aimed at 
pushing the country towards higher-value adding 
production. The end result was, however, a new 
regional architecture of production, where an 
increasing number of tasks were done within East 
Asia, and where partially finished goods moved 
from one East Asian country to another, until the 
final products were shipped to the developed 
economies of the world.
Until the mid-1980s, and with the exception 
of some Japanese and European firms, this East 
Asian international division of labour was tightly 
controlled by US firms and most plants were 
set up by foreign investment. Towards the end 
of 1980s, the situation started to change. In 
1985, Hong Kong had four locally owned wafer 
fabrication and assembly plants, whereas South 
Korea had five and Taiwan eight.129
Policy was a critical factor in establishing 
this indigenous production capability. In 
all the four “Asian Tigers,” electronics and 
semiconductors were perceived to be critical 
technologies for development. For example, the 
Korean government provided a continuous flow 
of low interest capital to semiconductor firms 
and it has also invested heavily in semiconductor 
R&D.	The	heavy	 involvement	of	 the	government	
also allowed the Korean policymakers to 
systematically plan for the development of the 
industry. An important factor in the growth of 
the indigenous semiconductor industry was 
also protectionist trade barriers that included 
formal import duties and also informal barriers. 
Korea, for example, imposed a total import ban 
on foreign-made electronics in the early 1980s, 
which was lifted only in mid-1990s. This meant 
that foreign producers could access the rapidly 
growing Korean market only by producing inside 
Korea either through fully-owned subsidiaries or 
joint-ventures, or by licensing their technology 
to Korean producers. Similar trade barriers were 
applied in Taiwan, where, for example, the 
imports of Japanese VCRs were forbidden in the 
129 Scott (1987).
early 1980s, and where import duties in other 
electronics products during the 1980s were often 
close to 50 percent.130
Relying on technology licenses from US, 
Japanese and European companies, Korea gained 
a substantial part of the world market on memory 
chips towards the end of 1980s. Originally, the 
Korean semiconductor industry was built around 
semiconductor divisions of the four chaebols, 
Samsung,	 GoldStar,	 Hyndai	 and	 Daewoo.	
Samsung and Hynix, formerly Hyndai Electronics, 
started to produce dynamic random-access 
memory	(DRAM)	chips	in	1983.	Today,	Samsung	
is the second largest and Hynix the eight largest 
semiconductor producer, worldwide.
Korea	 has	 now	 some	 260	 design	 houses	
with	 total	 revenue	 of	 USD	 1.5	 billion.131 
About ten percent of the design firms are in 
ASIC services. The Korean IT SoC Association 
(ITSA) estimates that Korea has 100 firms that 
specialize in System-on-Chip development. 
This area has also been one of the focal areas 
in the Korean Information Society Strategy. The 
Korean government believes that System-on-Chip 
represents the next step in climbing the value 
ladder, and that the SoC industry will be a major 
source of exports and employment in the next 
years. The Korean policymakers, therefore, are 
establishing a national ecosystem that supports 
the SoC industry, organized around ITSA. The 
government also aims at the standardization 
of the semiconductor IP production processes 
and process interfaces, hoping to speed up SoC 
production. The government also vitalizes the 
Shuttle Run system for multi-project wafers. The 
investments in the SoC industry are expected to 
enable Korea to gain ten percent of the global 
SoC market by 2010 and create 50,000 jobs in 
related fields.
Singapore, in turn, has now about 40 IC 
design houses and 14 silicon wafer fabs, and 20 
130 Aw et al. (2001).
131 ECN Asia (2008).
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total number of IC design engineers in Singapore 
at 1,250 in 2007, and projects it to grow to 
1,760	 by	 2009.	As	 Singapore	 is	 starting	 to	 lose	
manufacturing operations to low-cost regions, 
including China, Malaysia and Vietnam, the 
government has adopted a three-pronged strategy 
to strengthen Singapore’s semiconductor industry. 
First, it will support the growth of the wafer fabs to 
better economies of scale. Second, it will support 
process	 R&D	 that	 will	 ensure	 that	 the	 wafer	
fabrication plants are able to stay at the leading 
edge. Third, it aims at developing a vibrating 
semiconductor ecosystem. The objective is to 
provide a complete end-to-end system where IC 
design houses, IP providers, foundries, system 
design	 firms	 and	 EDA	 companies	 are	 integrated	
under	the	auspices	of	Microelectronics	IC	Design	
and	System	Association	(MIDAS).
According to Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI), Taiwan’s IC design sector will 
reach	USD	14.25	billion	in	2008.	ITRI	estimates	
that there were 350 design houses in Taiwan, of 
which 272 were local operations, in 2007.
In general, the key factor in the rapid growth 
of economies in Japan and the Asian Tigers is a 
simple one. East Asia become a powerhouse of 
electronics and semiconductor industries because 
of massive policy interventions. As Henderson 
points out:
“When one recognizes that these states 
(including Hong Kong) are precisely those that 
in the dream world of laissez-faire theorists are 
economic ‘success stories’ because of their 
supposed commitment to non-intervention, 
then one begins to get some measure of 
how ideological (not to mention empirically 
wrong) the dominant neo-classical paradigm 
in economics is. In spite of the fact that we 
are dealing with formally different states 
–repressive military dictatorships in South 
Korea (at least until 1987) and Taiwan, and 
authoritarian democracy in Singapore, and 
an autocratic colonial regime in Hong Kong 
– in all cases, economic development in these 
societies must now be seen, if anything, to be 
state-led.”132
Not unsurprisingly, then, that semiconductor 
production has been one of the main themes in 
policy debates also outside East Asian countries. 
In the 1980s, it was one of the most heated topics 
in the US – Japan trade relations. From late 1970s 
on,	Japan	rapidly	gained	dominance	in	the	DRAM	
memory industry, when Fujitsu and Hitachi 
advanced	beyond	 Intel	 as	 the	 leaders	 in	DRAM	
production. Japan also started to create globally 
visible ambitious nationally coordinated projects 
in electronics and computing. These included the 
Fifth-Generation Computer Systems project that 
was to implement massively parallel computing 
architectures with artificial intelligence user 
interfaces.133 As a response, the US government 
threatened to set punitive import duties on 
Japanese semiconductors, and set up their own 
Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation (MCC). Also the U.K. Alvey project 
and the EU ESPRIT aimed at responding to the 
emerging Japanese challenge. Among the US 
policy makers, the Japanese challenge was 
described as the “new Pearl Harbor.”
The growth of the Asian Tigers has created less 
controversy, probably because of three reasons. 
First, the East Asian export-oriented policies were 
generally aimed at attracting foreign investments 
from established semiconductor firms, based in 
the US, Japan and Europe. The policies, therefore, 
were often beneficial to the established firms. 
Second, both the semiconductor and the broader 
electronics industry were already globalizing in 
the late 1980s. Centrally controlled international 
firms were being transformed into multinational 
and multi-domestic enterprises that were managed 
as complex matrices of relatively independent 
profit centres. This development became possible 
when the rapidly declining communications 
132 Henderson (1989, 72).
133 For a US perspective, see Feigenbaum and McCorduck 
(1983).
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costs allowed increasingly tight integration of 
knowledge-intensive tasks across geographic 
distances. Industrial interests, therefore, were not, 
anymore, easily drawn along country borders. As 
Robert Reich (1993) put it, it was not clear “who 
is US.” A third factor that muted some militant 
voices declaring an imminent doom of the US 
technology leadership was the simple fact that 
the rapid growth of personal computing strongly 
favoured US semiconductor makers. This was 
partly because when Intel started to lose its fight 
against Japanese memory makers, it dropped 
the memory business and focused on CMOS 
microprocessor technology, which soon became 
the high-profit path to the future.134
6.3.2.2. India
India’s rapid economic development started in 
1991, when it opened to the world economy. Since 
then, its growth has been phenomenal. India’s 
“Grey Revolution” is now focusing on knowledge 
and human brains, lead by the rapid increase in 
software development. Starting from the level of 
3.4 million university students in 1985, twenty 
years later, in 2005, about 10.3 million students 
were enrolled in universities. About 350,000 of 
these were in engineering. By the year 2015, 
India is expected to have 18.5 million students 
enrolled in universities, 1.4 million of which will 
be in engineering.135	Today,	about	600,000	people	
in India work in software production. The Indian 
Semiconductor Association (ISA) estimates that 
the value of embedded software development 
exports	 were	USD	 4.9	 billion	 in	 2007,	 and	 that	
the embedded software market currently employs 
106,000	engineers.
Gartner now expects India’s ICT market to 
grow at a five-year compound annual growth 
rate	 of	 20.3	 percent	 and	 to	 reach	 USD	 24.3	
billion by 2011.
134	 For	a	discussion	and	further	references,	see	Langlois	&	
Steinmueller (1999).
135 Mashelkar (2008).
India has rapidly grown to be a major hub of 
semiconductor design. According to a joint study 
by	 Indian	 Semiconductor	 Association	 and	 IDC,	
the	 total	 ICT	design	market	 in	 India	was	USD	6	
billion in 2007, and it was expected to grow to 
7.37 billion in 2008.136 Embedded software was 
the largest segment, with 81 percent of revenues, 
followed by very-large-scale integration (VLSI) 
design, at 13 percent, and hardware/board design 
contributing	6	percent.	The	number	of	employees	
working in India’s design industry is estimated to 
be 130,000.
The largest pure-play IP company is Ittiam 
Systems, which focuses on advanced media 
communication applications for which software 
solutions are either unavailable or too expensive. 
Another pure-play IP firm, Cosmic Circuits 
focuses on analog circuits. Cosmic Circuits 
claims that that it has developed over 75 IP cores 
for applications such as power management, 
video analog front-end, and WiMAX and WLAN 
front-ends, and that it is able to create cores from 
350	nm	to	65	nm	processes.	The	 leading	global	
provider of WLAN and Bluetooth IP is Wipro-
NewLogic, which was formed when the Indian 
design service giant Wipro acquired the Austrian 
New	 Logic	 for	 USD	 56	million	 in	 2005.	Other	
design service firms, such as Mindtree and Sasken 
also now develop their own semiconductor IP.
In-Stat estimates that the Indian design 
services	 industry	 will	 grow	 from	 USD	 1.4	
billion in 2007 to 3.4 billion in 2012, at the 
compounded annual growth rate of 20.2 
percent. The Indian Semiconductor Association 
(ISA), in turn, estimates that the revenues from 
VLSI design services in 2008 will be about 
USD	 927	 million,	 and	 expects	 the	 combined	
IC design and embedded software industry to 
grow	 to	USD	 43	 billion	 in	 2015.	Today,	 design	
services are dominated by the captive design 
centres of multinational companies. In 2007, 
the contribution of the captive centres was 54.7 
136	 ISA-IDC	(2008).
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ry percent of the total revenues. At present, most of 
the leading semiconductor firms have established 
design centres in India, including Texas 
Instruments, Intel, STMicroelectronics, Freescale, 
AMD,	 Infineon,	 NXP,	 Cypress	 Semiconductor,	
Nvidia,	 Xilinx,	 Virage	 Logic,	 Analog	 Devices,	
and ARM. Also major electronic equipment 
producers, such as Nokia, Samsung and Motorola 
have established design centres in India. Intel 
had	about	2,900	R&D	workers	in	India	in	2006,	
Texas Instruments about 1,300, Motorola 1,500, 
Cisco	1,000,	and	one	of	 the	 leading	EDA	firms,	
Cadence, about 500.137
The estimated number of IC design starts 
in	 India	 was	 516	 in	 2007.	 In-Stat	 expects	 the	
number of design starts to grow to 1,305 in 2012. 
In 2007 about 40 percent of the design starts were 
for	90	nm	process,	and	about	20	percent	 for	65	
nm process. By 2010, the leading process node 
in	India	will	be	65	nm,	with	about	30	percent	of	
design starts, according to In-Stat. By 2012, about 
32 percent of new designs are expected to be for 
45 nm and below. ASICs constituted about half of 
the design starts in India in 2007, while about 22 
percent were for Systems-on-Chip and about 17 
percent for FPGAs.138
The geographical diffusion and concentration 
of IC production has been studied extensively 
during the last decades, also because policymakers 
have perceived the industry as a key to the future 
information society. The history of Silicon Valley 
has inspired many attempts to create high-tech 
clusters in other parts of the world. Many of these 
attempts have failed because the emergence 
of Silicon Valley has, indeed, been a historical 
process in a context that is impossible to recreate. 
This, of course, does not mean that it is impossible 
to learn from this history. Indeed, the recent 
ecosystem based approaches have been based on 
the idea that a complex system of complementary 
actors and their co-evolution are needed to 
create efficient locations for knowledge-intensive 
137 Mashelkar (2008, 154).
138 Lohyia (2008).
production. Today, however, it is not obvious that 
such ecosystems need to be based on physical 
proximity, and examples of Internet-supported 
ecosystems exist.
The rise of the Asian Tigers, in turn, highlight 
the fact that the semiconductor industry became 
a globally networked industry in the early 1990s, 
following an earlier phase of internationalization 
led by US firms. Silicon Valley, itself, could not 
exist today without its extensive links to Asia. 
Following the model provided by Japan, the Asian 
Tigers joined the global economy based on highly 
successful export oriented national policies, 
supported by competences developed mainly in 
the leading US universities and semiconductor 
firms. Gradually, the Asian Tigers climbed the 
value chain toward high-value adding activities, 
developing regional ecosystems that effectively 
support specific segments of IC production. Today, 
countries such as South Korea explicitly aim at 
moving beyond the state-of-the-art, to the next 
emerging levels of value production, focusing on, 
for example, broadband mobile and ubiquitous 
systems, and related systems-on-chip.
India is a latecomer in the industry, and it 
has very rapidly become a major focal point for 
software and design services. Yet, it still does 
not have chip fabrication facilities. This is often 
explained by the fact that the country still lacks 
reliable infrastructure. As one industry researcher 
puts it, there is too much dust in India. Although 
the country has many excellent universities, 
the differences in the quality of education vary 
greatly. The dream of many well-educated 
Indian ICT workers is to move abroad. This is in 
great contrast with China, where the Confucian 
educational principles aim at educating all 
citizens and where many professionals dream of 
a future where they can work for leading Chinese 
firms.	Due	to	China’s	potential	relevance	for	the	
future of European semiconductor IP industry, we 
discuss the Chinese IC design and IP activities in 
a separate chapter.
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e7. Makimoto Waves, Dominant Designs and User 
Innovation
discussion. Although the model is only a first 
sketch of a complex reality, and should be refined 
and justified by empirical data, the key argument 
in the present context is that the emergence of 
new innovation and product development models 
will imprint their requirements also on integrated 
circuit architectures. In the future, learning is 
no more confined to the industry itself; instead, 
processing architectures are becoming innovation 
platforms for end-user industries and, eventually, 
for user communities. This will introduce first 
configurability and then reconfigurability as 
new key industry drivers, making the Makimoto 
dichotomy between standardization and 
customization increasingly obsolete.
7.1. Learning and Obsolescence in the 
IC Industry
Although leading-edge integrated circuit 
technology typically is more expensive at 
introduction than the previous generation 
technology, rapid improvements in high-volume 
leading-edge technologies usually make earlier 
technologies quickly obsolete. Historically, the 
semiconductor industry has been characterized by 
very steep learning curves that rapidly erode the 
competitiveness of old technology generations in 
application areas where technical performance is 
important. As technical performance was associated 
with scaling, which implied simultaneous 
improvements in product cost, performance and 
size, traditionally there has been little profitable 
space for manufacturers who have not upgraded 
to the leading-edge. More recently, the shrinking 
life-time of consumer products has intensified this 
time-focused mindset in the industry.
The typical price dynamics of semiconductor 
chips	 is	 shown	 in	 Figure	 26,	which	 depicts	 the	
For industry participants, the semiconductor 
industry has been a difficult industry because of 
its cyclical nature. New manufacturing capacity 
requires large investments, and competing firms 
tend to invest when business prospects look good. 
This has regularly led to overcapacity and periods 
of low profitability. Rapid technical advances in 
the industry also mean that opportunity windows 
are narrow and research and development costs 
are often recuperated and profits generated in the 
first months of product availability. Semiconductor 
manufacturing is further characterized by very 
steep learning curves that provide large competitive 
advantage for first entrants. This combination 
of large swings in business cycles and rapid 
obsolescence of old products and production 
technologies makes the semiconductor industry a 
rather exceptional industry.
In this chapter, we first briefly describe the 
characteristics of learning curves that drive the 
development of high-volume products such as 
dynamic	random	access	memories	(DRAMs)	and	
general purpose processors. The following section 
then discusses historical industry cycles between 
standardization and customization, known as 
Makimoto waves. We also extend the Makimoto 
model in an attempt to propose some potential 
future developments in the industry and in its 
product architectures, for example, by taking 
into account the end of scaling. The following 
section then puts the discussion in a broader 
context of technology maturation, arguing that 
processing architectures are entering a technology 
maturation phase where dominant and optimized 
designs are increasingly being replaced by user-
centric product designs, and that configurability 
is becoming increasingly important for future 
integrated circuit designs. We present a simplified 
model of technology maturation and its innovation 
drivers to provide some starting points for further 
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prices	of	storage	bits	in	Dynamic	Random	Access	
Memory	 (DRAM)	 chips	 for	 several	 product	
generations.139 As can be seen in the figure, the 
introduction price for new generation chips is 
higher than the current price of more mature 
chips, but the next-generation technology rapidly 
becomes cheaper. Towards the end of the product 
cycle, the price decline stops, as the product 
generation becomes a niche product.
In	the	last	three	decades,	new	DRAM	product	
generations have entered the market in about 
every two years, on average. The profit windows 
are measured in months and the difference 
between profit and loss sometimes in weeks.
For	 example,	 between	December	2006	and	
April	2007,	 the	average	selling	prices	 for	DRAM	
chips dropped about 33 percent, according to 
139 Grimm (1998, 13).
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) data. 
This means that the value of products in the 
manufacturer’s or seller’s inventory drops more than 
one percent each week. The industry, therefore, 
can be characterized as a “fish business,” as the 
products on the shelf begin to stink if they are 
not moved to end-users fast enough.140 Although 
new business models are emerging, this historical 
fact of extremely fast obsolescence underlies the 
industry’s dominant logic.
The	 learning	 curves	 shown	 in	 Figure	 26	
represent the impact of several key factors.141 
Dedicated	 process	 development	 facilities,	
geographic proximity between development 
and manufacturing facilities, and the duplication 
of equipment between development and 
140 The fish business analogue comes from the hard-drive 
industry	(McKendrick,	Doner,	and	Haggard	2000,	30).
141 Hatch and Mowery (1998).
Figure 26: Price dynamics in different DRAM technology generations, 1974-1994
  117 
For example, between December 2006 and April 2007, the average selling prices for DRAM chips 
dropped about 33 percent, according to Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) data. This means 
that the value f products in the manufacturer's or seller's inventory drops more than one percent 
each week. The industry, therefore, can be characterized as a “fish business,” as the products on the 
sh lf b gin to stink if th y are not moved to end-users fast e ough.140 Alth h new business 
models are emerging, this historical fact of extremely fast obsolescence underlies the industry's 
dominant logic. 
The learning curves shown in Figure 27 repres nt the impact of several k y factors.141 Dedicated 
process development facilities, geographic proximity between development and manufacturing 
facilities, and the duplication of equipment between development and manufacturing facilities have 
all been historically important factors in improving performance in introducing new technologies. 
140  The fish business analogue comes from the hard-drive industry (McKendrick, Doner, and Haggard 2000, 
30) . 
141  Hatch and Mowery (1998) . 
Source: Grimm (1998).
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manufacturing facilities have all been historically 
important factors in improving performance 
in introducing new technologies. All these 
have to do with knowledge transfer, and, 
in particular, transfer of tacit knowledge.142 
Semiconductor manufacturing processes are 
complex interdependent configurations of sub-
processes and process steps, where relevant 
parameters are sometimes empirically found and 
optimized. Although it may be possible to specify 
how the different process steps have to be done 
in a given production context, it is very difficult 
or impossible to define optimal processes in 
generic terms. Successful ramp-up of production, 
therefore, depends on the effective transfer 
of unarticulated contextual knowledge from 
development facilities to production.
Historically, this has meant that research 
and development of new chip technology and its 
manufacturing have been co-located. Intel has 
extended this approach using its “Copy Exactly” 
methodology, where manufacturing facilities 
are built as detailed copies of development 
facilities. In this approach, the firm first creates 
and optimizes the production process in a 
development fab and then makes identical copies 
of the optimized process in other locations.143 
Contextual knowledge is transferred, for example, 
by copying the plant layout, lengths of water 
pipes, instrument settings and configurations, as 
well as other process parameters.
7.2. Cycles of Standardization and 
Customization
Technical advances and steep learning 
curves have enabled new functionality to be 
implemented at constantly declining costs in the 
142 Tacit knowledge includes contextual and non-articulated 
knowledge. The concept originates in Michael Polanyi’s 
works,	 e.g.	 (Polanyi	 1967),	 and	 was	 popularized	 by	
Nonaka through his knowledge creation model (Nonaka 
1994).
143 Cf. Chesbrough (2003, 113-33).
integrated circuit industry. This has constantly 
pushed the technology frontier towards new 
product generations. At the same time, the point 
of gravity in the industry has moved between 
standardized and customized products. One 
expression of this idea is the so-called Makimoto 
Wave. Originally devised by Tsugio Makimoto 
from Sony in 1991, the wave is a model of 
ten-year cycles in the semiconductor industry 
between standardization to customizability.144
According to Makimoto, the semiconductor 
industry swings like a pendulum between 
customization and standardization. When 
many new devices, architectures and software 
innovations appear, the semiconductor industry 
as a whole moves towards standardization. 
As standardization becomes an increasingly 
dominant trend, need for product differentiation 
and added value start to act to the opposing 
direction of customizability. Amplifying this 
counteraction is an imbalance between supply 
and demand, as overcapacity develops for 
dominant standard products.
When new developments in design and 
manufacturing technologies catch up with the 
possibilities of the underlying semiconductor 
technologies and enable increasingly complex 
designs, product customization becomes an 
increasingly dominant trend. As customization 
starts to dominate, this trend, in turn, is 
slowed down by the need to lower product 
cost and to improve operational efficiencies 
is manufacturing. Further, as products are 
customized and require more design effort, time-
to-market becomes an increasingly important 
source of competitiveness. This “Makimoto 
pendulum” is depicted in Figure 27.145
144 Makimoto (2003).
145 The picture is based on presentation by Makimoto at the 
IEEE Field Programmable Technologies Conference held 
in	December	 2002	 in	Hong	 Kong.	We	 have	 rewritten	
Makimoto’s explanation and some of the terminology.
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The swings of the Makimoto pendulum 
creates cycles as shown in Figure 28, where we 
have added two cycles to Makimoto’s original 
model.146 In the mid-1990s, for example, the 
number of new application specific integrated 
circuit (ASIC) designs totalled probably more than 
10,000 each year. Each top-tier ASIC provider 
could count almost two new designs for every 
working day.147 Since then, the focus has shifted 
from customization to standardization, first to 
application specific standard products (ASSPs), 
and, more recently, to customer configurable 
hardware, especially to field programmable gate 
arrays (FPGAs). According to a recent estimate, 
there has been a 40 percent decline in new ASSP/
ASIC design starts during the last four years.148
146 The model is obviously a heuristic model, and it is 
not obvious how it could be empirically verified. For 
example, the y-axis dimension is undefined in the 
model. In the first approximation, one could try and 
interpret it as the production volume of the dominant 
product category in a given period.
147 Selburn (2004).
148 Manners (2008).
In	 year	 2008,	 Gartner	 Dataquest	 expected	
ASIC and ASSP design starts to continue to fall 
to reach 7,500. In contrast, the design starts for 
FPGA was expected to reach about 90,000.149
In the Makimoto model, the cycles of 
customization and standardization are defined 
from the point of view of the semiconductor 
device industry. For the early history of the 
industry, this point of view is quite unproblematic. 
One should note, however, that as devices 
become increasingly complex, also standardized 
products can be highly customizable from the 
end user point of view. In Figure 28 we have 
followed Makimoto’s original logic and located 
ASSPs on the customization wave and FPGAs in 
the standardization wave.
ASSPs are, in fact, technically ASICs. The 
difference between ASICs and ASSPs is not 
149	 Data	from	a	presentation	by	Jim	Tully	at	Design	&	Reuse	
IP08	 Conference,	 December	 2008,	 as	 quoted	 in	 Pele	
(2008b)
Figure 27: The Makimoto pendulum
Source: Meaning Processing.
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technical; instead, it is in the business model. 
ASSPs are sold in large volumes for many 
similar customers who do not try to differentiate 
their end products based on a proprietary chip 
design. For example, many mobile phone 
manufacturers and set-top box makers now use 
standard chip platforms that are built on ASSPs. 
ASSPs may, therefore, be understood as a product 
category that extends the swing of the Makimoto 
pendulum beyond the limits of ASICs, when cost, 
time to market, and operational efficiency start 
to make customer-specific ASICs uncompetitive. 
In a somewhat similar way, chip architectures 
where only some upper layers of the chip are left 
for customer configuration and most layers are 
mass-produced, known as “structured silicon,” 
try to push beyond the cost, time to market, and 
operation efficiency boundaries.
FPGAs, in turn, are standard products 
from the manufacturing point of view. From 
the end user point of view, they, however, are 
customizable, and can be loaded with basically 
any digital functionality that the user wants. 
Modern FPGAs are also reconfigurable, and 
their logic circuitry can be reprogrammed, for 
example, over the Internet.
Whereas the original Makimoto pendulum 
was driven by the underlying continuous 
improvements in technology and by normal 
competitive forces, including time-to-market, 
cost effectiveness, operational efficiency, product 
differentiation, need for value creation, as well as 
industry-level cycles of overcapacity, the future 
developments in the industry will also depend on 
emerging new dynamics of innovation. For end-
user industries, integrated circuits are increasingly 
used as innovation platforms. Chips that have 
processing capabilities do not necessarily 
completely define product functionality, which 
becomes gradually defined during the life-time of 
the product. In Figure 28 we note this development 
towards looser coupling between the chip design 
and product design by adding two new trends 
–“chip as platform” and “reconfigurability”– to 
the picture.
The first of these refers to the case where the 
chip architecture provides capabilities and options 
for product evolution. A relatively straightforward 
approach is to create full programmable systems-
on-chip, where application-level software can 
be used to change chip functionality. This is 
basically the current IP-based approach, where 
pre-designed IP blocks are configured into a 
Figure 28: Extrapolated Makimoto waves, 1957-2020
Source: Meaning Processing.
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attraction of this approach is that if processing 
can be done using general purpose processors, 
the system can be programmed using standard 
software programming languages and tools. The 
swing from FPGA’s to IP-based SoCs is enabled 
by customizing pre-designed and standardized 
design blocks. It thus requires the existence of a 
robust IP vendor population, system-level design 
tools and a new level of design abstraction.
An extension to this IP-based SoC wave is 
to create reconfigurable hardware, for example, 
by including FPGA blocks on the chip. When 
FPGA-based configurability is combined with 
specialized IP-blocks that, for example, process 
multimedia data streams, efficient and high-
performance systems can be built using a single 
chip. In this approach, customization is based on 
combining function-specific processing blocks 
and modifiable components, which can be 
manufactured in standardized processes.
Beyond the IP-based SoC wave, the swings 
of the Makimoto pendulum may become 
somewhat chaotic, as new forces come into play. 
As the marginal cost of increasing the number 
of transistors grows, it becomes increasingly 
expensive to waste transistors on a chip. This 
means that designs have to be increasingly 
hardware-aware, and generic software-based 
solutions become inadequate.
In particular, the end of scaling implies that 
there is only limited space for future improvements 
in conventional FPGA technologies, as 
improvements require increases in the number 
of transistors on a chip. FPGAs have benefited 
greatly from the declining costs of components on 
a chip and the fact that during the last decade the 
absolute number of these components became so 
high that very complex functionality can now be 
configured on a single chip. The basic challenge, 
however, is that the fine-grain granularity that 
makes the implementation of any logic circuitry 
possible on a FPGA makes them sub-optimal for 
almost all applications. The flexibility of FPGAs 
also means that their power consumption is 
usually very high compared to more optimal 
processing architectures. As more and more 
digital devices are used, both the overall energy 
consumption in the society and the battery life-
time of mobile devices become increasingly 
important considerations, thus reducing the 
attractiveness of FPGA architectures.150
As new open and continuous innovation 
models penetrate IC user industries, products are 
increasingly designed as flexible platforms for 
continuous evolution and improvement. Product 
reconfigurability thus becomes increasingly 
important. Standardization, in turn, is –in addition 
to manufacturing cost– pushed by the fact that 
many future products will include embedded 
processing and communications capability and 
products will be interconnected. A relatively 
straightforward extension of the Makimoto 
trajectory would, then, lead to heterogeneous 
IC architectures that have flexible reconfigurable 
processing cores and interface components 
that can be configured for standardized 
communications and interaction protocols. A 
basic challenge is to create low-cost products 
that can be both customized and dynamically 
reconfigured using high-level functional 
descriptions and tools.
One early example of a product that moves 
toward this direction is the “software defined 
silicon” chip introduced by XMOS in 2008. The 
XMOS architecture –which is inspired by the earlier 
Transputer architecture developed by Inmos in 
the UK in the 1980s– essentially provides a set of 
parallel processing units that can be programmed 
and configured to a specific architecture using 
a software program. A more application specific 
example is the Montium reconfigurable digital 
150 Although it is possible that radical new approaches, 
such as FPGAs based on spintronics, could make FPGA 
architectures viable also in the future, at present it is not 
known what these radical approaches would be or how 
they could be implemented.
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signal Tile Processor, developed by Recore 
Systems, based in the Netherlands. The Montium 
processor is configured by loading an application-
specific set of instructions to its processors and by 
configuring the data paths according the needs of 
the task at hand. Whereas the XMOS architecture 
is based on programming a set of processors 
and combining them in a way that solves the 
computational problem at hand, the Recore 
architecture is based on modifying the actual 
set of instructions that the underlying parallel 
processors handle. The Recore architecture also 
assumes that the data can be processed in parallel 
without referencing data that is “distant” in time 
or space from the currently processed data. This 
makes the Recore architecture suitable for typical 
multimedia streams, including video processing. 
Both architectures can be manufactured as large-
volume chips, yet they allow customization and 
reconfiguration by the users.
Whereas the underlying dynamics and 
predictive value of Makimoto’s Wave model 
can be debated, it highlights the point that the 
sources of profitability change as technology 
advances. As Makimoto focused on the dynamics 
of semiconductor manufacturing, the key drivers 
in his model only implicitly take into account the 
demand structure and end-user requirements. 
The model also does not explicitly describe the 
trends of the drivers themselves. For example, 
an important factor in the recent decline in ASIC 
design starts has been the increasing fixed cost of 
new designs, combined with the technical and 
business risks associated with complex designs 
in leading-edge technologies and shrinking end-
product lifetimes. Whereas time-to-market and 
cost efficiency remain key drivers in the industry, 
the escalating costs and tighter opportunity 
windows slow down the swing of the Makimoto 
pendulum, almost as if the gravitational constant 
would be increased over time.
An important factor in the upswing of the 
pendulum in the standardization cycle is that 
new innovations in fundamental technologies 
tend to generate many attempts to benefit from 
the emerging possibilities. This point is supported 
by empirical studies on technology innovations. A 
broader view on the dynamics of semiconductor 
industry can therefore be gained by looking at the 
typical patterns in the development of technical 
products.
7.3. Configurability and Recombination
When a new promising technological 
opportunity emerges, it creates a large number of 
product ideas and a large variety of products.151 
Abernathy and Utterback called this stage the 
“fluid phase” of innovation.152 This phase typically 
leads to a “transitional phase” in which the rate 
of major product innovation slows down and 
the rate of major process innovations speeds up. 
At this point, product variety begins to give way 
to standard designs. As the form of the product 
becomes settled and a dominant design emerges, 
the pace of product innovation slows down and 
the intensity of process innovation increases, 
leading to declining costs and optimized 
performance. Some industries enter, according 
to Abernathy and Utterback, a “specific phase,” 
in which the rate of major innovation dwindles 
for both product and process. These industries 
become extremely focused on cost, volume, 
and capacity, and innovation occurs in small 
incremental steps.
Why such a developmental path emerges? 
In current terminology, one explanation is that 
an ecosystem forms around the most attractive 
product feature configurations, leading to 
the emergence of a dominant design. In this 
phase of technology maturation cycle, the 
dominant design provides a definition of what 
the product is and where it belongs in the 
151 Schumpeter (1975) described this as the “swarming” of 
entrepreneurs. The impact of this process on the rate of 
innovation and firm entry and exit was first explored by 
Mueller	and	Tilton	(1969).
152	 Utterback	and	Abernathy	(1976),	and	Utterback	(1994).
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design therefore allows multiple actors to link 
and stabilize their interactions with each other 
and the focal product. The ecosystem actors 
also span an interlinked net, increasing the 
difficulty of changing the dominant design, 
except through gradual evolution. To give 
an example, the historical emergence of the 
QWERTY typewriter keyboard as a dominant 
design required the establishment of training 
providers that had courses standardized on 
using the QWERTY keyboard.153 In addition, 
it also required competent writers who had 
invested their time and effort in learning 
to use the keyboard. As the actor linkages 
153 QWERTY typewriters are commonly used as examples 
of dominant designs. This example, of course, is 
somewhat culturally biased as, for example, French 
speaking countries do not use QWERTY keyboards.
stabilize, technical improvements, on the 
other hand, can be evaluated in this context 
and dominant lines of improvement emerge. 
Technical improvements then further lead to a 
current “technically optimized” design, which 
effectively and efficiently implements the main 
characteristics of the dominant design.
Technical optimization results in high-
performance products that are best adapted to 
those users that prioritize technical performance 
at any feasible cost. In the early history of 
integrated circuits, the US military was such a 
user. Technical optimization, however, leads 
also to product variants that optimize technical 
performance in relation to product cost. In this 
model, advancing technology makes the purely 
performance-oriented user segment eventually 
a minority. As the performance-price relation is 
good enough, the majority of users start to focus 
Figure 29: Innovation drivers in new product categories
  126 
dominant
design
The concepts of “ease of use” and “user-centric” require, however, some further consideration. The 
common idea that product characteristics can define products that are “easy to use” implies that 
product uses are predetermined and stable.155 The “users,” in this conceptualization, represent a 
dominant segment of users. In practice, this model works best when production is organized as 
mass-production, as it often was in the 19th century. In reality, however, there are usually many 
different communities of users. The “same” product is used in many social practices, and each 
community of practice constructs the meaning of the product from its own point of view. When the 
product becomes sufficiently reliable and usable, these different user communities start to 
reinterpret the possibilities of the product functionality and technology, in effect reinventing the 
product characteristics using the current functionality as a starting point. At that point the product 
becomes a platform for user-centric innovation. The configurability, flexibility and modifiability of 
the underlying product, then, become increasingly important. This dynamic is visible, for example, 
in the mobile communications industry and in the evolution of the World-Wide Web.156
155  The concept also works best when only entry-level users, i.e. new product buyers, are considered. Ease 
of use means very different things, for example, for a novice musician and a professional violin player but we rarely 
think that violins are badly designed because everyone can not play them well. 
156  Tuomi (2002a; 2005) . 
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on other criteria, including product reliability 
and ease of use. This leads to an increasingly 
“user-centric” and human-centric emphasis on 
product improvements. At that point, engineering 
knowledge is increasingly complemented by 
cultural and social knowledge when products 
are designed.
Figure 29 shows such a generic model of 
technology maturation.154
The concepts of “ease of use” and “user-
centric” require, however, some further 
consideration. The common idea that product 
characteristics can define products that are 
“easy to use” implies that product uses are 
predetermined and stable.155 The “users,” in 
this conceptualization, represent a dominant 
segment of users. In practice, this model works 
best when production is organized as mass-
production, as it often was in the 19th century. 
In reality, however, there are usually many 
different communities of users. The “same” 
product is used in many social practices, and 
each community of practice constructs the 
meaning of the product from its own point of 
view. When the product becomes sufficiently 
reliable and usable, these different user 
communities start to reinterpret the possibilities 
of the product functionality and technology, in 
effect reinventing the product characteristics 
using the current functionality as a starting point. 
154 The model extends earlier research on technology 
evolution by Christensen et al. (Christensen 1997; Bass 
and Christensen 2002; Rosenbloom and Christensen 
1994; Bower and Christensen 1995) and Utterback 
(Utterback	and	Abernathy	1976;	Utterback	1994),	along	
the lines of the downstream distributed innovation 
process	 model	 by	 Tuomi	 (2002a).	 Dominant	 designs	
emerge here when many stakeholders form a network 
of interests that slow down developments in the focal 
product. This variation of the dominant design concept 
is particularly suitable for system innovations, where the 
focal product forms a key subcomponent. Programmable 
integrated circuits are examples of such subcomponents.
155 The concept also works best when only entry-level 
users, i.e. new product buyers, are considered. Ease 
of use means very different things, for example, for a 
novice musician and a professional violin player but 
we rarely think that violins are badly designed because 
everyone can not play them well.
At that point the product becomes a platform 
for user-centric innovation. The configurability, 
flexibility and modifiability of the underlying 
product, then, become increasingly important. 
This dynamic is visible, for example, in the 
mobile communications industry and in the 
evolution of the World-Wide Web.156
In the above model, the different phases 
of product maturation and renewal are driven 
by different value propositions, and the locus 
of innovation also shifts between the phases. 
Different	 types	 of	 knowledge	 are	 needed	 and	
different sources of knowledge and innovation 
become focal in the different phases. In 
particular, when a dominant design is 
optimized, progress is typically measured using 
engineering criteria established by the industry 
that produces the product.157 When product 
configuration becomes the dominant driver, the 
criteria established by innovative users become 
more central.
The importance of configurability as 
an enabler of end-user innovation has been 
widely recognized in recent years. The role 
of configuration and recombination is highly 
visible in the software domain, where the 
growth of the Internet is to a large extent related 
to the combinatorial mode of innovation, 
where existing technologies are reconfigured 
and adapted to new innovative uses.158 In this 
regard, hardware innovations such as IC designs 
are not different from software. The relative 
invisibility of the combinatorial growth mode in 
semiconductor hardware has to a large extent 
been related to the fact that semiconductor 
design has required specialized knowledge and 
access to expensive tools and implementation 
156 Tuomi (2002a; 2005).
157 This is particularly the case when the innovation 
ecosystem is dominated by the focal developer 
community, which establishes its evaluative criteria as 
the measure for improvement. See Constant (1987).
158 The combinatorial mode of innovation and its role in 
the development of Internet technologies is elaborated 
in Tuomi (2002a, chap. 7).
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on systems. As the technical performance of 
information processing technologies becomes 
sufficient for the majority of potential users, in 
the model presented above the main bottleneck 
for innovation shifts to social and economic 
entry barriers that potential innovators face. 
Lowering these entry barriers, therefore, could 
lead to a very rapid expansion of innovative 
activity in semiconductor hardware and close-
to-hardware software.
A more fundamental challenge and 
opportunity is related to the entry point in Figure 
29. If the integrated circuit technology has evolved 
according to the phases described above, could a 
new cycle be created using fundamentally new 
concepts of computing?
Although computers are used in all areas 
of life today, current computing models work 
optimally in only few special cases. These special 
cases are extremely important in practice, which is 
one of the reasons why the present-day computing 
models have successful been used since the 
1940s. The stored-program algorithmic computing 
models, used in almost all microprocessor-based 
computers and programmable devices, however, 
were originally intended to solve two basic kinds 
of computational problems: iterative solution of 
differential equations, and syntactic manipulation 
of character strings.
The first application area was related to 
physical computations, including artillery 
trajectories. The second application area was 
originally related to decryption of encrypted 
messages, and later, to storing character strings 
for census data, payrolls, and other similar 
database applications that underlie the social 
organization of the Information Society. Although 
computers have been used for many applications 
beyond these prototypical cases, many of these 
are inherently incompatible with traditional 
computational models and require brute-force 
approaches that lead to escalating computational 
requirements.159 The common belief, according to 
which we today have sophisticated computational 
architectures, therefore, is to a large extent based 
on an illusion that has survived because the rapid 
scaling of integrated circuits have brought with it 
rapidly increasing computational performance. In 
practice, however, much of the sophistication in 
the underlying processing and chip architectures 
is aimed at overcoming and mitigating technical 
challenges created by the limitations of the 
underlying models of computation.160
One interesting possibility for future IP 
processing architectures, therefore, could be that 
new ecosystems form around new paradigms of 
computing. For example, real-time embedded 
systems require new computational models and 
programming approaches that may considerably 
differ from the conventional approaches.161 
159 Today, algorithmic computation is successfully used, 
for example, to model wind-tunnels. The trade-offs 
between analog computing using wind-tunnels and 
digital computing were not obvious in the early history 
of computing, and the were analyzed insightfully by 
Wiener (1975). In general, the algorithmic approach 
becomes increasingly tedious when computational 
problems cannot be reduced to context-independent 
calculations.	 Differential	 equations	 and	 syntactic	
manipulation of character strings belong to a special 
class of problems where context does not matter. 
Algorithmic computations work particularly well for 
solving problems in Newtonian mechanics, as context-
independence is a basic feature of the Newtonian 
physics, which is also reflected in the fact that Newton’s 
equations can be represented as simple differential 
equations. In most real-world problems, such as weather 
prediction, natural language processing, artificial 
vision, and real-time embedded systems, the standard 
computational model leads to fundamental challenges. 
These challenges present themselves, for example, by 
the fact that almost all computational problems lead to 
exponential growth of computational complexity.
160 For computing professionals, the fundamental theoretical 
limitations of common computational models are also 
sometimes obscured by the fact that stored program 
algorithmic machines are known to be related to 
universal Turing machines. The nature of universality 
is often misunderstood, however, as Turing machines 
are formal mechanistic procedures that exist in a 
world that does not have external interactions, time, or 
space. Universal Turing machines are universal because 
they end their computations for all algorithmically 
computable tasks after a non-infinite sequence of steps. 
In the real world, many problems require infinite time 
to define with sufficient accuracy the computational 
problem in a form that the universal Turing machine 
could then compute. This was called “the starting 
problem of Turing machines” in Tuomi (1988).
161 See, for example Lee (2008).
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Locations that have relatively low cognitive, 
educational and economic investment in the 
prevailing paradigm could well be able to 
leapfrog relatively easily to the next generation 
information and meaning processing models, 
as the end of scaling makes progress in the old 
paradigm increasingly difficult. An interesting 
possibility, for example, is that China could enter 
the IP arena in this fashion.
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In this section, we provide an overall view 
of the recent developments in the semiconductor 
sector in China, and discuss in more detail IC 
design activities and semiconductor IP in China.
8.1. The State of the IC Market
China has rapidly emerged as a global 
leader in the electronics and semiconductor 
industry.	 In	 year	 2006,	 it	 produced	 480	million	
mobile phones, 93 million microcomputers, and 
33.6	 billion	 integrated	 circuits.	 In	 year	 2007,	 it	
produced 517 million mobile phones, 120 million 
microcomputers and 41.2 billion integrated 
circuits.162 In 2007, China’s semiconductor 
market	 became	 a	 88.1	 billion	USD	market	 and	
it now accounts for over one-third of the world’s 
total. As a consumer of semiconductors, China 
is over two times bigger than Europe or North 
America.	Although	 in	2007	almost	 6	percent	 of	
the growth resulted from currency exchange rate 
changes, the Chinese semiconductor market has 
been growing much faster than in the rest of the 
world. Since 2001, China’s semiconductor market 
has grown at a 31.5 percent compounded annual 
growth rate, while the worldwide market has 
grown	at	a	10.6	percent	rate.	In	2007,	the	Chinese	
consumption for optoelectronics, sensors, and 
discrete	 semiconductors	 was	 USD	 14.2	 billion,	
and the integrated circuit consumption was 
562,373	million	Yuan,	or	about	USD	73.9	billion,	
growing	24	percent	 from	2006.163	During	2007,	
the	 Chinese	 IC	 consumption	 increased	 by	USD	
162	 Data	from	China	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	and	China	
Center	 for	 Information	 Industry	 Development	 (CCID)	
Consulting. NBS integrated circuit statistics report 
“pieces” produced, and the actual definition depends on 
the type of producer. The numbers, therefore, cannot be 
directly interpreted as the number of final IC products. 
For a discussion, see Pausa et al (2008), Appendix 1.
163	 CCID	and	Pausa	et al. (2008).
14.4	billion	while	the	worldwide	IC	grew	by	USD	
9 billion. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2008 update on China’s impact on the 
semiconductor industry,164 this indicates that the 
Chinese market grew by displacing consumption 
in other regions. According to data from China 
Centre	 for	 Information	 Industry	 Development	
(CCID)	Consulting,	 the	 expansion	 is	 Chinese	 IC	
market is, however, slowing down. Since 2003, 
the annual growth rate has slowed down from 41 
percent	to	18.6	percent	in	2007.	In	the	first	half	of	
2008, the sales revenue growth declined to 11.8 
percent from the first half of 2007.
The rapid growth of the Chinese 
semiconductor market has been driven by 
the global transfer of electronic equipment 
production to China. Whereas China produced 
about 9 percent of electronic equipment in year 
2000, in 2007 it produced already 27 percent.165 
The semiconductor content was also higher in 
electronic equipment produced in China than 
in the rest of the world. The largest suppliers to 
the Chinese market are the leading international 
semiconductor firms. In 2007, Intel had a market 
share of about 14 percent, followed by Samsung 
(5.4%), Hynix (3.9%), Texas Instruments (3.4%), 
Toshiba	 (3.3%),	AMD	 (3.1%),	 NXP	 (2.8%),	 and	
STMicroelectronics (2.7%).
To a large extent, the consumption of chips in 
China is based on exports of electronic products. 
The rapid growth of manufacturing finished 
electronics products was the main source of the 
rapid growth of semiconductor consumption 
in the first half of the decade. This expansion 
started to slow down in 2005, leading to slower 
growth rates of Chinese IC markets. According 
164 Pausa et al. (2008).
165 Pausa et al. (2008).
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to	 the	PricewaterhouseCoopers	 (PwC),	about	69	
percent of total consumption was for products 
that were assembled in China and exported 
for sale in other countries in 2007.166 This 
number, however, includes also semiconductor 
products that are actually bought outside China 
but transhipped to China. As PwC points out, 
some customers purchase semiconductors 
outside China for reasons such as supply chain 
management, intellectual property protection and 
toll processing business models. According to 
PwC, up to 48 percent of Chinese consumption 
was bought outside China. For example, many 
Taiwanese, Japanese, Singaporean and European 
electronics equipment manufacturers tranship 
components to China, where they are assembled 
into finished products. About two thirds of these 
products are then exported out from China. 
The total consumption of semiconductors in 
China, therefore, is both considerably larger 
than the consumption for local markets and also 
166 Ibid, p.13.
considerably larger than revenues generated by 
semiconductor producers in China.
Chinese semiconductor statistics, however, 
are not always easy to interpret. Foreign-owned 
and indigenous production are sometimes 
treated differently, and intermediate production 
is sometimes aggregated with final production, 
thus double counting essentially the same 
products. For example, PwC estimates that for 
many foreign-owned semiconductor packaging, 
assembly	and	testing	(SPA&T)	plants,	the	reported	
revenues may be about four times larger than they 
would be if reported using conventional reporting 
practices. This is because many foreign-owned 
firms sell the fabricated wafers to their Chinese 
SPA&T	firms,	 and	 then	buy	back	 the	 assembled	
and tested chips. As a result, the Chinese statistics 
record the value of the final product also when 
only a fraction of the product value is added in 
China. Similarly, when different production steps 
are done by different companies, the Chinese 
statistics usually add the revenues of these 
companies to get the total industry revenue. The 
Figure 30: Production of integrated circuits in China, 1990-2007
As a result, the Chinese statistics record the value of the final product also when only a fraction of 
the product value is added in China. Similarly, when different production steps are done by different 
companies, the Chinese statistics usually add the revenues of these companies to get the total 
industry revenue. The cost of wafers and their further processing steps, i.e., the revenues of 
intermediate producers, become added with the revenues of the finished product. It is therefore 
important to recognize that even the best available data on Chinese semiconductor industry is only 
indicative, and cannot always be directly compared with data on other countries.167
A key characteristic of the Chinese market is that, despite the rapid growth of production, China is 
still consuming considerably more semiconductors than it is producing. In 2007, the gap reached a 
record of USD 54.9 billion. This is one important reason for the Chinese policy makers to promote 
local production. The number of integrated circuits produced in China is shown in Figure 31, as 
reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
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167  For a det iled discu sion, see A endix 1 in the PricewaterhouseCoopers' 2008 updat  on China's Impact 
on the Semiconductor Industry (Pausa, Gilhawley, and Wang 2008) . 
  132 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, various years.
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cost of wafers and their further processing steps, 
i.e., the revenues of intermediate producers, 
become added with the revenues of the finished 
product. It is therefore important to recognize 
that even the best available data on Chinese 
semiconductor industry is only indicative, and 
cannot always be directly compared with data on 
other countries.167
A key characteristic of the Chinese market 
is that, despite the rapid growth of production, 
China is still consuming considerably more 
semiconductors than it is producing. In 2007, the 
gap	 reached	 a	 record	 of	USD	54.9	 billion.	This	
is one important reason for the Chinese policy 
makers to promote local production. The number 
of integrated circuits produced in China is shown 
167 For a detailed discussion, see Appendix 1 in the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2008 update on China’s 
Impact on the Semiconductor Industry (Pausa, 
Gilhawley, and Wang 2008).
in Figure 30, as reported by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China.
Measured in US dollars, the reported revenues 
of Chinese semiconductor firms grew by 27 
percent	in	2007,	reaching	USD	27.4	billion.	This	
includes the production of discrete semiconductor 
devices	 such	as	LEDs	and	 transistors,	packaging	
and testing, integrated circuit manufacture, 
and integrated circuit design. In China, the IC 
manufacturing sector includes wafer foundries, 
wafer fabrication plants of foreign-owned firms, 
and	Chinese	IDMs.	The	IC	design	sector,	in	turn,	
consists of IC design companies, institutes and 
laboratories, as well as all fabless firms. In year 
2007, discrete devices were the largest segment, 
with 40 percent of the total, followed by IC 
packaging and testing (30.1%), IC manufacturing 
(19.1%), and IC design (10.8%). The growth of 
Figure 31: China semiconductor revenues by industry sector, 2003-2007
  133 
Measured in US dollars, the reported revenues of Chinese semiconductor firms grew by 27 percent 
in 2007, reaching USD 27.4 billion. This includes the production of discrete semiconductor devices 
such as LEDs and transistors, packaging and testing, integrated circuit manufacture, and integrated 
circuit design. In China, the IC manufacturing sector includes wafer foundries, wafer fabrication 
plants of foreign-owned firms, and Chinese IDMs. The IC design sector, in turn, consists of IC 
design companies, institutes and laboratories, as well as all fabless firms. In year 2007, discrete 
devices were the largest segment, with 40 percent of the total, followed by IC packaging and testing 
(30.1%), IC manufacturing (19.1%), and IC design (10.8%). The growth of revenues by industry 
sector in the 2003 to 2007 period are shown in Figure 32.168
168  Data from CCID, CSA and PwC, as reported in Pausa et al. (2008, 21) . 
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Source: CCID, 2008.
Figure 33: IC consumption by product category in China, 2007
Source: CCID, 2008.
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revenues by industry sector in the 2003 to 2007 
period are shown in Figure 31.168
The use of produced and imported ICs was 
dominated by computers, followed by consumer 
electronics and network communications. The 
customer structure of the Chinese IC market in 
2007 is shown in Figure 32, based on data from 
CCID.
Consumption by product categories is shown 
in Figure 33.
Indigenous production still represents a 
relatively small fraction of the total semiconductor 
consumption in China. In 2007, the difference 
between Chinese IC consumption and production 
increased	 to	 USD	 54.9	 billion.	 Semiconductor	
consumption is also expected to grow faster than 
production in the next years. CSIA expects the 
China’s	 IC	market	 to	 reach	USD	110	 billion	 by	
2010, when IC industry revenues are expected 
to	 be	 USD	 33	 billion.	 In	 local	 currency	 terms,	
CCID	expects	the	IC	market	to	grow	to	1,238,400	
million	Yuan	and	production	 to	357,660	million	
Yuan by 2012. Using present currency exchange 
rates, this would imply a difference of about 
USD	 128	 billion,	 or	 almost	 half	 of	 the	 present	
semiconductor device market.169 This growing 
production gap has prompted the Chinese policy 
makers to support initiatives and policies that aim 
at increasing indigenous production in the sector.
In fact, also much of the growth in the 
Chinese semiconductor production has been 
driven by multinational firms. From 2005 to 
2007, China’s reported semiconductor industry 
revenues	increased	from	USD	16.1	billion	to	27.4	
168	 Data	from	CCID,	CSA	and	PwC,	as	reported	in	Pausa	et 
al. (2008, 21).
169 The Chinese IC market includes wafer fabrication, IC 
design, and semiconductor packaging, assembly and 
testing	 (SPA&T).	 It	 therefore	 consists	 of	 both	 sales	 of	
final products (the packaged chips) and intermediate 
production, such as wafer fabrication. The worldwide 
semiconductor market, measured as sales of final 
products,	 will	 be	 about	 USD	 279	 billion	 in	 2008	
according to Gartner November 2008 estimate.
billion, or about 70 percent, according to PwC.170 
The memory maker Hynix-Numonyx, originally 
a joint effort by Hynix and STMicroelectronics, 
contributed about 12 percent to the growth with 
the launch of its new fab in Wuxi. Qimonda 
followed with a contribution of about 11 percent, 
Freescale	9	percent,	RF	Micro	Devices	3	percent,	
and Infineon with about 2 percent. The largest 
indigenous companies contributing to the growth 
during the two-year period were SMIC (2.1%) 
and Xinchao Group (1.7%), the former being 
now globally the fourth largest foundry with 2007 
revenues	of	about	USD	1.5	billion,	and	the	latter	
being one of the leading packaging and testing 
vendors in China, with 2007 revenues of about 
USD	0.5	billion.
In general, multinational semiconductor 
firms have followed the historical pattern of first 
moving their most labour intensive activities 
to China. Among the top 20 semiconductor 
manufacturers in China, as listed by PwC,171 
Freescale,	Qimonda,	RFDM,	Renesas,	Panasonic,	
ST Microelectronics, Fujitsu, STATS ChipPAC, 
Infineon, Intel, and Samsung all have their 
main focus on packaging and testing. The main 
exception	 is	 the	 DRAM	 memory	 device	 maker	
Hynix-Numonyx, a wafer fab joint venture 
between Hynix and the STMicroelectronics and 
Intel memory spin-off Numonyx. Of the 50 largest 
semiconductor manufacturers in China, 24 focus 
on packaging and testing.
170 On a local currency basis, this was 59 percent. 
Renminbi appreciated very fast in 2007 in US dollar 
terms,	 making	 USD	 conversions	 highly	 dependent	 on	
the actual exchange rate used. PwC uses the average 
annual exchange rate.
171 Pausa et al. (2008).
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8.2. IC Design in China
In 2000, the State Council adopted the Policy 
for	Encouraging	the	Development	of	the	Software	
Industry and the IC Industry. Subsequently, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology approved 
seven national IC design bases in Shanghai, 
Xi’an, Wuxi, Beijing, Chengdu, Hangzhou and 
Shenzhen. At present, there are about 500 IC 
design enterprises across China.172 The IC design 
industry	generated	 revenues	of	about	RMB	26.7	
billion	Yuan,	according	to	CCID	statistics,	or	about	
USD	3.5	billion.173 Of the 491 design enterprises 
identified	 by	 CCID,	 about	 390	 are	 indigenous	
Chinese companies. According to PwC, the rest 
includes Chinese design activities of 18 of the 
top 25 multinational semiconductor companies 
and 24 of the top 100 semiconductor-consuming 
OEMs. The IC design segment represented 10.8 
percent of the overall semiconductor sector in 
172	 In	its	annual	report	on	Chinese	IC	design	market,	CCID	
states that there are nearly 500 IC design enterprises 
across China. The China Semiconductor Industry 
Association	IC	Design	Branch	(CSIA-ICCAD)	states	that	
there were over 500 IC design houses at the end of 
2007.
173 Using the year-and rate of 7.3 Yuan per US dollar, the 
revenues	would	have	been	USD	3.7	 billion.	The	Yuan	
appreciated rapidly during 2007, and we get 3.5 billion 
using	 the	 exchange	 rate	 7.6	Yuan	 per	US	 dollar.	 PwC	
gives	a	lower	estimate	of	USD	3.0	billion.
2007. According to PwC, growth in this segment 
can almost solely be attributed to China’s fabless 
companies,	 which	 in	 2007	 constituted	 about	 6	
percent of the worldwide fabless market.
IC	 design	 revenues	 have	 grown	 from	 USD	
178	 million	 in	 2001	 to	 over	 USD	 3	 billion	 in	
2007, with a compounded annual growth rate of 
60	percent.	Measure	in	local	currency,	 the	year-
on-year growth rate has declined from its 2003 
peak of 108 percent to 21 percent in 2007.
According to data from Chinese 
Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA), 
the top ten indigenous IC design focused 
semiconductor enterprises generated revenues of 
about	USD	1.3	billion	in	2007,	as	shown	in	Table	
10. The leading firm, China Huada Integrated 
Circuit	Design	(Group)	Co.,	Ltd.	is	a	state-owned	
corporation specialized in IC design. It has about 
600	 staff	 with	 IC	 technology	 and	 management	
expertise.	 CIDC	 Group	 was	 formed	 in	 2003	
with partial funding from China Electronics 
Corporation (CEC) from the first Chinese IC design 
house,	 China	 Huada	 Integrated	 Circuit	 Design	
Centre,	which	was	originally	founded	in	1986.
The second firm, HiSilicon, was established 
in	October	2004,	as	a	spin-off	from	ASIC	Design	
Table 10: Top 10 design houses in China based on revenues in 2007
  138 
Actions Semiconductor, in turn, focuses on SoC development for MP3 players and personal 
multimedia. It had 523 employees at the end of 2007.174
Rank Company
1 240
2 186
3 160
4 156
5 Actions Semiconductor Co. Ltd 127
6 122
7 118
8 102
9 98
10 68
Revenue
USD millions
China Huada Integrated Circuit Design Co. Ltd
Shengzen Hilisilicon Semiconductor Co. Ltd
Spreadtrum Co. Ltd
Datang Microelectronics Technology Co. Ltd
Wuxi Huanrun Semico Microelectronics Co. Ltd
Hangzhou Shilan Microelectronics Joint-stock Co. Ltd
Vimicro Corp.
Shanghai Huahong IC Design Co. Ltd
Beijing Tshinghua Tongfang Microelectronics Co.
8.2.1. Design Capabilities 
The growth of the number of IC design enterprises is shown in Figure 35, based on data from 
CCID. According to PwC, the number of employees has increased at least 10 percent between 2005 
and 2007, and the number of enterprises with more than 100 employees was 21 in 2007. According 
to CCID, more than a third of IC design enterprises had less than 50 employees, and almost two-
thirds had less than 50 employees. 
174  GSA Global Financials Report assigns 257 employees to Actions Semiconductor. This number is also 
used by PwC, which concludes that Actions was the only Chinese design company that achieved the average sales 
per employee of the 180 worldwide fabless companies reported by GSA. Actions Semiconductor Investor FAQ, 
however, reports that the company had 523 full-time employees at the end of 2007. 
Chinese Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA).
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Centre of Huawei Technologies. HiSilicon claims 
to have IPRs of more than 100 types of self-
developed chips and over 500 patents. At the end 
of	2007,	it	had	over	1600	employees,	two-thirds	
of them having a doctor or masters degree.
Spreadtrum, in turn, was incorporated in 
Cayman Islands in April 2001, and it established 
its wholly-owned subsidiary in Shanghai two 
months later. It is a fabless operation that focuses 
on	wireless	market.	According	to	PwC,	it	had	576	
employees at the end of 2007.
Datang	Microelectronics	Technology	 (DMT)	
is the former IC centre of China Academy of 
Telecommunications Technology. It specializes in 
smart card design, and has over 800 employees. 
Actions Semiconductor, in turn, focuses on SoC 
development for MP3 players and personal 
multimedia. It had 523 employees at the end of 
2007.174
8.2.1. Design Capabilities
The growth of the number of IC design 
enterprises is shown in Figure 34, based on data 
from	 CCID.	 According	 to	 PwC,	 the	 number	 of	
employees has increased at least 10 percent 
between 2005 and 2007, and the number of 
enterprises with more than 100 employees was 
21	 in	 2007.	 According	 to	 CCID,	 more	 than	 a	
third of IC design enterprises had less than 50 
employees, and almost two-thirds had less than 
50 employees.
Although the Chinese design organizations 
tend to be small, the distribution of firm sizes is, 
however, somewhat less tilted towards very small 
firms than in Europe. The largest Chinese firms have 
174 GSA Global Financials Report assigns 257 employees 
to Actions Semiconductor. This number is also used 
by PwC, which concludes that Actions was the only 
Chinese design company that achieved the average sales 
per employee of the 180 worldwide fabless companies 
reported by GSA. Actions Semiconductor Investor FAQ, 
however, reports that the company had 523 full-time 
employees at the end of 2007.
about	600	employees,	whereas	in	Europe	the	largest	
firm, ARM Ltd, had over 1700 employees in 2007. 
Using data from the Future Horizons European 
Fabless Semiconductor Report, which provides data 
on engineering employee counts of 313 design firms 
(design houses, fabless and semiconductor IP firms), 
we can compare the size distributions of Chinese 
and European design firms. The distributions, as the 
percentage of firms in different size categories, is 
shown in Figure 35. The data on Chinese enterprises 
comes	from	CCID,	with	total	491	enterprises.175
The size distributions are different. One possible 
explanation could be that the European ecosystem 
has evolved for a longer time, leading to a situation 
where relatively few firms have successfully grown 
to be dominant players in their segments, either 
through organic growth or by acquiring smaller 
firms. In China, the market has expanded very 
rapidly and competition among firms has been 
relatively	modest	 until	 recently.	Due	 to	 the	 lower	
employment costs in China, the number of full time 
employees is also a less tightly linked with overall 
productivity and business success than in Europe. 
iSuppli states that the Chinese semiconductor design 
industry is polarized with about 50 firms achieving 
success, and about 500 firms struggling to survive. 
iSuppli also expects that in the next two years about 
100 design enterprises will close down.176 PwC, in 
turn, predicts that about 100 core firms will remain 
competitive.
The Chinese IC design enterprises still work 
with technologies that are several generations 
behind the leading edge. At present, the top tier of 
Chinese enterprises design at the 90 nm technology 
node. Almost 80 percent of the enterprises, however, 
created designs at over 250 nm geometries in 
2007. A relatively complete picture of the Chinese 
175	 The	CCID	data	include	all	employees	in	2007,	whereas	
Future Horizons only provides data on engineering 
employees. We use the 2007 Edition of the Future 
Horizons European Fabless Semiconductor Report, 
which in some cases gives employee counts that suggest 
that the data may have been collected in earlier years.
176	 McGrath,	D.	(2008)	iSuppli:	Setbacks	in	some	China	IC	
firms linger. EE Times Asia, 21 November 2008.
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Although the Chinese design organizations tend to be small, the distribution of firm sizes is, 
however, somewhat less tilted towards very small firms than in Europe. The largest Chinese firms 
have about 600 employees, whereas in Europe the largest firm, ARM Ltd, had over 1700 employees 
in 2007. Using data from the Future Horizons European Fabless Semiconductor Report, which 
provides data on engineering employee counts of 313 design firms (design houses, fabless and 
semiconductor IP firms), we can compare the size distributions of Chinese and European design 
firms. The distributions, as the percentage of firms in different size categories, is shown in Figure 
36. The data on Chinese enterprises comes from CCID, with total 491 enterprises.175
The size distributions are different. One possible explanation could be that the European ecosystem 
has evolved for a longer time, leading to a situation where relatively few firms have successfully 
grown to be dominant players in their segments, either through organic growth or by acquiring 
smaller firms. In China, the market has expanded very rapidly and competition among firms has 
175  The CCID data include all employees in 2007, whereas Future Horizons only provides data on 
engineering employees. We use the 2007 Edition of the Future Horizons European Fabless Semiconductor Report, 
which in some cases gives employee counts that suggest that the data may have been collected in earlier years. 
Source: CCID, 2008.
Figure 35: Distribution of enterprise sizes in Chinese and European design firms
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been relatively modest until recently. Due to the lower employment costs in China, the number of 
full time employees is also a less tightly linked with overall productivity and business success than 
in Europe. iSuppli states that the Chinese semiconductor design industry is polarized with about 50 
firms achieving success, and about 500 firms struggling to survive. iSuppli also expects that in the 
next two years about 100 design enterprises will close down.176 PwC, in turn, predicts that about 
100 core firms will remain competitive. 
The Chinese IC design enterprises still work with technologies that are several generations behind 
the leading edge. At present, the top tier of Chinese enterprises design at the 90 nm technology 
node.  Almost 80 percent of the enterprises, however, created designs at over 250 nm geometries in 
2007. A relatively complete picture of the Chinese design firm outputs will be available after the 
China Semiconductor Industry Association IC Design Branch (CSIA-ICCAD) publishes the first 
176  McGrath, D. (2008) iSuppli: Setbacks in some China IC firms linger. EE Times Asia, 21 November 
2008. 
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design firm outputs will be available after the China 
Semiconductor	 Industry	 Association	 IC	 Design	
Branch	 (CSIA-ICCAD)	 publishes	 the	 first	 China	
National IC Procurement manual “China Chip IC 
Products Collection” in the next months. 177
Pure-play semiconductor IP vendors are 
still rare in China, and most of the IP revenues 
are payments for imported IP. PwC estimates 
that Chinese semiconductor firms were buying 
semiconductor	 IP	 for	 about	 USD	 26	 million	 in	
2007. This consists mainly of license fees paid by 
Chinese fabless firms to companies such as ARM 
and MIPS. Indigenous production of licensable 
and reusable semiconductor IP is still very limited. 
We were able to locate 13 firms that marketed 
semiconductor IP blocks outside China in 2007. 
These include Shanghai Fullhan Microelectronics, 
established in 2004, that licenses video coder IP 
177	 CSIA-ICCAD:	 The	 Notice	 to	 Publish	 “China	 Chip	 IC	
Products Collection,” available at http://www.csia-iccad.
net.cn/u/jcdl/iccg/01.html. The deadline for submitting 
information for the collection was August 30, 2008.
cores; C*Core Technology, which was originally 
set up to receive the M*Core 32 bit RISC CPU 
technology from Motorola in 2001; V-Trans 
Microelectronics, which licenses mixed signal 
cores for data bus drivers and claims to be able to 
do	analog	and	mixed	 signal	designs	down	 to	65	
nm processes; and Advanced Intellectual Property 
System Technology (AIPS Microelectronics), which 
licenses memory and bus controller IP cores.
A somewhat different view on the Chinese 
design landscape is provided by looking the 
developer ecosystem of the largest independent IP 
vendor, ARM Ltd. Chinese companies and research 
institutes are very actively participating in the ARM 
Connected Community network. In early 2008, over 
10 percent of the 311 ARM Connected Community 
members had their main address in China and 
Hong Kong. The number of Chinese partners in 
the ARM Connected Community was increasing 
rapidly, with 41 Connected Community members 
reporting their headquarter address in China and 
3 in Hong Kong in November 2008. Only the US 
Figure 36: ARM Connected Community members in different countries, 2008
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8.3. Policy Issues 
Integrated circuits is listed as one of the key items in inf rmation in ustry development in the 11th
Five-Year Plan of China. The core electron devices and high-end general chips are the emphasis 
areas of the information strategy. The policy aim is to gradually realize a Chinese made core of 
electron devices, to develop the high-end eneral chips, to promote industry restructuring, and to 
enhance Chinese competitiveness. 
Linguistic problems make it sometimes difficult to interpret the reality behind political declarations. 
Considerable p licy effort, however, has been dedicat d to improve China's semiconductor s ctor. 
In recent years, IC design enterprises have been gathered to discuss the importance of “self-
innovation” and indigenous innovation as a key success factor.  
Source: Meaning Processing, 2008.
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had more members. As noted before, this was partly 
because also firms that have their main activities 
outside the US tend to locate their head offices 
in the US or want to provide a contact address 
for their US locations. For example, the Chinese 
fabless firm Spreadtrum lists as its main address its 
Sunnyvale subsidiary, in California. The number of 
ARM Connected Community members in different 
countries	 in	early	2008	 is	 shown	 in	Figure	36,	as	
reported by the Community members.
8.3. Policy Issues
Integrated circuits is listed as one of the key 
items in information industry development in the 
11th Five-Year Plan of China. The core electron 
devices and high-end general chips are the 
emphasis areas of the information strategy. The 
policy aim is to gradually realize a Chinese made 
core of electron devices, to develop the high-end 
general chips, to promote industry restructuring, 
and to enhance Chinese competitiveness.
Linguistic problems make it sometimes 
difficult to interpret the reality behind political 
declarations. Considerable policy effort, 
however, has been dedicated to improve China’s 
semiconductor sector. In recent years, IC design 
enterprises have been gathered to discuss the 
importance of “self-innovation” and indigenous 
innovation as a key success factor.
8.3.1. Export Regulations
Until recently the Wassenaar arrangement178 
on export restrictions for dual-use technologies 
178 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls 
for	 Conventional	 Arms	 and	 Dual-Use	 Goods	 and	
Technologies	 was	 established	 on	 May	 12,	 1996.	 It	
has 40 participating states, who, at their discretion, 
restrict exports of dual-use technologies. The current 
list of restricted products and technologies includes, for 
example, custom ICs for which either the function or 
the status of the final equipment is unknown, if the IC is 
rated to operate above 125 C or – 55 C. The agreement 
also restricts exports of several wafer fabrication 
technologies that create features below 180 nm. 
has substantially limited China’s ability to acquire 
leading-edge products. Both export restrictions 
and their impact, however, seem to be weakening, 
at least for the time being. For example, Intel 
started	 to	 build	 an	 advanced	 USD	 2.5	 billion	
wafer	fabrication	facility	in	Dalian	in	September	
2007, with financial incentives from the Chinese 
government. This is the first 300mm fab that Intel 
launches	in	Asia,	and	it	will	cover	163,000	square	
meters of factory space and host a 15,000 square 
meter clean room. Intel has declared that the fab 
will be used to make chipsets, which use process 
technology that is about two generations behind 
the leading edge. This fits export regulations that 
limit the exports to so-called N-2 equipment, or 
equipment that is two generations behind the 
most advanced contemporary standard. Intel has 
already secured a license from the US government 
to	make	90	nm	chips	 in	Dalian	 in	2009.	As	 the	
Dalian	Fab	68	 is	expected	 to	be	 in	operation	 in	
early 2010, it is probable that the fab, in fact, will 
start	the	production	with	65	nm	chips.
In	December	 2007,	 IBM	 announced	 that	 it	
had licensed its next-generation 45nm technology 
to Semiconductor Manufacturing International 
Corp. (SMIC), which is the globally third-largest 
pure-play foundry, based in Shanghai. At present 
SMIC is shipping wafers at 90 nm process 
technology,	and	it	expects	to	deliver	chips	in	65	
nm at the end of 2008. SMIC expects to move 
to 45 nm processes towards the end of 2009. 
The process is based on technology licensed 
from IBM and advanced equipment from ASML 
Holding NV. SMIC expects to deliver its 32 nm 
process in the second quarter of 2011, about 18 
months behind the technology leaders. Although 
IBM and SMIC have not discussed their future 
plans in detail, SMIC has told that it is engaged in 
talks to license IBM’s 32 nm technology.179
One reason for the weakened export 
restrictions is the fact that advanced semiconductor 
technologies are not controlled by any single 
179 LaPedus (2008).
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country, and restrictions are normally applied 
only if equivalent equipment is not available from 
other sources. SMIC has been able to avoid export 
controls, for example, by buying advanced used 
equipment	 from	 Belgium.	 According	 to	 CCID,	
already	 in	2006	2.5	percent	of	Chinese	 foundry	
capacity was for a 90 nm process.
The loosening of Taiwanese export restrictions 
could also have an important impact in China. 
The current government in Taiwan has favoured 
closer ties with mainland China, thus reversing 
the earlier policy of tight restrictions. Until 
2002, Taiwan had a total ban on semiconductor 
investments in China. Since then, Taiwanese 
semiconductor firms have gradually started to 
move to mainland. More recently, firms and 
policy makers have argued that Taiwan should 
not be more restrictive in its export policies 
than, for example, the US. In July 2008, the 
Taiwanese government abolished the limits 
on investment in China by companies whose 
operational headquarters are in Taiwan. Further 
loosening of export and investment restrictions 
are expected in 2008 and 2009. As the Taiwanese 
semiconductor	 industry	 had	 revenues	 of	 USD	
44.6	billion	in	2007,	closer	ties	with	Taiwan	and	
the mainland China will potentially have a big 
impact on the global semiconductor industry. 
PwC estimates that semiconductor production in 
Greater China, including Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
mainland China, represented about 24 percent of 
the worldwide revenues. In 2007, semiconductor 
consumption in Greater China represented about 
39 percent of the global consumption.
8.3.2. Labour Contract Law
In 2007, China adopted a new Labour 
Contract Law (LCL), which became effective 
in January 1, 2008. The new LCL harmonizes 
regulations that previously have varied across 
local jurisdictions, and it considerably strengthens 
employee rights. The law includes sections on 
probationary periods, redundancy, liquidated 
damages, severance pay, collective bargaining, 
noncompete, and part-time employment. 
Employees who have worked for the employer for 
ten consecutive years or who have consecutively 
completed two fixed-term contracts, will have 
labour contracts without a fixed term. Employers 
who terminate employees early from a fixed-
term contract shall be liable for severance pay. 
The employee will have the right to terminate 
the contract with a 30-day advance notice, and 
immediately if the working conditions are unsafe, 
or, for example, if the employer fails to pay 
overtime pay or legally required social insurance. 
Similarly, the employee may immediately 
terminate the contract if the employer illegally 
limits the employee’s personal freedom. In such 
cases, the employer is liable for severance pay.
The new LCL also restricts noncompete 
clauses in labour contracts to senior managers 
and senior technicians and other personnel under 
non-disclosure obligations. If the employer pays 
for special training, the employer may require a 
service period, and if the employee terminates 
the contract before the end of the period, he or 
she may have to pay back part of the training 
expense. The LCL also states that when companies 
plan for lay off more than 20 employees or over 
10 percent of total staff, the company needs to 
provide a 30-day advance notification to the 
labour union or all employees, consult with 
either the union or employee representatives, 
and submit the plans to the labour authorities. 
The employer is required to retain with priority 
those employees who have long-term contracts 
or contracts without fixed term, and employees 
without other working family members. If the 
company rehires within six months, the laid-off 
employees shall be given priority.
According to PwC, the new LCL may 
substantially increase labour costs and reduce 
flexibility for many employers. For most 
multinational companies, the new law will, 
however, most likely provide a more level playing 
field as it requires local competitors to provide a 
level of human resource management practices 
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that is comparable with those in developed 
economies. As multinational firms have in recent 
years typically been required to apply also in 
China human resource practices that are similar 
to those in their home countries, the impact of 
the new law is relatively small for them. Also the 
main Chinese suppliers to foreign-owned firms 
and the global market have increasingly been 
required to meet global standards in human 
resource management. The potential impact of 
the new law, therefore, may be to reduce the 
viability of those Chinese firms that have based 
their competitiveness on weak employee rights.
A natural consequence of the strengthened 
labour rights is that labour costs will increase. 
Chinese firms will therefore have an incentive to 
move towards higher-value adding activities. A 
somewhat similar policy was used in Singapore 
to upgrade its production structure, as was noted 
before.
8.3.3. Investment Incentives and the New 
Corporate Income Tax
The rapid development of the Chinese 
economy has been based on systematic policies 
that have aimed at export-oriented growth, 
industrialization, and the development of national 
competitiveness. The policies have been inspired 
by experiences from Japan, and, later, Taiwan and 
South Korea. On the other hand, since the late 
1970s, the Chinese economic policy has also 
aimed at providing a success model that would 
show the future for Taiwan and Hong Kong. To an 
important extent, the policy has been built around 
Special	 Economic	 Zones,	 which	 have	 acted	 as	
“experiments” on the new model.
Since 1980, China has established Special 
Economic	 Zones	 in	 Shenzhen,	 Zhuhai	 and	
Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen 
in Fujian Province, and designated the entire 
province of Hainan a special economic zone. 
The objective was, first, to attract foreign 
investment, establish industrial investment, 
and promote export-oriented growth. Later, the 
objectives were expanded to provide “windows” 
for new technology, knowledge, management 
experience, and the new policy of openness. 
In 1984, China further opened 14 coastal cities 
–Dalian,	Qinhuangdao,	Tianjin,	Yantai,	Qingdao,	
Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Wenzhou,	 Fuzhou,	 Guangzhou,	 Zhanjiang	 and	
Beihai– to overseas investment. In 1990, the 
Chinese government decided to open the Pudong 
New	 Zone	 in	 Shanghai	 to	 overseas	 investment,	
and opened more cities in the Yangtze River 
valley. Since 1992, the State Council has opened 
a number of border cities and, in addition, opened 
all the capital cities of inland provinces and 
autonomous regions. In addition, 15 free trade 
zones, 32 state-level economic and technological 
development zones, and 53 new- and high-
tech industrial development zones have been 
established in large and medium-sized cities. The 
five special economic zones aim at integrating 
science and industry with trade, and they benefit 
from preferential policies and special managerial 
systems. The preferential policies include tax 
holidays, subsidies, and other similar incentives. 
The	most	prominent	SEZs	are	now	Shenzhen	and	
Pudong.
Combined with low labour costs, these 
investment and tax incentives have led to 
extremely rapid expansion of the Chinese 
economy.	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 early	 SEZ,	
Shenzhen, has developed from a small village 
into a city with a population of over 10 million 
in 20 years. In the 1980s, the investment was 
mainly from compatriots in Hong Kong and 
patriotic overseas Chinese. In the 1990s, also 
multinational corporations became important 
investors. In relative terms, foreign investment 
peaked	 in	1996,	 representing	almost	12	percent	
of all investment in China. In absolute terms, 
both government and foreign investment has 
continued to grow, however, as can be seen from 
Figure 37. To a large extent, foreign investment 
has	focused	on	SEZs.
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In 2007, the Chinese government enacted 
major revisions in its policies on foreign 
investment	and	SEZs.	The	new	Corporate	Income	
Tax law (CIT law) replaces the earlier laws that 
distinguished foreign-owned enterprises (FEs) or 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) from domestic 
firms. Although both had a theoretical 33 percent 
statutory tax rate, FEs and FIEs had a much lower 
effective tax rate, generally about 15 percent, 
according to PwC. The new CIT essentially puts 
domestic and foreign enterprises on a level 
playing field, imposing a 25 percent tax rate on 
both. The law aims at simplifying tax regimes, 
broadening the tax base, lowering tax rates, and 
strict enforcement.
The new law shifts the focus from foreign 
investment and export oriented development 
policy towards knowledge-based indigenous 
development. The PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008 
update on China’s impact on the semiconductor 
industry summarizes the main tax implications of 
the new CIT law for semiconductor industry as 
follows:
The tax rate will increase to 25 percent both 
for domestic and non-domestic firms. For firms in 
Special	Economic	Zones	that	enjoyed	a	reduced	
tax rate of 15 percent, the tax rate will gradually 
increase during the next five years. Existing 
domestic enterprises and FIEs that have unused 
tax holidays will be able to use their remaining 
years of their tax holiday, which, however, has to 
start in 2008.
High and New Technology Enterprises 
(HNTE) that meet specific criteria are eligible 
for a reduced tax rate of 15 percent. The 
criteria include proprietary intellectual rights, 
proportion of university graduates employed 
in	 R&D,	 percentage	 of	 revenue	 spent	 on	 R&D,	
and percentage of income from high or new 
technology products or services. New HNTEs 
established	in	SEZs	may	also	be	eligible	for	a	two-
year tax exemption and a three-year 50 percent 
tax rate reduction with the holiday commencing 
from the first profit-generating year. For the first 
two years, such HNTEs, therefore have a tax rate 
of zero, increasing to 12.5 percent for the next 
Figure 37: Total investment in fixed assets in China
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In 2007, the Chinese government enacted major revisions in its policies on foreign investment and 
SEZs. The new Corporate Income Tax law (CIT law) replaces the earlier laws that distinguished 
foreign-owned enterprises (FEs) or foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) from domestic fir s. 
Although both had a theoretical 33 percent statutory tax rate, FEs and FIEs had a much lower 
effective tax rate, generally about 15 percent, according to PwC. The new CIT essentially puts 
domestic and foreign enterprises on a level playing field, imposing a 25 percent tax rate on both. 
The law aims at simplifying tax re imes, broadening the tax base, lowering tax rates, and strict 
enforcement. 
The new law shifts the focus from foreign investment and export riented development policy 
towards knowledge-based indigenous development. The PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008 update on 
China's impact on the semiconductor industry summarizes the main tax implications of the new CIT 
law for semiconductor industry as follows: 
The tax rate will increase to 25 percent both for domestic and non-domestic firms. For firms in 
Special Economic Zones that enjoyed a reduced tax rate of 15 percent, the tax rate will gradually 
increase during the next five years. Existing domestic enterprises and FIEs that have unused tax 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, various years.
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three years if the firm makes profit, and further 
increasing to 15 percent from that on.
In the new CIT law, IC design enterprises are 
treated in the same way as software enterprises. 
For example, VAT rebates used for production 
expansion	 and	 R&D	 will	 be	 exempt	 from	 CIT.	
Newly established IC design firms have a two-
year tax exemption, followed by a three-year 
50 percent tax reduction starting from their first 
profit-making year. Staff training expenses are tax 
deductible, and purchase software is allowed to 
be depreciated or amortized over a minimum 
period of two years.
IC production companies will be entitled to 
additional tax preferences, including the shrinking 
of depreciation periods for production equipment 
to a minimum of three years and reduced tax 
rates that depend on the process line-width. For 
example, IC producers with total investment 
greater	 than	 8	 billion	 Yuan	 (about	 USD	 1.1	
billion) or which produce ICs with a line-width of 
less than 250 nm may be eligible for a 15 percent 
tax rate. From 2008 to 2010, IC firms will also be 
able to get a 40 percent refund of the taxes they 
have already paid if they reinvest after-tax profits 
to increase the registered capital of the firm or a 
new IC production or assembly enterprise. In the 
same period, firms that invest after-tax profits in a 
new IC production or assembly company located 
in the Western Region may get a 80 percent 
refund of already paid taxes.
In general, the new CIT law will 
considerably change the incentives for foreign 
direct investments and offshoring to China. Many 
benefits enjoyed by foreigners will disappear, 
and the incentives will be increasingly uniform 
across different types of investors. At the same 
time, the new CIT law concentrates incentives 
for	 R&D	 intensive	 enterprises	 and	 in	 firms	 that	
introduce new advanced technologies, thus 
improving the Chinese competitiveness in the 
global marketplace.
8.4. The Five Paths to the Chinese IP 
Future
Since the early 1990s, Taiwan has become 
the dominant location for independent foundries. 
This was based on strong government policies, 
as well as on tight social networks among 
expatriates from Taiwan. Today, one out of every 
four IC products comes from Taiwan. A natural 
question is: Could China follow the growth path 
of Taiwan and become a leading producer of key 
ICT components?
In principle, China could march five 
alternative paths towards the future. First, 
the increasing semiconductor manufacturing 
capabilities could pull increasingly advanced 
design to China. Second, the large market of 
semiconductors could pave the way for the 
Chinese leadership in advanced semiconductor 
design. Third, government policies could tilt the 
balance. Fourth, the Chinese innovation system 
could eventually create competitive advantages 
that would shift the locus of semiconductor 
innovation to China. Fifth, the fact that China is 
currently considerably behind the leading edge 
could actually become a competitive advantage 
as the CMOS technology progress slows down, 
and eventually hits the dead-end. In the following, 
these alternative routes are briefly discussed.
8.4.1. Manufacturing Pull
Brown and Linden (2009) argue that, to 
analyze the “manufacturing-pull” hypothesis, we 
need to differentiate between two primary types 
of	R&D	in	the	chip	industry:	process	development	
and chip design. In process development, the shift 
of fabrication to Taiwan (and memory production 
to South Korea and Taiwan) had, indeed, led to 
increasing	 amounts	 of	 process	 R&D	 in	 Asia.	
There are, however, exceptions, an important 
exception being the equipment suppliers. Process 
development is actually done jointly by chip 
manufacturers and equipment manufacturers. 
The	 combined	 R&D	 spending	 of	 equipment	
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manufacturers is about one quarter that of the 
chip manufacturers. The leading semiconductor 
lithography supplier is ASML, headquartered in 
Veldhoven, the Netherlands. The remaining top 
ten semiconductor manufacturing equipment 
suppliers are all based in the US or Japan.
Another exception, according to Brown 
and Linden, is the growing use of process 
development alliances. The leading edge 
fabrication technologies are now developed by 
large international alliances, such as the Common 
Platform alliance, built around IBM, Chartered 
Semiconductor, Samsung, Infineon, Freescale, 
STMicroelectronics, Toshiba, and others. The 
Common Platform alliance now includes five of 
the top ten IC producers, all concentrating their 
basic process development in IBM’s East Fishkill 
facility in New York.
Although major semiconductor producers, 
such as Texas Instruments and IBM, are now 
outsourcing chip fabrication in the future 
technology generations to either such global 
alliances or leading independent foundries based 
in Taiwan, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
the manufacturing-pull theory does not work in 
practice.
According to Brown and Linden, the 
manufacturing-pull effect is even weaker with 
respect to chip design. Today, the US is still the 
dominant location for design-based fabless 
semiconductor firms. Although the US firms are 
offshoring and outsourcing their activities to Asia, 
this rarely happens because of fab location. A 
simple counter example for the manufacturing-
pull hypothesis is India, which is the leading 
offshoring and outsourcing location for IC 
design.	 Despite	 its	 considerable	 volume	 of	 IC	
design activities and their rapid growth over the 
last decade, India still does not have a single 
semiconductor fabrication facility.
In fact, the old wisdom “fab is the lab” 
seems	 to	 describe	 best	 the	 era	 of	 IDMs,	 in	 the	
1980s. Given the multi-billion dollar investments 
required for next-generation chip making, and 
additional multiple billions required for process 
development, the manufacturing pull hypothesis 
can be rejected under normal economic 
conditions. In theory, the Chinese government 
could, of course, invest such huge amounts of 
money to set up bleeding-edge facilities that 
normal economic conditions would not apply. 
Given the approaching end of CMOS scaling, the 
investment, however, would probably be difficult 
to justify also among policymakers.
8.4.2. Large-Market Pull
The second path, the “large-market pull,” 
has somewhat more credibility. According to 
Brown and Linden, a key assumption in this 
hypothesis is that powerful “national champions” 
emerge in Asia that eventually will overtake 
current industry leaders. Given that engineering 
talent is a critical determinant of the capabilities 
of a semiconductor company, a key factor is the 
availability of engineering capabilities.
In fact, the raw numbers are impressive. In 
year	 2006,	 China	 had	 over	 12,000	 new	 PhDs	
in engineering, and over 144,000 new students 
started their postgraduate studies in engineering. 
The total enrolment in engineering studies was 
412,273 students. In science, the total enrolment 
was about 135,000. There were 2.8 million 
scientists and engineers working in science and 
technology	activities	 in	year	2006,	according	 to	
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The 
growth of employment in science and technology 
is visible in Figure 38, which shows the number 
of persons engaged in scientific and technical 
activities.
The number of engineering students in 
China, however, is only a fraction of the total 
number of Chinese engineering students. For 
example, in 2003 there were about 258,000 
Chinese	 students	 in	OECD	countries,	 according	
to	 the	 data	 from	 OECD	 Education	 database.	
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From	 1989	 to	 2006,	 Chinese	 students	 earned	
about 45,000 science and engineering doctorates 
from	 US	 universities	 and	 institutions.	 In	 2006,	
citizens	 of	 China	 constituted	 26.6	 percent	 of	
all engineering doctorate recipients and 27.1 
percent of all science and engineering doctorates 
in the US; citizens of India and Korea represented 
10.4 percent and 7.4 percent of engineering 
doctorates, respectively.180 The growth in the 
number of doctoral awards granted to Chinese 
citizens can be seen in Figure 39.
Also a considerable amount of post-doctoral 
experience is gained outside China. For example, 
in	 2006,	 almost	 one	 third	 of	 the	 new	 US	 H-1B	
temporary work visas for holders of doctorates 
were granted to persons coming from China. India, 
in turn, had about 13 percent of H-1B visas, which 
allow people with special skills and expertise 
to work as guest workers in the inviting host 
180 Falkenheim (2007). In electrical engineering, 77.3 
percent of all doctoral awards were granted for non-US 
citizens.
organization. The distribution of US H-1B visas in 
the	financial	year	2006	is	shown	in	Figure	40.181
The development of Taiwanese 
semiconductor industry was to a large extent 
based on returning expatriates, trained in US 
universities and leading semiconductor firms. 
Social networks among ethnic Chinese have also 
been highly important in setting up the industry 
in Taiwan.182 It is therefore clear that China 
will have considerable potential in shifting the 
point of gravitation towards mainland China. A 
critical factor is also the attractiveness of China 
for	 returning	 expatriates.	 Due	 to	 the	 increasing	
business opportunities in China and the opening 
of the economy, many expatriates are now willing 
to return to China. This is in some contrast with 
India, for example, where most expatriates state 
that they want to stay abroad.
181	 Data	 from	 the	US	Science	and	Engineering	 Indicators,	
2008.
182 Saxenian (1999; 1991). Texas Instruments has been 
called the “Training Institute” among Taiwanese expats.
Figure 38: Personnel engaged in science and technology activities in China, 2002-2006
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China,2007.
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Also a considerable amount of post-doctoral experience is gained outside China. For example, in 
2006, almost one third of the new US H-1B temporary work visas for holders of doctorates were 
granted to persons coming from China. India, in turn, had about 13 percent of H-1B visas, which 
allow people with special skills and expertise to work as guest workers in the inviting host 
organization. The distribution of US H-1B visas in the financial year 2006 is shown in Figure 41.181
180  Falkenheim (2007) . In electrical engineering, 77.3 percent of all doctoral awards were granted for non-
US citizens. 
181  Data from the US Science and Engineering Indicators, 2008. 
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Figure 40: Country of citizenship for new recipients of U.S. H-1B temporary work visas holding 
doctorates in FY 2006
Source: US Science and Engineering Indicators, 2008.
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The development of Taiwan to the leading 
edge was to some extent slowed by the fact that 
much of Taiwanese production went to Taiwanese 
electronic equipment makers, who typically 
didn’t produce technically the most advanced 
products.183 To pull the industry to a globally 
leading position, the producers need to supply 
the most demanding customers. The development 
of the Chinese OEM industry, therefore, will have 
an important role in making or breaking the 
“large-market pull” hypothesis. If Chinese OEMs, 
such	 as	 Lenovo,	 Huawei,	 TCL,	 ZTE	 and	 others	
will be able to become first-tier vendors in the 
global market, it is probable that also Chinese 
semiconductor design firms will follow the suit.
Another factor that could support the large-
market pull hypothesis is the fact that product 
variety and segmentation are important sources 
of profit. When cultural and local market 
characteristics are taken into account, products 
can be customized and made more usable. The 
Chinese market is culturally and economically 
quite different from the markets in many 
developed Western countries, and it therefore 
makes sense to develop products specifically 
aimed at the Chinese market. This, indeed, is 
an important reason for many multinational 
companies	 to	 locate	 their	 R&D	 centres	 in	
China. Another important factor has been that, 
in practice, market access has often required 
setting	 up	 joint	 ventures	 and	 R&D	 activities	 in	
China. Chinese policymakers have followed 
the model set by Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Korea, and well understood that long-term 
economic development requires that China is 
able to gradually climb the value ladder towards 
increasingly knowledge-intensive production.
8.4.3. Development Policy
As the histories of the Asian economic tigers 
show, and now also the Chinese developments 
confirms, government policy can have a major 
183 See Brown and Linden (2009).
impact in the development of semiconductor 
production capabilities. Investment incentives and 
R&D	subsidies	have	been	 important	 in	all	 these	
countries, and policy-oriented import barriers 
have been important both in Korea and China. In 
the case of Korea, import bans were simply used 
to promote local industry. In the case of China, 
the large domestic market has also allowed 
the Chinese authorities to define technology 
standards that create markets that are relatively 
protected from global competition. Examples 
of such standards include the WAPI wireless 
encryption standard, which was eventually 
retracted after the US government claimed that the 
licensing procedure forced disclosure of sensitive 
information;	 the	 third-generation	 TD-SCDMA	
mobile standard; and the AVS video compression 
standard. To a large extent the promotion of such 
standards is aimed at creating Chinese IPR, to 
limit the license fees for IPR developed outside 
China, and to lower product costs, thus leading 
to increasingly competitive global products.
The Chinese policymakers clearly had played 
a critical role in the industrial development of 
China in the last two decades. The current Five 
Year Plan calls for the development of five IC 
design companies, each worth 3 billion to 3 
billion Yuan, and 10 companies each worth 1 
billion to 3 billion Yuan. Although it is improbable 
that the objectives are met by the end of the 
current Five Year Plan in 2010, it is clear that 
the Chinese government believes that IC design 
is a critical component in the development of 
Chinese competitiveness. The large-market pull 
hypothesis, in the context of strong industrial 
policy, therefore, looks quite viable.
Does	this,	then,	also	mean	that	semiconductor	
IP activities would move to China in the next 
years? The conventional answer has been 
based on labour costs and design capabilities. 
An apparently simple answer can be found by 
looking statistical data on costs and educational 
attainment.
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Since	 the	early	1960s,	 semiconductor	firms	
have offshored their activities to Asia. The driving 
factor has been low labour costs: in 1985 the 
hourly compensation of production workers in 
Hong	Kong	and	Taiwan	were	about	16	percent	of	
US average hourly earnings of production workers 
in electronic components and accessories. In 
Indonesia the hourly compensation was about 4 
percent, and in Malaysia about 10 percent of the 
US earnings.184 This movement of work, however, 
was very strongly focused on labour-intensive 
unskilled tasks. When the first electronics 
establishment were set up in the territory of Hong 
Kong	 in	 1961,	 71.3	 percent	 of	 their	 employees	
were	 female.	 During	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 the	
industry	 in	 Hong	 Kong	 during	 the	 1960s,	 the	
share of female workers rose up to 83 percent. 
Even today, most of the offshoring activities of 
international semiconductor firms concentrate on 
packaging, assembly and testing.
In 2004, the average annual salaries for 
electronics engineers in China were roughly one 
fourth of those in the US.185 Part of this difference 
can probably be explained by the fact that 
Chinese engineers were less experienced and 
less productive than their US colleagues. As the 
salaries of highly educated workers have increased 
in China, the importance of labour costs is 
decreasing. Although labour costs obviously have 
an impact on competitiveness in semiconductor 
design as the case of India shows, it is also clear 
that other factors are often more important.
A more useful analysis needs to be based on 
a model of competence development. Advanced 
design competence is typically gained by working 
with advanced design tools and experienced 
senior designers for highly-demanding customers. 
A critical question, therefore, is whether there are 
competence development paths that allow new 
designers to gain high-level competences.
184 Henderson (1989, 54).
185 Brown and Linden (2009) Ch. 8.
8.4.4. Competence and Innovation System
In principle, the entry barriers in the 
independent IP vendor business are the same 
in China as in the other parts of the world. The 
practical importance of these barriers, however, is 
different. For example, typically the license costs 
for	 high-quality	 EDA	 tools	 cost	 several	 hundred	
thousand dollars per seat, which means that only 
a small fraction of the average work hour costs 
are labour costs. The actual fraction is, however, 
difficult to estimate. As many small Chinese 
IC design enterprises have been claimed to be 
engaged in various forms of reverse engineering, it 
is	possible	the	also	EDA	software	is	available	at	low	
cost.	In	any	case,	the	access	to	advanced	EDA	tools	
will be a critical factor in the future development 
of semiconductor IP industry in China.
Informal competence development routes 
can also have an important role in generating the 
required skills. For example, reverse engineering 
is a relatively demanding technical activity that 
can develop advanced skills before they can be 
acquired through formal education and training.
An important source for competitive 
advantages for the current IP leaders has been 
their capability to develop vibrant ecosystems that 
consist of hundreds of firms with complementary 
products and services. Such ecosystems are 
difficult to create from scratch and they are also 
very difficult to copy. The central firms in such 
ecosystems, therefore, tend to have sustainable 
competitive advantage.
As technical advances have been very rapid 
in semiconductor technology, it is possible that 
technology, in itself, can not create sustainable 
competitive advantages in the semiconductor IP 
industry. Rapid technical obsolescence means 
that, in theory, new entrants could relatively 
easily introduce new products that have better 
performance characteristics than the current ones. 
IP components are, however, by definition, system 
components. In practice, the competitiveness of 
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an IP product depends on interrelated products 
and services that cannot easily be produced by 
any single actor. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, the customers are also part of this 
ecosystem, with heavy investments in compatible 
tools and skills. Competition, therefore, occurs in 
two qualitatively different domains: inside a given 
ecosystem, among firms that provide competing 
products and services, and between ecosystems. 
In both cases, the dominant ecosystem actors 
are relatively well protected from competition. 
As Warren East, the CEO of ARM, noted in a 
recent interview, such an ecosystem can provide 
a complete solution for customers, thus creating 
entry barriers for competitors.186
The future of Chinese IP business, therefore, 
depends on the ability of Chinese enterprises 
to participate in the current and emerging IP 
ecosystems. Two interesting possibilities arise 
here: one related to the Chinese innovation model 
and, another, related to the end of scaling.
As organization researchers have pointed 
out, the Chinese way of doing business does 
not fit very well the conventional economic 
model of markets. Instead of utility-maximizing 
transactions, business transactions in China are 
often based on long-term collaboration and trust. 
For example, the competitiveness of Chinese 
electronics manufacturers is not so much based 
on low cost as it is based on the continuous 
improvement capabilities of Chinese value 
creation networks. Hagel and Brown, in fact, 
argue that process networks, such as the one 
orchestrated	by	the	Hong	Kong	-based	Li	&	Fung,	
represent a new type of global ecosystem where 
development is coordinated across participants.187 
Li	&	Fung	works	closely	with	a	network	of	some	
7,500 partner firms. Hagel and Brown contrast 
this model with traditional business ecosystems 
that evolved around specific geographic 
locations such as the Silicon Valley. The key 
186 Shelton (2008).
187 Hagel and Brown (2005).
difference, according to Hagel and Brown, is that 
local business ecosystems focus on advancing 
specialized practices, whereas process networks 
focus on organizing the activities across extended 
business processes.
As Hagel and Brown point out, open 
process networks can combine effective learning 
and competence development with efficient 
production. Potentially, they combine the rapid 
distributed competence development model that 
characterizes successful open source software 
projects with a flexible delivery-focused project 
model that resembles, for example, high-
performance interdisciplinary movie production 
teams. Open process networks, therefore, could 
potentially overwhelm traditional organizational 
forms in domains where innovation and capability 
development are key sources of competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, as Castells has noted,188 
the East Asian network-based business systems 
can also be inherently advantageous when 
the sociotechnical logic of the informational 
production paradigm –in other words the 
network society– converges with the cultural 
and institutional structures in Asia. As Chinese 
enterprises are culturally and historically inclined 
to form networks, and as many key electronics 
OEMs are now Chinese, loosely coupled and 
centrally orchestrated process networks could 
well emerge in the semiconductor industry, 
allowing Chinese IP vendors to participate in 
rapid competence development and state-of-the-
art innovation processes.
8.4.5. Technical Disruption
The concept of ecosystem is, however, also 
associated with the concept of extinction. Part 
of the stability of ecosystems results from their 
conservative character. Almost by definition, 
ecosystems evolve gradually and do not sustain 
revolutions. For example, the success of ARM 
Connected Community is to an important 
188	 Castells	(1996,	173)	.
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extent based on the fact that the ARM processor 
architecture is based on a widely used reduced 
instruction set computing (RISC) model. This 
model is well understood by software programmers 
and computer scientists. In fact, the two largest 
IP vendors, ARM and MIPS, base their products 
on RISC architectures originally developed in 
the early 1980s in the parallel research projects 
in UC Berkeley and Stanford. Could China, for 
example, develop a radically different ecosystem 
or orchestrate an efficient process network based 
on future computing paradigms?
As noted, the end of semiconductor scaling 
creates interesting opportunities for future IP 
architectures. In theory, China could leapfrog to 
new computing paradigms, and establish global 
leadership in the future IP ecosystems. Although, 
for example, many small European IP vendors and 
semiconductor design firms develop advanced 
computational architectures,189 it is very difficult 
to integrate such new computing paradigms 
within the prevailing mainstream ecosystems. 
In general, disruptive technologies are best 
developed in green-field operations.190 Potentially, 
China could represent such a “green-field” with 
relatively little sunken investment and prevailing 
interests in present generation architectures.
As the end of scaling approaches, the 
speed of progress in the bleeding-edge slows 
down. The process of catching up the state-
of-the-art, therefore also becomes easier and 
there is more time for newcomers to learn 
tools and technologies required to design chips 
in advanced technologies. As the bleeding-
edge becomes increasingly expensive, only 
few product categories benefit from the most 
advanced technology, and the majority of designs 
will be done in older technologies. This means 
189 These include various parallel reconfigurable dataflow 
models for multimedia processing, analog neural 
hardware, and, for example, self-organizing and 
transport triggered architectures.
190 See, for example, (Rosenbloom and Christensen 1994; 
Christensen 1997; Anderson and Tushman 1990; 
Utterback 1994).
that Chinese designers, who now tend to be two 
or more generations behind the leading edge, 
can happily stay one or two generations behind 
the leading edge. That’s where most of the money 
will be made, anyhow.
Open source software and open source 
hardware will also potentially transform Chinese 
capabilities in semiconductor IP. The future 
semiconductor design market would look quite 
different	 if	 high-quality	 EDA	 tools	 are	 available	
in	open	source.	The	high	cost	of	proprietary	EDA	
tools, combined with high cost of fabricating 
custom-designed chips, means that only a 
relatively small number of new designs are 
implemented every year. The situation would not 
immediately change if low-cost or open source 
EDA	tools	were	available.	If,	however,	new	designs	
could be implemented using low-cost hardware, 
low	 cost	 EDA	 tools	 would	 potentially	 generate	
a large variety of new designs. Today, FPGA 
chips are widely used to produce such low-cost 
hardware implementations. As the developments 
in CMOS technology slow down, older-generation 
technologies start to have longer life-times 
and their maturation leads to rapidly declining 
production costs. New designs, therefore, can 
be implemented for many applications that have 
not been economically justifiable before. In this 
process,	 improved	 access	 to	 sophisticated	 EDA	
tools will be an important factor in lowering 
entry barriers. China would benefit from such 
developments perhaps more than other regions.
Similarly, access to current leading-edge 
designs is an important source of learning and 
competence development. Access barriers have 
been reduced, for example, by low-cost licenses to 
universities and also by open source licensing. For 
example, advanced RISC microprocessor designs 
are available today through the OpenCores.org, 
and Sun Microsystems is currently releasing 
its processor designs through the OpenSPARC.
net initiative. Also commercial IP vendors have 
lowered entry barriers in China. For example, 
in	 2006	 ARC	 International	 waived	 its	 up-front	
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license fees from Chinese fabless firms for designs 
that are intended for the Chinese market.
In general, design capability is generated 
by a combination of human, technical, and 
organizational ingredients. Human capabilities 
are not something that reside inside humans; 
instead they are expressed using technical tools 
that embed accumulated knowledge, and they 
are implemented by relying on socially and 
materially distributed knowledge that is mobilized 
for	 design	 tasks.	Designs,	 therefore,	 are	 created	
in complex socio-technical systems, where 
human knowledge and skill is used in a context 
of technical tools, and where the results are 
materialized through social and organizational 
networks. In the modern connected world, skills 
and competences are relatively easily acquired if 
the learner has basic conceptual and theoretical 
knowledge on which practical competences can 
be built. In this regard, China is well positioned 
due to its strong emphasis on general education. 
The rapidly grown importance of electronics 
production in China creates many opportunities 
to use advanced knowledge in computing and 
semiconductors inside China. There is, therefore, 
both potential supply and demand of design 
capabilities in China.
If the entry barriers for semiconductor design 
are lowered, there is a possibility of a relatively 
rapid growth of design activities in China. An 
important condition, however, is that the end 
demand does not get saturated. The present global 
IP market shows some signs of saturation, with a 
small number of dominant firms in the different 
segments of the industry. The overall industry 
dynamic, at the end of semiconductor scaling, 
suggests, however, that the future competition 
may be based on product variety and the opening 
up of new innovation segments. If there are no 
obvious dominant designs, and the long tail of the 
semiconductor market creates new application 
areas for design knowledge, the semiconductor 
design market may experience a phase where 
saturation is not a problem, and where a large 
number of alternative product concepts and 
variations co-exist.
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in the semiconductor industry suggests that 
also these invisible pools of semiconductor IP 
can relatively rapidly enter the marketplace. 
This, in itself, could transform the traditional 
business logic that underlies the production and 
development of ICTs.
At the same time, the geographic relocation 
of the industry continues and new regional 
hubs emerge. Since the 1970s, Asia has rapidly 
transformed itself from a developing region into 
a connected network of leading industrial actors, 
and the semiconductor industry has played a 
critical role in this transformation. In a couple 
of years, China has emerged as the largest 
consumer of semiconductors worldwide, and a 
major location for semiconductor production. 
Europe’s future role depends on its capacity 
to create and grow firms in this knowledge- 
and research-intensive industry. Although the 
actual manufacture of integrated circuits is now 
dominated by the US-based Intel and a small 
number of Asian firms, Europe has a relatively 
strong presence in the integrated circuit design 
segment, and it hosts several leading IP firms.
This, in short, is probably the most exciting 
time in the history of semiconductors. It is also 
very exciting for policymakers who try to make 
sense of semiconductors’ future potential.
In reality, many of the major semiconductor 
firms are international networks. Traditional 
regional policies have difficulties in interfacing 
with such actors, and industry statistics 
often provide data that do not well describe 
developments that would be relevant for 
policymakers. In the semiconductor IP business, 
these problems are somewhat mitigated by the 
fact that many of the firms are small and located 
in geographically well-defined places. Yet, even 
The semiconductor industry is rapidly 
approaching its most radical technology 
discontinuity, the end of scaling. Many 
business models that rely on rapid continuous 
improvements and price declines in 
semiconductor technology may fail. Such business 
models underlie, for example, many of the fastest 
growing social networking sites on the Internet. 
This fundamental technical disruption will create 
interesting new opportunities for new business 
models, new technologies, and processing 
architectures. As the technical performance of 
present-day integrated circuit technologies often 
surpasses user requirements, and as the creation 
of bleeding edge chips now cost over € 50 
million, a new focus on low-cost processing and 
configurability is potentially emerging. Instead 
of chasing the moving boundary of the ultimate 
physical limits, designers and their customers will 
ask what is the most reliable and usable solution 
for a given problem, and what is the optimal and 
not necessarily most sophisticated technology 
that can easily address the requirements. As low-
cost hardware architectures and implementation 
platforms become widely available, a new user-
centric mode of technology development can 
rapidly expand the uses and applications of 
reusable semiconductor IP components.
Almost all future electronic products rely 
on embedded and interconnected digital and 
analog designs. An increasing number of these 
designs are composed from pre-designed virtual 
components, also known as intellectual property 
blocks or IP cores. In practice, it is impossible to 
create complex integrated circuits without such 
IP cores, and state-of-the-art chips often include 
several dozens of them. Although a large majority 
of IP creation activities still occur internally within 
large firms and are thus invisible in industry 
statistics, the history of vertical disintegration 
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because they participate in globally distributed 
knowledge networks.
As the present study shows, future regional 
development policies could well be based on 
creating conditions that facilitate rapid growth 
in selected hot-spots of large global ecosystems. 
Policy, therefore, necessarily has to address factors 
that structure growth dynamics and accelerate 
innovation, experimentation and absorption of 
globally generated knowledge. For an individual 
firm, the key question is which ecosystems it 
wants to participate and how can it establish 
itself as a key node in the global network. For 
policymakers, the question is how the society 
builds capabilities and processes that allow 
industrial actors to recognise and appropriate 
emerging opportunities. This approach puts 
regional development in a global context and 
aims to accelerate development in potentially 
fast-growing niches in a broader ecosystem. 
Although small niches may represent relatively 
minor generators of value added in today’s 
economic accounts, they also represent areas of 
key future competences and domains of above-
average economic growth.
New policy approaches are being developed 
on all continents, and policy can make a 
difference. The leading industrialised countries in 
South East Asia became success stories because of 
their effective and sustained policy interventions. 
Now they are focusing their policies on the 
next generation semiconductor-based system 
technologies, building complete ecosystems that 
translate and integrate designs into final products. 
China is still climbing the knowledge-value 
ladder. The disruptive change generated by the 
end of semiconductor scaling could well provide 
a fertile ground for new computing paradigms, 
and China might well leapfrog into future.
This leaves us with the question: What could 
Europe do?
9.1. Four Key Trends
According to the present study, several 
new key trends will shape the future of 
integrated circuits and semiconductor IP. First, 
as we approach the end of scaling, it becomes 
increasingly expensive to waste transistors on 
a chip. This means that there will be increasing 
demand for chip designs that are optimised for 
the problem at hand. Furthermore this means that 
there will be increasing demand for configurable 
and reconfigurable hardware architectures. 
Traditionally, configurability has been achieved 
by writing application-specific software that runs 
on general purpose processors. In the future, 
software will increasingly be used to configure 
and define hardware. An important side effect 
is that, when processing architectures can be 
optimally configured for the problem at hand, 
also mature low-cost manufacturing technologies 
can be used to create high-performance chips.
Second, it is increasingly impossible to 
build advanced chips without pre-designed 
and pre-tested sub-components. Chip design 
is increasingly about mixing, matching and 
modifying existing IP cores. The level of design 
abstraction is therefore now rising from bits to 
behaviour. Yet, the lack of sophisticated system 
development tools and standardised component 
interfaces currently slows down this move to 
system-level design.
Third, the dynamics and mindsets in the 
semiconductor industry are changing. For the 
last four decades, both the IC industry and the 
broader ICT industry have been driven by the 
assumption that the cost of computing and 
communication declines rapidly. In the future, 
this assumption does not work anymore. New 
sources of innovation become important for value 
creation, and new actors become networked in 
the technology and product creation process.
Fourth, semiconductor user industries are 
also increasingly being driven by new open and 
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distributed innovation models. As information 
processing products become embedded in our 
material environment and bundled with services 
over the product life-time, processing components 
need to be reconfigurable. When the underlying 
hardware architectures become reconfigurable, 
user-centric innovation modes become possible 
also in semiconductor hardware. This opens up 
new growth paths for future ICTs.
9.2. Policy Alternatives
One way to realise the growth potential in 
semiconductor design is to lower barriers for new 
entrants. Figure 41 lists some key entry barriers 
where policy could make a difference. We discuss 
examples of these below.
9.2.1. Competence Development
For new entrants, participation in the design 
ecosystem requires skills and competences that 
are relatively scarce. As the cost of advanced 
designs is measured in millions of dollars, 
competence development opportunities are rare, 
and now increasingly focus on FPGA designs. 
Although formal education can produce some 
of the required skills, the declining number of 
new design projects and the resulting decline 
in the demand for skilled designers makes skill 
acquisition in this domain relatively unattractive 
for potential designers. There are few possibilities 
to play around and experiment with designs and 
their modifications, resulting in slow competence 
development and reduced innovation capacity in 
the domain. A capability-oriented policy could 
aim to create new opportunities to experiment 
and explore technologies and tools that support 
competence development. This could turn the 
industry to a new growth path. Two examples are 
given below.
Important informal learning processes occur 
in communities of practice, where novices can 
both observe more skilled actors and participate 
with the support of peers. Open source software 
communities are prime examples of such open 
Figure 41: Dynamics of the IP design ecosystem
  164 
material environment and bundled with services over the product life-time, processing components 
need to be reconfigurable. When the underlying hardware architectures become reconfigurable, 
user-centric innovation modes become possible also in semiconductor hardware. This opens up new 
growth paths for future ICTs. 
9.2. Policy Alternatives 
One way to realise the growth potential in semiconductor design is to lower barriers for new 
entrants. Figure 42 lists some key entry barriers where policy could make a difference. We discuss 
examples of these below. 
Demand
Design
Ecosystem
Entry Exit
ƔCompetence
ƔTool access
ƔConcept realization capability
ƔEcosystem openness
ƔProfitability
ƔResource availability
ƔDesign advantage
ƔLatent demand
ƔDemand variability
ƔSubstitutes
ƔEndogenous growth
Source: Meaning Processing
9.2.1. Competence Development 
For new entrants, participation in the design ecosystem requires skills and competences that are 
relatively scarce.  As the cost of advanced designs is measured in millions of dollars, competence 
development opportunities are rare, and now increasingly focus on FPGA designs. Although formal 
Source: Meaning Processing.
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development of open innovation ecosystems can 
therefore be important tools to facilitate both entry 
and the endogenous growth of the system. Open 
ecosystem policies need to address openness on 
technical, social, and cognitive levels. Today, we 
do not have sufficiently well-developed models 
for ecosystem evolution. Improved models could 
therefore be useful for policy support.
As the history of computing shows, advanced 
capabilities and skills are often created outside the 
formal educational system. The microcomputer 
revolution was to a large extent created by hobbyists, 
and many video, audio and general purpose 
processor IP firms have their roots in hobbyist 
computer game and demo programming. Policies 
that pave the way for enthusiastic experimenters 
and hobbyists could potentially be highly influential 
in generating new skilled designers and new 
innovative applications of technology. Industry-
focused policies could therefore be complemented 
by competence development policies aimed at non-
commercial actors.
9.2.2. Expanded Access to Design Tools
In ICT, the economics of software and 
hardware are different partly because the creation 
of commercially interesting hardware has required 
considerable investment and access to leading 
edge technologies and tools. It is possible to 
write a demonstration version of a new software 
system at a very low cost, whereas new hardware 
often requires several million dollars as front-end 
investment. The entry cost is high partly because 
state-of-the-art	Electronic	Design	Automation	(EDA)	
tools are expensive. Although the leading design 
tool vendors license their tools to educational 
institutions at a small fraction of the cost of their 
commercial licences –typically measured in 
hundreds of thousands of dollars– the use of these 
tools really makes sense only when the designs 
are actually implemented. Access to educational 
licences also requires enrolment in university 
courses where the tools are used.
One may compare the situation with software 
development, where compilers and other tools 
are widely available at low and no cost. Although 
the complexity of hardware design software is not 
fundamentally greater than, for example, modern 
program	compilers	or	operating	systems,	the	EDA	
market is now structured around a small number of 
customers. This market structure originates in the 
era	where	the	current	EDA	vendors	were	spun	off	
from major integrated device manufacturers, and 
it is supported by the fact that the implementation 
of designs requires heavy front-end investments 
and large customers. Broad access to design tools 
would facilitate both competence development 
and innovation. Components of the design 
tool chain could be developed, for example, 
in EU research projects that build open tool 
infrastructure for future processing architectures. 
Open source tool chains and design platforms 
could warrant policy support, research, and 
development. Policymakers could also benefit 
from a study that highlights the characteristics of 
alternative business models that can be built on 
open design tool infrastructures.
9.2.3. Low-Cost Design Realisation Capabilities
One way to address the entry challenge 
would be to create low-cost implementation 
paths that rely on, for example, mature chip 
manufacture technologies and new design and 
implementation approaches that make these older 
technologies useful. Figuratively, this approach 
would amount to “rising the tail of the long tail.” 
Although the most advanced and complex designs 
will also require leading-edge chip technologies 
in the future, the height of the first entry step is 
the critical factor for new entrants. When new 
designs can be realised at low cost, many new 
designs become viable.
Low-cost realisation paths could be created 
also by sharing chip manufacturing costs and by 
using new realisation technologies. This approach 
is now becoming popular in several Asian 
countries.	 For	 example,	 Hong	 Kong	 Science	 &	
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Technology Parks (HKSTP) recently signed a 
collaboration agreement with the Japanese 
e-Shuttle to provide silicon shuttle services 
for start-up integrated circuit design houses in 
Asia. e-Shuttle, a subsidiary of Fujitsu, provides 
electron beam direct writing technology at low 
cost to small and medium-sized firms. HKSTP, 
in turn, will provide development support 
and remote access to design tools. European 
policymakers could benefit from a study that 
evaluates alternatives for setting similar facilities 
for European designers.
The high manufacturing costs can also be 
avoided by using configurable chips that provide 
flexible platforms for designs. FPGAs are now 
widely used for this purpose; new approaches, 
such as software defined silicon and general 
purpose reconfigurable architectures, could 
also open the design space for new innovations. 
At some point, radical new implementation 
technologies, such as printed electronics, could 
become viable solutions in some domains. A 
future-oriented study on alternative low-cost 
implementation technologies could support 
policymaking in this area.
System-level design tools that explicitly 
address reusability and provide open interfaces 
are also important in enabling modular IP 
development and low-cost integration. Industry 
efforts, such as the US-based Open Core Protocol 
International Partnership (OCP-IP), exist in this 
domain. These efforts could be complemented by 
broader initiatives that, for example, consider the 
impact of the end of scaling and new processing 
architectures. This could be supported on research 
that focuses on future system-level design tool 
architectures and interfaces.
9.2.4. New Design Advantages
The end of scaling will create a demand 
for new processing architectures. Almost by 
definition, the new architectures implement new 
disruptive paradigms. They therefore tend to be 
peripheral in the current academic and industrial 
context. The potential importance of such new 
paradigms suggests that search and development 
of new computational paradigms and their 
physical implementations could be strongly 
supported.
It is important to realise that many current 
processing architectures are built using 
abstractions that are difficult or impossible to 
link with the physical world. This is becoming 
increasingly visible as processing is embedded 
in almost all products and environments. 
For several decades, the continuing success 
of semiconductor scaling and the resulting 
improvements in processing power have made 
it unattractive to rethink conventional processing 
architectures. In the future, new computational 
models that, for example, combine analogue 
and digital processing and build on various 
reconfigurable data flow architectures, could 
become increasingly important. A systematic 
mapping of existing and emerging computational 
paradigms would help policymakers in locating 
research gaps and opportunities.
9.2.5. Characterisation of Latent Demand and 
Supply Through Roadmap Activities
Although, for example, the EU ARTEMIS Joint 
Technology Initiative could provide opportunities 
for developing the European semiconductor IP 
architectures, it is important to note that a large 
majority of the current IP vendors are very small. 
Their interests are not necessarily highly visible in 
policy initiatives that are driven by the interests 
of major industrial actors. The small size of 
many existing IP vendors and new entrants also 
makes it difficult for them to join the EU research 
programmes. It could, therefore, be useful to 
create a relatively strongly policy-oriented 
platform where small IP firms could engage with 
low effort and good cost-benefit ratio in defining 
road maps for the industry that is approaching a 
major disruption. For example, the current study 
could be used as a starting point for a project that 
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and design enterprises, resulting in a bottom-
up road map and scenarios for the future of IP 
architectures, interoperability standards and 
design tool development.
9.2.6. Intellectual Property Legislation
Although intellectual property rights 
legislation and enforcement are obviously an 
issue in the semiconductor IP industry, the present 
study has mainly skipped the topic. For example, 
it is estimated that a large fraction of the small 
Chinese semiconductor design firms are engaged 
in various forms of reverse engineering and some 
observers	claim	that	up	to	two-thirds	of	EDA	tools	
in China are illegal copies. The semiconductor 
design industry, as well as major integrated device 
manufactures are, therefore, actively addressing 
technical, cultural and political challenges that 
would reduce the production of counterfeit 
integrated circuits and unlicensed copying.
It is important to note that stronger IPR 
legislation and increased control of rights 
holders in the IP industry do not necessarily or 
automatically lead to a stronger semiconductor 
IP industry. Vendors with different business 
models have different requirements for IPR 
legislation and its enforcement. As the question 
of the optimal IPR regimes greatly exceeds the 
scope of semiconductor IP, we simply noted 
above that the linkages between innovation and 
IPR are complex, actively debated, and not well 
understood today. As the IPR structure greatly 
influences innovation dynamics and ecosystem 
development, a specific study on the impact of 
IPR in semiconductor IP ecosystems would be 
useful for future policymaking.
9.2.7. Ecosystem Openness and New Innovation 
Models
A potentially important research question that 
emerged during the present study is the viability 
of open source hardware projects. There are now 
many hardware IP architectures available in open 
source form and, for example, Sun Microsystems 
is currently releasing its advanced SPARC 
processor designs as open source. The availability 
of high-quality architectures in open source 
could change the current IP vendor landscape. 
More importantly, if the distributed collaborative 
open source innovation model would work in 
the integrated circuit hardware domain, the 
historical growth dynamics in hardware design 
could change considerably. Until today, this 
possibility has not been explored except briefly 
during the present study. It appears that –although 
the open source software development model 
often seems to fail in hardware domains– with 
suitable modifications and support processes 
open innovation models could also become 
effective in IP architecture development. A 
better understanding of these conditions could 
support faster growth of ecosystems that develop 
semiconductor IP processing architectures, and 
lead to new policy instruments.
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e11. Appendix: The IC Design Process
To understand the value creation alternatives 
in the semiconductor IP business, it is necessary 
to understand the steps that are needed to 
create designs. The activities differ somewhat 
depending on the type of design. For example, 
designs that include analog components, such 
as wireless interfaces and sensors, typically 
require modelling the physical characteristics 
of the component. Purely logic devices, such 
as microprocessors and microcontrollers, 
in contrast, are created in a design process 
that focuses on describing the behavioural 
characteristics of the chip.
Two main design flows exist: one that is 
used to create application specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs) and one that is used with field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
In ASIC design, logic and other electronic 
circuitry is converted from high-level functional 
description to a physical layout that is transferred 
on silicon wafers in a complex process that builds 
and interconnects microscopic components to a 
functional design. Typically, a single wafer is used 
to make a large number of identical chips, or die, 
which are subsequently cut and packaged as an 
integrated circuits.
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), 
in contrast, are fully standardized chips, which, 
however, can be configured after manufacturing. 
The early FPGAs could only be programmed 
once, essentially by burning fuses or by creating 
“short-circuits” on a chip so that a specific 
logic architecture emerged. Modern FPGAs, 
however, are fully programmable and can also be 
reconfigured remotely, for example, through the 
Internet. Modern FPGA chips also often contain 
embedded ASIC blocks for memory and signal 
processing. Currently, the two largest providers of 
FPGA chips are Xilinx and Altera, which together 
share about 80 percent of the FPGA market.
When the first FPGAs were introduced by 
Xilinx in the 1980s, the number of transistors on 
a chip were limited, and only relatively simple 
functions could be implemented using FPGAs. 
The rapid scaling of chip features, however, 
means that today it is possible to download 
several microprocessors and complete digital 
systems onto a FPGA. As FPGAs consist of many 
configurable logic blocks they are also inherently 
parallel in their architecture. FPGAs are, therefore, 
increasingly being used for high-performance 
computing.
IP cores can be, and often are, implemented 
on both technologies. Many IP cores are first 
developed and implemented using a FPGA. If 
the customer product is manufactured in large 
volumes, the design is converted into a custom-
made ASIC.
These main routes to customer-specific chips 
have very different characteristics and trade-
offs. The main difference is that front-end costs 
of ASICs can be very large, measured in tens of 
millions	 of	 USD,	 whereas	 commercial	 FPGA	
chips and development platforms can cost only 
tens of dollars.191 Errors in the ASIC design can 
become extremely expensive, as new mask sets 
may need to be created and the manufacturing 
process often has to be started anew. Moreover, 
design errors that are discovered after the chip is 
manufactured, can lead to a new manufacturing 
cycle that may take several months. Specifically 
in consumer electronics, where time to market is 
191 The up-front costs of leading-edge ASIC are today $40 
or $50 million and a completed device may cost today 
up	to	100	million	USD.
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a critical factor in profitability, such a delay can 
kill a product. According to industry experts, at 
present, over 50 percent of ASIC designs require 
such re-spins. In bleeding-edge ASIC technologies, 
the risk of errors increases.
The main benefit of ASICs is that, after the 
non-recurring costs are paid, the marginal cost 
of producing new copies of the chip are low. 
Custom-developed ASICs can also be optimized 
for the design in question, which can be highly 
important when, for example, chip size and 
power consumption are important.
A traditional ASIC uses a cell-based design, 
where logic gates and other components are 
created by depositing semiconductor substrates 
and metal and isolation layers on top of each 
other. Leading-edge ASICs can have several 
dozens of metal layers. The features on each 
metal layer are defined by an optical mask that 
is used to expose the chip. The processing of 
semiconductor wafers, therefore, may require 
dozens of exposures through different optical 
masks, and sophisticated chemical processing 
that builds the physical features layer by layer. 
Leading edge chip fabrication technologies 
can produce feature sizes that are considerably 
smaller than the wavelength of light used to print 
the layout.
The high entry costs for fully custom-
made ASIC implementations have created an 
alternative ASIC implementation type, which is 
based on standardized chips that can be partially 
configured during manufacturing. These are called 
structured ASICs. Unlike normal ASICs, where all 
chip layers are manufactured according to the 
customer’s specifications, most of the metal layers 
in structured ASICs are fixed, and only a few top 
layers are left open so that customer logic can be 
implemented. The cost of manufacturing the basic 
layers of a structured ASIC chip, therefore, can be 
amortized across all the customers. This leads to 
relatively low non-recurring engineering and mask 
costs. Typically, for a new structured ASIC device 
they	are	about	100,000-200,000	USD.
FPGAs typically cost tens of dollars in small 
volumes, with leading edge products up to several 
hundred dollars. Compared with the non-recurring 
engineering costs of even simple ASICs, which can 
easily be hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more, 
it is not surprising that FPGAs have emerged as the 
main entry platform also for ASIC design. Typically, 
chips and the related software are now developed 
Figure 42: Cost curves for different IC technologies
technologies can produce feature sizes that are considerably smaller than the wavelength of light 
used to print the layout.  
The high entry costs for fully custom-made ASIC implementations have created an alternative ASIC 
implementation type, which is based on standardized chips that can be partially configured during 
manufacturing. These are called structured ASICs. Unlike normal ASICs, where all chip layers are 
manufactured according to the customer's specifications, most of the metal layers in structured 
ASICs are fixed, and only a few top layers are left open so that customer logic can be implemented. 
The cost of manufacturing the basic layers of a structured ASIC chip, therefore, can be amortized 
across all the customers. This leads to relatively low non-recurring engineering and mask costs. 
Typically, for a new structured ASIC device they are about 100,000-200,000 USD. 
FPGAs typically cost tens of dollars in small volumes, with leading edge products up to several 
hundred dollars. Compared with the non-recurring engineering costs of even simple ASICs, which 
can easily be hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more, it is not surprising that FPGAs have 
emerged as the main entry platform also for ASIC design. Typically, chips and the related software 
are now developed using FPGA development boards. Products are also often launched using FPGA, 
which can easily be reprogrammed if bugs are found or if new features are introduced. Only when 
the product volumes get high, the chip is converted from FPGA to an ASIC chip. The typical cost 
curves in relation to manufacturing volume are shown in Figure 43. 
The leading FPGA 
vendor Xilinx introduced 
in 2005 a new low-cost 
alternative for ASICs. It 
is based on customer 
tailored FPGAs. The idea 
is that after the customer 
has developed a chip 
using a standard FPGA, 
the design can be cost-
efficiently manufactured 
Figure 43: Cost curves for different IC technologies. 
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using FPGA development boards. Products are also 
often launched using FPGA, which can easily be 
reprogrammed if bugs are found or if new features 
are introduced. Only when the product volumes 
get high, the chip is converted from FPGA to an 
ASIC chip. The typical cost curves in relation to 
manufacturing volume are shown in Figure 42.
The leading FPGA vendor Xilinx introduced 
in 2005 a new low-cost alternative for ASICs. It is 
based on customer tailored FPGAs. The idea is that 
after the customer has developed a chip using a 
standard FPGA, the design can be cost-efficiently 
manufactured in larger volumes. Most designs 
use only a fraction of the transistors available on a 
FPGA chip. After the design is ready, it is possible 
to manufacture chips where only the required parts 
of the chip are tested. This increases the yield of 
chips and lowers the cost. According to Xilinx, the 
non-recurring and mask costs for such customer 
FPGAs	 can	be	 as	 low	as	 75,000	USD,	 and	 their	
unit costs are lower than for structured ASICs.
One new semiconductor start-up that tries to 
solve the challenge of ASIC entry costs is XMOS, 
based in Bristol, UK. It has developed a processor 
architecture that can be configured by downloading 
new software on the chip. XMOS calls its approach 
Software	 Defined	 Silicon.	 This	 approach	 is	
described in more detail in the box above.
The increasing costs of designing ASICs has 
led to a rapidly decreasing number of ASIC design 
starts. Today, the cost of designing a cell-based 
ASIC	can	be	over	50	million	USD.	Few	firms	can	
afford such costs, and even fewer can afford the 
risk that the investment does not pay back. In the 
last four years there has been a 40 percent decline 
in the design starts for fully customized ASICs.192
192	 Manners,	D.	(2008)	Semiconductor	CEOs	have	strategy	
for Asic decline. Electronics Weekly, 13 May 2008.
XMOS: ASICs without manufacturing
XMOS, founded in 2005 and located in Bristol, UK, is trying to address the ASIC challenge with a new 
approach that it calls Software Defined Silicon (SDS). XMOS makes a processor chip that consist of 
several event-driven processors. The processors can be programmed using the high-level C-programming 
language and processor interconnections can be defined so that the chip architecture can be tailored to 
specific applications. The architecture also allows chips to be connected to a larger parallel  system.
The XMOS SDS chip is based on the parallel Transputer message-passing architecture, originally 
developed in the 1980s. XMOS was co-founded by David May, Professor of Computer Science at 
Bristol University and the architect of the Transputer.
“'What if you could start a semiconductor company with $100,000 again?' asks XMOS CEO James Foster.
‘Our NREs [non-recurring engineering costs] are less than $100,000 and our prototype lead-
time is 30 seconds,’ according to Foster, ‘making $100,000 semiconductor start-ups possible 
again. Anyone who can program in C, who can get their hands on an XMOS development kit 
and an XMOS SDS chip, can bring an IC to market.’ (Manners, D. “XMOS may make standards 
unnecessary.” Electronics Weekly, 15 July 2008).
XMOS is expected to have its chip in production in the last quarter of 2008. It also intends to bring out 
a hobbyist kit and robotics design kit at the beginning of 2009, followed by industrial design kit and 
automotive design kit. The company has stated it targets the $1-$10 price range for its chips.
In June 2008, XMOS won the Intellectual Property and FPGA category of the annual Electron d’or 
awards. The Electron d’or awards recognise those electronic products the editorial team of Electronique 
magazine believes have made the biggest impact in the last 12 months. Runners-up in the IP and 
FPGA category included Actel, Altera and Xilinx.
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11.1. The ASIC Design Flow
The basic design process for modern system-
on-chip ASICs consists of systems design, register 
transfer level design, logic design, functional 
verification, physical design, physical verification, 
and design for manufacturing. A schematic 
representation of the full ASIC production flow is 
shown below, in Figure 43.
In system design, the designer describes the 
chip’s functions using a high-level language. This 
phase leads to a high-level behavioural model of 
the chip.
In register transfer level (RTL) design, the 
flow of data and the transformations that the data 
undergoes when the chip operates are described. 
The description is based on hardware description 
languages	(HDLs).	The	most	widely	used	HDLs	are	
Verilog, based on the C programming language, 
and	 VHDL,	 based	 on	 the	 ADA	 programming	
language. RTL is used to describe how data 
moves between the chip’s “registers” that actually 
store the bits to be processed.
Figure 43: The ASIC production flow
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In system design, the designer describes the chip's functions using a high-level language. This phase 
leads to a high-level behavioural model of the chip. 
In register transfer level (RTL) design, the flow of data and the transformations that the data 
undergoes when the chip operates are described. The description is based on hardware description 
languages (HDLs). The most widely used HDLs are Verilog, based on the C programming 
language, and VHDL, based on the ADA programming language.  RTL is used to describe how data 
moves between the chip's “registers” that actually store the bits to be processed. 
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partly because of these magnetic tapes and partly 
because until 1970’s many chip designs were 
actually manually taped on transparent films.
A physical design also needs to be verified 
in the physical verification phase, as the design 
must comply with the specific requirements of 
the manufacturing process that is used to make 
the chip.
Modern chips also require extensive design 
for manufacturing. The physical design files have 
to converted into a series of photomasks that are 
actually used to generate the physical features 
Functional verification checks the RTL or 
netlist code using automated test benches and 
simulators to verify that the chip behaves as 
intended. As the code for complex chips easily 
contains errors, and as it may be extremely 
expensive to correct such errors after the chip is 
produced, verification is a critical design task. The 
functional verification effort can easily represent 
70 or 80 percent of the total work required to 
design a chip.
In logic design or logic “synthesis,” the RTL 
code is converted into a logical diagram of the 
chip. Logic synthesis generates a data file known 
as “netlist.” The netlist describes the various groups 
of transistors, or gates, which are implemented 
on a chip. This conversion or “compiling” of RTL 
code into a netlist typically uses manufacturing 
process specific “technology libraries” that 
describe the physical implementation of basic 
logic functions. The designer can, for example, 
optimize the compiled code for space or speed, 
generating alternative netlists from the same RTL.
In the physical design phase the designer 
uses “place and route” tools to plan the physical 
location of the transistors and wires connecting 
them. This phase is also known as “physical 
synthesis.” Typically, the designer first locates 
the various functional blocks on the available 
die space, and then determines the locations 
of gates in each block, and then defines the 
wiring. As the blocks can consist of millions of 
transistors, the placement and routing is mainly 
done automatically, although designers can 
intervene in this automated process if they 
consider it necessary. This design phase results in 
data files that describe the physical structures that 
need to be manufacturer to create the transistors 
and interconnections on the chip. This is also 
know as the “layout view” of the chip. The files 
normally	 use	 the	GDS	 II	 binary	data	 format.	As	
these binary files can be very large, they used to 
be written on magnetic tapes that were then sent 
for manufacturing. This traditional end phase of 
the design it therefore also know as “tapeout,” 
Figure 44: VHDL code for a logic OR circuit
Functional verification checks the RTL or etlist 
code using automated test benches and simulators 
to verify that the chip behaves as intended. As the 
code for complex chips easily contains errors, and 
as it may be extremely expensive to correct such 
errors after the chip is produced, verification is a 
critical design task. The functional verification 
effort can easily represent 70 or 80 perc nt of the 
total work required to design a chip. 
In logic design or logic “synthesis,” the RTL code 
is converted into a logical diagra  of the chip. 
Logic synthesis generates a data file known as “netlist.” The netlist describes the various groups of 
trans stors, or gates, wh ch are implemented on a chip. This conversion or “com iling” of RTL code 
into a netlist typically uses manufacturing process specific “technology libraries” that describe the 
physical implementation of basic logic functions. The designer can, for example, optimize the 
compiled code for space or speed, generating alternative netlists from the same RTL. 
entity OR_ent is 
port( x: in std_logic; 
      y: in std_logic; 
      F: out std_logic 
);
end OR_ent;
architecture OR_arch of OR_ent is 
begin
  process(x, y) 
  begin 
      if ((x='0') and (y='0')) then 
          F <= '0'; 
      else 
          F <= '1'; 
      end if; 
  end process; 
end OR_arch; 
Figure 45: VHDL code for a logic OR 
circuit. 
In the physical design phase the designer uses “place and route” tools to plan the physical location 
of the transistors and wires con ecting them. This phase is also known as “physical ynth is.” 
Typically, the designer first locates the various functional blocks on the available die space, and 
then determin s the lo tions of gates in each block, and then efines the wiring. As the blocks can 
consist of millions of transistors, the placement and routing is mainly done automatically, although 
designers can intervene in this automated process if they consider it necessary. This design phase 
results in data files that describe the physical structures that need to be manufacturer to create the 
transistors and interconnections on the chip. This is also know as the “layout view” of the chip. The 
files normally use the GDS II b nary data format. As these binary files can be very large, they used 
to be written on magnetic tapes that were then sent for manufacturing. This traditional end phase of 
the desig  it therefore also know as “tapeout,”  partly because of these magnetic tapes and partly 
because until 1970's many chip designs were actually manually taped on transparent films. 
A physical design also needs to be verified in the physical verification phase, as the design must 
comply with the specific requirements of the manufacturing process that is used to make the chip. 
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Figure 45: Metal layers in a simple logic 
cell; 3D CAD image 
  184 
Modern chips also require extensive design for manufacturing. The 
physical design files have to converted into a series of photomasks that are 
actually used to ge erate the physical features on t e different layers of the 
silicon wafer. As the feature sizes i  leading-edge processes are only tens 
of nanometres, an , for exampl , smal er than the wavelength used to 
expose the waf r, it is not possible to simply copy the imag of the 
physical design to the wafer. Instead,  the image is distorted and enhanced 
in multiple ways so that the distortions that occur in the manufacturing 
process are compensated. 
11.2. The FPGA Design Flow 
The first phases of the FPGA design flow are basically the same as those for ASICs. System design 
is followed by RTL level hardware specification. As the hardware in this case consist of an already 
existing FPGA, the RTL code needs only to be translated so that it can be used to configure the 
FPGA architecture. After the programming of the FPGA, the system functionality needs to be 
verified and tested. 
The design flows for ASICs and FPGAs are schematically compared in Figure 47 below. 
 
Figure 46: Metal layers 
in a simple logic cell; 
3D CAD image. 
138
11
.  
A
pp
en
di
x:
 T
he
 IC
 D
es
ig
n 
Pr
oc
es
s
on the different layers of the silicon wafer. As the 
feature sizes in leading-edge processes are only 
tens of nanometres, and, for example, smaller 
than the wavelength used to expose the wafer, it 
is not possible to simply copy the image of the 
physical design to the wafer. Instead, the image is 
distorted and enhanced in multiple ways so that 
the distortions that occur in the manufacturing 
process are compensated.
Figure 46: Production flows for FPGA and ASIC
  184 
11.2. The FPGA Design Flow
The first phases of the FPGA design flow 
are basically the same as those for ASICs. 
System design is followed by RTL level hardware 
specification. As the hardware in this case 
consist of an already existing FPGA, the RTL 
code needs only to be translated so that it can 
be used to configure the FPGA architecture. 
After the programming of the FPGA, the system 
functionality needs to be verified and tested.
The design flows for ASICs and FPGAs are 
schematically	compared	in	Figure	46.
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Abstract
Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) blocks, also known as IP cores, are reusable design 
components that are used to build advanced integrated circuits (ICs).  It is typically impossible to create 
new IC designs without pre-designed IP blocks as a starting point. These design components are called 
‘intellectual property’ blocks because they are traded as rights to use and copy the design. Firms that focus 
on this business model are often called ‘chipless’ semiconductor firms.
IP cores are perhaps the most knowledge-intensive link in the information economy value chain. They 
define the capabilities of billions of electronic devices produced every year. As all products are becoming 
increasingly intelligent and embedded with information processing and communication capabilities, 
future developments in semiconductor IP will have a profound impact on the future developments in the 
overall knowledge economy and society.
At present, the IC industry is approaching the most fundamental technological disruption in its history. 
The rapid incremental innovation that has led to exponential growth in the number of transistors on a chip 
and expanded the applications of ICT to all areas of human life is about to end.  This discontinuity (the end of 
semiconductor scaling) opens up new business opportunities and shifts the focus of ICT research to new areas.
The main objective of this study is to describe the current state and potential future developments in 
semiconductor IP, and to relate the outcomes of the study to policy-related discussions relevant to the EU 
and its Member States.
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